

“ NUNC IGITUR, NUNC COELO ITERUM VICTRICIA SIGNA
(RES EGIT HIS ARMIS ET BELLATORIBUS ISTIS)
ELFVA, ET ACCELFRA PUGILES ARMARE BRITANNOS.”

●
BAPTISTA MANTUANUS.

ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS,
FROM
MDCCCVI TO MDCCCXIV.

BY THE AUTHOR OF CYRIL THORNTON.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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ANNALS

OF THE

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

ANDALUSIA—ARRAGON—CATALONIA.

THOSE disposed to attribute to the imbecility CHAP. I.
of the government, the successive disasters 1810.
which had befallen the Spanish armies, naturally looked forward with anxiety to the Convention of the Cortes. By decree of the Supreme Junta, before quitting Seville, that representative body was directed to assemble in the Isla de Leon, and a code of instructions was promulgated, directing the mode and principles of election. All cities which had

CHAP. I. sent representatives to the last assembly were to
1810. retain their privilege. The provincial Juntas were each empowered to elect a member, and the population of the provinces was to be represented by delegates, in the proportion of one to every fifty thousand inhabitants. Besides these, sixty-eight supplementary deputies were to be chosen in the different provinces as a representative *corps de reserve*, from which all vacancies by death or otherwise were to be filled up. Nobles, plebeians, and secular priests, were declared equally within the pale of election; and the only qualifications demanded were, that the person chosen should have attained the age of twenty-five years, and should hold no pension or office of emolument under government.

A temporary arrangement was made with regard to the representation of the American Colonies. It was agreed that twenty-six members should be added for that portion of the monarchy, including the Columbian and Philippine islands; and, in order to obviate delay, it was arranged that these should, in the first instance, be chosen from the natives of those dependencies then resident in Spain. It was the intention of the Supreme Junta to have balanced

the influence of this popular assembly, by another composed of the grandees, and dignitaries of the church, but this part of the project was not carried into effect.

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Many difficulties occurred in the election of members; nor was it till the twenty-fourth September that the meeting, so anxiously expected, took place. At nine in the morning of that day the deputies assembled at the Constitutional Hall in Cadiz, and walked in solemn procession to the Cathedral, where high mass was performed by the Cardinal Archbishop de Bourbon. The oath was then administered; and, after a discourse from the Bishop of Orense, the assembly at once entered on its high functions.

Sep. 24.

One of the first acts of the Cortes was a decree declaratory of their own character and privileges, and of the indefeasible rights of Ferdinand to the throne of Spain. They pronounced the invalidity of any cession of the crown in favour of the French Emperor, and ordained that no member of the Cortes should accept of pension, honour, or reward from the Executive.

In the proceedings of this assembly, a disposition was speedily evinced to engage in matters of abstract and speculative legislation, little ap-

CHAP. I. Towards the end of October a change took
 1810. place in the council of Regency. The Cortes displaced them, alleging as a cause, the repeated solicitations they had made to be relieved from office. Their successors were Blake, at that time commanding in Murcia; Don Pedro Agar, a naval officer; and Don Gabriel Cisgar, governor of Carthagená. Neither Blake nor Cisgar were then present; and the Marques del Palacio and Don Joseph Maria Puig were selected, *ad interim*, for the vicarious exercise of their functions. At the ceremony of installation, Palacio ventured to express some scruples with regard to the inaugural oath, which he deemed inconsistent with the perfect allegiance due to Ferdinand and the Seventh. The Cortes then declared him to have forfeited the confidence of the nation, and appointed the Marques de Castellar to fill his place in the Regency.

Till the close of the year, few discussions of importance took place. A project for regulating the representation of the colonies was passed into a law. It was unanimously voted that a public monument should be erected to the British monarch, as a testimony of the national gratitude; and it was proclaimed that the Span-

ish people would never lay down their arms while a Frenchman remained within the Pyrenees, nor till they had secured the independence and absolute integrity of the monarchy in both hemispheres.

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1810.

While such occurrences were passing within the walls of Cadiz, the city was still leaguered by the French army. Early in October, Marshal Soult received intelligence that an expedition was preparing to alarm the coast near Malaga; and orders were sent to Sebastiani directing him to be in readiness to repulse the meditated attack. On the twelfth, a corps of nearly four thousand British and Spanish troops, under Major-General Lord Blayney, sailed from Cadiz, and on the fourteenth landed to the westward of Frangirola, about four leagues from Malaga. The object of this expedition was to gain possession of the fort, which was occupied only by a small detachment. Had Lord Blayney succeeded in this object, he was then to have garrisoned the fort, and have re-embarked the remainder of his troops, in order to induce Sebastiani to attempt its re-capture. The expedition was subsequently to have been joined by a re-

Oct. 12.

CHAP. I. inforcement from Gibraltar, with the view of
1810. carrying Malaga by a *coup-de-main*.

This project, in many respects faulty, experienced a complete failure. Had Lord Blayney succeeded in gaining possession of the fort, the distance from Malaga to Frangirola was too small to have enabled him to accomplish the main object of the expedition. As it was, the troops were disembarked about three leagues to the westward of Frangirola, and were delayed many hours on their march by the badness of the roads. The Governor of the fort perceiving that the assailants were unprovided with the means of taking it by storm, declined all parley, and Lord Blayney did not deem it advisable to attempt an escalade. During the night some guns from the ships were placed in battery, but there was no time for a siege. On the following morning, Sebastiani, at the head of a superior force, came up, and at the moment of his appearance the garrison made a sortie. The result was, that Lord Blayney, and a great part of his force, were made prisoners, and the remainder with difficulty effected a retreat to their ships. The wonder is, that Lord Blayney, having failed in his object of carrying the castle,

should, instead of re-embarking his troops in the night of the fourteenth, have thought it advisable to await the arrival of Sebástiani.

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In Murcia, and on the frontiers of Granada, several partial encounters took place between the French army and that of Blake. While the Spaniards were content to engage the enemy in a warfare of partisans, their efforts were frequently successful; but whenever they attempted to assume a fixed position, defeat followed their imprudence. In the centre and north of Spain the system of Guerilla warfare was steadily pursued. The *Empecinado* in Castille, and Mina in Arragon and Navarre, were indefatigable in seizing every opening for successful attack, and occasioned continual annoyance to the enemy. The hostility thus waged, was, on both sides, marked by features of the most barbarous atrocity. No quarter was given or expected by either party; and the waste of human life in the constant succession of desultory conflicts, was perhaps greater than would have resulted from the systematic operations of regular armies.

Porlier was busy in the Asturias and Galicia. An expedition of five British frigates, and about

CHAP. I. five hundred Spaniards under that leader, sailed
 1810. from Corunna, with the view of attacking the
 French defences on the coast, and was completely successful. Nearly the whole of the
 Jul. 9. enemy's batteries, from St. Sebastian to St. Andero, mounting upwards of an hundred pieces of heavy cannon, were taken and destroyed without loss on the part of the assailants; and the port of Santona was completely dismantled.

A subsequent expedition, however, was less
 October. fortunate in result. A squadron of three British frigates, accompanied by one Spanish frigate, several brigs and gun-boats; and above thirty sail of transports, with a considerable body of Spanish troops, under the distinguished partisan Renovales, sailed from Corunna, to occupy and fortify the town of Santona. The squadron had reached its destination when a storm came on, which drove the vessels from their anchorage in the roadstead, and, increasing in fury, the Spanish frigate, an English brig, and five Spanish gun-boats, were wrecked on the coast. Many of the transports were driven ashore; others were compelled to seek refuge in ports occupied by the enemy; and upwards of one thousand men were thus lost. The English frigates suc-

ceeded with difficulty in weathering the tempest. CHAP. I.
—The operations in Catalonia were generally

1810.
unconnected with those in the other provinces of the Peninsula. In a mountainous country, containing fortresses of great strength, which it was necessary to garrison and maintain, amid a fierce and hostile population, the establishment of large magazines was indispensable to the success of the invaders. The British flag was seen everywhere on the coast, and supplies could only be procured by means of land convoys, at best slow, precarious, and insufficient. Thus was the French army in Catalonia narrowed, cramped, and hampered in all its movements; and its operations were necessarily confined within a narrow circle, which the activity of the native troops was contributing still further to circumscribe.

The first object of Macdonald was to provision Barcelona, which, from the commencement of the war, had been in a state of blockade, more or less rigorous. No stronger illustration can be afforded of the fragile and precarious tenure by which the French army maintained its hold in Catalonia, than the fact, that it was found necessary to array their whole force for the es-

- CHAP. I. cort of a convoy. While Macdonald was en-
 grossed by this service, O'Donnel was not inac-
 1810. tive. He attacked the French force on its
 march near Granollers, and succeeded in gaining
 an advantage which would have been more de-
 cisive had the Somatenes, who received orders
 July. to attack the enemy in rear during the heat of
 the engagement, obeyed their instructions. As
 it was, the convoy succeeded in reaching Bar-
 celona.

The system at first pursued by Marshal Macdonald was worthy of his reputation. Sparing of the blood of his soldiers, he avoided engagements which, though almost certain to be crowned with immediate success, could exercise no influence on the ultimate result of the war. His first object was to strengthen and provision the fortified places occupied by his army, and he endeavoured, like St. Cyr, to conciliate the good-will of the inhabitants. In this respect, he formed an honourable contrast to his immediate predecessor. After the fall of Gerona, Augerau imagined that measures of the greatest severity were necessary to intimidate the people. Acting under this detestable delusion, all peasants, taken with arms in their hands, were executed,

and a system of ferocious intimidation was adopted throughout the principality. CHAP. I.

 1810.

Macdonald at first acted on a sounder and better policy. He endeavoured to allay, by conciliatory proclamations, the fierce passions of the people, and substituted a system of mercy and mildness for one of bloodthirsty vengeance. The formation of magazines did much to prevent the necessity of pillage, and all abuses of authority were severely repressed. Yet even a policy so wise and generous failed of success. It is not at the moment when the wind abates, that the waves become still. The memory of past cruelties cannot suddenly be obliterated; and the ardent, haughty, and suffering Catalans, were rather disposed to attribute to fear, than to more generous motives, any increase of lenity discernible in the measures of the invaders.

Having relieved Barcelona, Macdonald took up a position near Cervera, as a central point, which would enable him at once to cover the siege of Tortosa, and menace the line of the Llobregat. O'Donnel was no indifferent spectator of this movement. On the sixth of September he quitted Tarragona, at the head of a

September.

CHAP. I. strong division, and marched on Mataro. The
1810. artillery went by sea, under convoy of the Cam-
brian frigate, and a small Spanish squadron. On
the tenth he reached Mataro, and on the four-
Sep. 14. teenth, succeeded, by a skilful manœuvre, in sur-
prising the brigade of General Schwartz, which
occupied Bisbal and the neighbouring villages.
The French, thus taken at unawares, and sur-
rounded by a force greatly superior in number,
made a gallant though vain resistance. All who
escaped the sword were made prisoners, and
Schwartz himself was in the number of the latter.
They were immediately embarked for Tarragona.

This was the last achievement of O'Donnel
in Catalonia. He received a wound in the en-
gagement, which made it necessary he should
resign the command, and the Marqués de Cam-
poverde was appointed his successor. The suc-
cess of Bisbal diffused energy and spirit through-
out the whole population of the province.
Those who had hitherto been restrained by fear,
now gave full vent to their sentiments of hatred
and revenge. The war, on both sides, became
one of bloodthirsty vengeance; and the French
leader, departing from the system of lenity and
forbearance which he had hitherto followed, en-

deavoured to allay the general excitement by violent reprisals. CHAP. I.

1810.

In the meanwhile, the situation of Upper Catalonia rendered it necessary that Macdonald should quit his position at Cervera. A convoy had assembled at Gerona, which required the presence of the whole French army for its protection. After much difficulty, the convoy reached Barcelona in safety; and Macdonald, Nov. 25. having received large reinforcements, returned to afford protection to the third corps in the siege of Tortosa.

The chief object, however, both of Suchet and Macdonald, was the reduction of Tortosa. Early in June, the former received orders to undertake the siege, and was informed that the Catalonian army would simultaneously commence operations against Tarragona. In pursuance of these instructions, Suchet began his preparations for this important siege. The command in Arragon was confided to General July. Musnier; and the brigade of General Bugeat was posted at Huesca to maintain tranquillity on the left of the Ebro. The brigade of General Verges occupied Doroca, Teruel, and Calatayud. A series of fortified posts was estab-

CHAP. I. lished on the different lines of communication ;
 1810. and thus guarded, a division was pushed forward to blockade the *tête-de-pont* of Tortosa, on the right bank of the Ebro.

The mild and judicious administration of Suchet had brought the inhabitants of Arragon to a state of comparative tranquillity. Many had resumed their ordinary occupations, and the fields again bore marks of cultivation. Those whom terror alone had induced to take arms, returned with the hope of safety to their homes ; and the resistance to French power, though kept alive by the bold spirit of the Guerillas, had become less ferocious and pervading. This state of things, which a system of terror, however rigorously enforced, never could have produced, contributed to give greater security to the more distant operations in which the army was about to engage.

Many circumstances, however, combined to impede the progress of the besieging army. Near its confluence with the sea, the Ebro flows through a mountainous and barren country, affording no road practicable for artillery. By the droughts of summer the river had become too shallow for navigation ; and these obstacles,

which labour and perseverance could alone surmount, occasioned much delay. It was necessary too to establish a secure depot for the ammunition and provisions of the besieging army. With this view, *têtes-de-pont* were constructed at Mora and Xerta, and intrenchments thrown up, by which these towns would be protected from any sudden attack.

CHAP. I.

 1810.
 September.

During the progress of these events, the blockading force was annoyed by sorties from the garrison; and a body of Valencians, under General O'Donaju, advanced against the fort of Morella. A brigade was accordingly detached to convey provisions and ammunition to the garrison; in which operation, after a smart engagement, it was completely successful.

The situation of Suchet, however, was one of considerable difficulty. He had advanced to Tortosa, under the idea that the army of Catalonia would already have commenced the investment of Tarragona, as the despatches of the Major-General (Berthier) had authorized him to expect. This, however, was not the case, and Suchet found himself open to the attacks of the Catalan army, which, acting in concert with the Valencian forces and the garrison of Tortosa, might be ex-

CHAP. I. 1810. pected to make a strong effort for the relief of the city. Under all its disadvantages, however, Suchet determined to maintain his position, in the conviction that any danger was preferable to the unfortunate consequences which must have resulted from retreat.

While the army thus waited the approach of Macdonald, in order to commence the siege, partial engagements almost daily took place. A more serious attempt, however, was made by the Valencian army, under Bassecourt, to relieve the town, but it was completely defeated by General Musnier, near Vineros, with the loss of two thousand five hundred of its number. Several encounters likewise took place with Villa Campa, who hovered on the frontiers of Arragon; but even an unbroken series of successful engagements did not relieve the French army from its state of almost perpetual annoyance.

Dec. 13. At length, on the thirteenth of December, Macdonald, with fifteen thousand men, arrived at Mora, on the Ebro, to cover the besieging army. On the fifteenth Tortosa was invested on both sides of the river, and General Suchet fixed his head-quarters at Xerta. On the eighteenth Macdonald moved to Perello, to keep

the enemy in check on the side of Tarragona. CHAP. I.

—The operations of the siege were pushed on
with vigour. On the eighteenth all the outposts
were driven in, and the besiegers took possession
of the heights in front of Fort Orleans; and
on the following night, the first parallel was
opened, on the ground, between that fort and
the river. At the same time a trench was opened
on the right bank of the river, and batteries
were erected to flank the principal attack. The
covered way was crowned on the seventh night
of the siege, before the completion of the bat-
teries. Repeated sorties were made from the
town, but without beneficial result. Alarmed
by the rapidity of the enemy's approaches,
the garrison determined, by a desperate attack, to
attempt arresting his progress. At four o'clock
on the twenty-seventh, a body of about three
thousand Spaniards sallied from the Puerta del
Rastro, and attacked the right of the French
works on the height in front of Fort Orleans,
while strong parties from the fort attempted to
carry the trenches in the centre, and destroy
the guns, then in the act of being conveyed into
the batteries. One column succeeded in penetrat-
ing to the works in the plain, overpowered the

1810.

December.

Dec. 19.

Dec. 27.

CHAP. I. guard in the trenches, burned the gabions in a
 1810. lodgement in the covered-way, and filled in a
 December. portion of the sap; but a strong body of the
 enemy coming up, they were driven back with
 considerable loss, and without effecting their ob-
 ject of spiking the guns.

The attack on the parallel opposite to the
 fort, was still less successful. In attempting to
 take them in reverse, they were attacked in
 flank by the brigade of General Habert, and
 compelled to retreat. In this affair the garrison
 lost nearly four hundred of their number, in
 killed and wounded.

The enemy's batteries on both sides of the
 river were now completed, and at daydawn on
 Dec. 29. the twenty-ninth, forty-five pieces of cannon
 from ten batteries opened a fire, which in the
 course of two hours silenced every thing oppos-
 ed to them. On the following day the bridge
 was almost demolished; and in the course of the
 night the Spaniards abandoned the *tête-de-pont*.
 1811. The fire continued from the batteries, with little
 Jan. 1. return from the town; and on the first of Jan-
 uary the counterscarp having been blown in, and
 two breaches effected in the walls, the Governor,
 Count de Alacha, sent a flag of truce to propose

a suspension of arms for fifteen days ; at the expiration of which period he offered to deliver up the town, if not relieved, under stipulation that the garrison, with arms, baggage, and four pieces of cannon, should be conducted to Tarragona.

CHAP. I.

1811.

January.

These terms were instantly rejected, and an officer was sent into the town to state that nothing but immediate and unconditional surrender could preserve the inhabitants from the impending horrors of assault. The Governor was ir- resolute, and no answer was returned. On the following morning the batteries renewed their fire, by which the breaches were enlarged, and soon rendered practicable. The columns of assault were in the act of forming, when three white flags were displayed from the ramparts. The fire of the besiegers, however, was not suspended, and two officers were despatched to the Governor, to demand, as a preliminary condition of any arrangement, the instant admission of a French garrison, into one of the forts, as a security against treachery. To this demand the Governor replied, that he could no longer reckon on the obedience of the troops, and that the military council had not consented to the proposed terms.

Jan. 2.

CHAP. I. Under these circumstances, Suchet determined on a bold measure. Accompanied by the
1811. generals and officers of his staff, with no
January. larger escort than that of a company of grenadiers, he approached the walls and demanded to be conducted to the Governor. The latter was a weak man, and overpowered by the difficulties of his situation. "A bold and well-timed address from the French leader determined him to surrender. He directed the garrison to lay down their arms, and a brief capitulation was signed on the spot.

Thus was Tortosa, after a siege of seventeen days, surrendered to the enemy. The garrison, amounting to about seven thousand five hundred men, were marched as prisoners of war to Zaragoza. One hundred and eighty pieces of ordnance, a large quantity of ammunition, and provisions of all kinds, were found in the place. The capture of Tortosa cost the French army not more than four hundred men.

Under a commander of greater talent and vigour than the Count de Alacha, the city would have made a better defence; for the garrison were animated by the best spirit, and in all their sorties displayed gallantry and resolution. That

the place was not adequately defended, is evident from the fact that the enemy were suffered to complete the covered way without a shot being fired from the batteries,—a circumstance which could only have arisen from the ignorance or pusillanimity of the Governor. The Spaniards were naturally indignant at this tame surrender of so important a stronghold. The Count de Alacha was sentenced to death by a court-martial assembled at Tarragona, for having traitorously given up the fortress committed to his charge, and he was beheaded in effigy in the market-place. On the part of the enemy the conduct of the siege was marked by an union of skill and boldness, highly honourable to the Baron de Rogniat, who commanded the engineer department of the army.

CHAP. I.

1811.

While Suchet carried on the operations against Tortosa, the Catalan forces were kept in check by Macdonald. No great effort was made to relieve the place, and the projects formed for this purpose were defeated by its premature surrender. Tortosa was the principal point of communication with the neighbouring provinces, and its fall carried with it the preclusion of all exterior co-operation except by sea. To com-

CHAP. I. plete the insulation of Catalonia, preparations
 1811. were immediately made for the investment of
 January. Tarragona, the only stronghold of importance
 which remained to the Spaniards.

About this period the cause of liberty sustained other misfortunes of minor importance. The Coll de Balaguer, a small fort on the coast, was surprised by a detachment of the French army, which succeeded in overpowering the garrison.

1810. In the bay of Palamos the boats of the British squadron attacked a convoy of eleven vessels, laden with provisions for Barcelona, anchored under protection of the batteries on shore. A party of seamen were landed under Captain Fane of the Cambrian, who dislodged a French battalion, and succeeded in bringing out two of the vessels, and burning the remainder. Having defeated their enemy, however, order was at an end. Unaccustomed to the artifices of land warfare, both men and officers entered the town, when the French, returning, charged through the streets, and thus taken at a disadvantage, one hundred and twenty-two of the seamen were killed and wounded, and eighty-six made prisoners. The boats of the squadron succeeded with difficulty in bringing off the remainder.

Dec. 13.

CHAPTER II.

PORTUGAL.—RETREAT OF MASSENA.

IN Portugal the patriotic cause sustained a severe loss in the death of the Marques de la Romana. He died at Curtaxo on the twenty-third of January. Lord Wellington thus speaks of this distinguished patriot :—

CHAP. II.
1811.
January.

“ I am concerned to have to report to your Lordship, that the Marques de la Romana died in this town, on the twenty-third instant, after a short illness. His talents, his virtues, and his patriotism, were well known to his Majesty’s Government. In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country its most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always ac-

CHAP. II. knowledge with gratitude the assistance I have
1811. received from him, as well by his operations as
by his counsel, since he had been joined with this
army." What pen shall presume to add aught
to such an epitaph?

In Andalusia no effort was made for the expulsion of the invaders, and the inhabitants of Cadiz, satisfied with the security for which they were indebted to their situation, gave little demonstration of activity or zeal. Under these circumstances, Soult found himself in condition to detach a portion of his army to invade the Alentejo, and open a communication across the Tagus with Massena.

About the end of December, Soult and Mortier accordingly quitted Seville, with a force about fifteen thousand strong, and advanced into Estramadura. At Llerena, a division under General Girard, was met by Mendizabel and Ballasteros and compelled to retire; but having effected a junction with the remainder of Mortier's corps, Mendizabel in turn retreated on Almandrejo and Badajos, without attempting to defend the passage of the Guadiana. On Mortier's approach, the division of Ballasteros fell

back to the neighbourhood of Olivença, and subsequently to Salvatierra. CHAP. II.

Before attempting to penetrate to the Tagus, Soult deemed it necessary to secure his communication with the south by the reduction of Badajos and Olivença. The latter place was defended by a garrison of three thousand men; and Girard's division, with the artillery of the advanced guard, was directed to reduce it. The trenches were opened on the twelfth of January; and after a feeble and inadequate resistance, the place surrendered on the twenty-second. The fall of Olivença was immediately followed by the investment of Badajos.

1811.
January.

Intelligence of Soult's movements no sooner reached the British head-quarters, than Romana despatched the troops under his orders to the assistance of Mendizabel. They joined that leader at Elvas, on the sixth of February; and on the same day, the enemy's cavalry were driven beyond the Gebora; and a communication was established with Badajos through Fort St. Christoval, on the right bank of the Guadiana. Mendizabel then took up a position on the heights of St. Christoval; but a few shells thrown by the enemy from the opposite side of the river,

Feb. 6.

CHAP. II. unfortunately induced him to move his whole
 1811. force to its left, beyond the protection of the
 February. fort. Of this circumstance the besieging army
 immediately prepared to take advantage.

The overflowing of the Guadiana and the Gebora, secured Mendizabel from attack for several days, but the operations of the siege were prosecuted with vigour. On the night of the
 Feb. 11. eleventh the fort Pardaleras was carried by assault; and the waters having subsided on the eighteenth, the French forded the rivers during the night, and prepared to attack the Spanish army in its position.

Feb. 19. On the morning of the nineteenth, the cavalry crossed the Gebora, by a ford previously discovered, and advanced by the road leading from Badajos to Campo Mayor against the left flank of the enemy. The leading squadrons came suddenly in contact with the Spanish advance, and immediately dispersed it. The alarm of this attack spread through the army, and the troops flew to arms to engage an enemy of whose approach they had been ignorant. Day had already dawned, but a dense mist concealed the movements of the French army in the plain. Mortier took advantage of this, and by eight

o'clock his whole force was drawn up in order of battle. Shortly afterwards the sun broke forth, and the dense volume of vapour rolling upward like a curtain, both armies were seen drawn up in order of battle.

CHAP. II.

1811.

February.

The engagement commenced with a brisk cannonade; and three columns were seen simultaneously advancing against the Spanish line. Girard, with three battalions, was directed to turn the right flank of the Spaniards, by the height near Fort St. Christoval. Mortier in person led the column of attack on the centre, consisting of six battalions. Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, manœuvred on the Spanish left, which he succeeded in turning. All these movements were executed with rapidity and precision; and Mendizabel, alarmed at beholding his army pressed and surrounded on all sides, hastily directed the formation of two large squares, which, for a time, received and repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy with gallantry and firmness. The cavalry, however, at length came up, and by an impetuous charge succeeded in breaking the squares, and the victory was decided in a moment. The carnage was great. The army of Mendizabel was in

CHAP. II. fact annihilated. A few escaped into Badajos,
1811. —others, more fortunate, succeeded in reach-
February. ing Elvas; but the brigade of Portuguese ca-
valry, under General Madden, was the only
portion of the army which quitted the field
in a state at all approaching to organization.
Nearly nine hundred of the Spaniards were left
dead on the field; the prisoners are said to
have amounted to nearly eight thousand. The
French loss in this decisive victory did not ex-
ceed five hundred in killed and wounded.

The conduct of Mendizabel throughout these operations proves him to have been a person utterly destitute of military talent. From the moment of his arrival before Fort St. Christoval, he indulged in dreams of security from which the presence of the enemy alone awoke him. He courted battle, and yet was unprepared for it; and, in such circumstances, nothing can extenuate the disgrace of being surprised in a position commanding the whole country in his front, by an enemy who had to cross two rivers of very considerable breadth in their approach.

Perhaps the true policy of Mendizabel was to have left a sufficient garrison in Badajos, and with the remainder of his corps to have acted on

the enemy's rear, and cut off his communication with Seville. This would have forced Soult to divide his army, and detach a strong force to hold him in check. The operations against Badajoz would thus necessarily have been retarded, and Soult might even have been forced to relinquish the enterprise.

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February.

During the progress of these events, Massena and Lord Wellington remained inactive in their positions. The circumstances of the two great armies, however, were very different. Lord Wellington had the capital behind him, with its noble port accessible to all the vessels which the power and wealth of England could freight, and his troops had to encounter no privations of any sort. The army of Massena, on the other hand, subsisted solely on the plunder of the surrounding country; and as the resources of the nearer districts became exhausted, its supplies became necessarily more inadequate and precarious. The convoys, coming from a distance, were continually liable to be intercepted and cut off. Every where in rear, the militia were in full activity, and the nature of the country was peculiarly favourable for a warfare of this irregular description. On the first of February, a small body

Feb. 1.

CHAP. II. under Colonel Grant, made a spirited attack on
1811. the detachment of General Foy, about three
February. thousand strong. Taking post on a ridge commanding the road along which the enemy were proceeding, he assailed them with so warm and well-directed a fire, that, in the space of four leagues, above two hundred of their number were found dead, and but for the approach of night, the loss would have been greater. During the months of January and February, small parties from Abrantes succeeded in cutting off upwards of three hundred of the enemy. A single peasant alone, in the neighbourhood of Thomar, killed above thirty Frenchmen with his own hand, and took about fifty horses and mules.

While this incessant warfare was carrying on, not only on the rear of the French, but almost in their very position, disease also was at work. Every day the number in the hospitals was increased; the supplies of provisions were constantly diminishing, and forage could no longer be provided. The reinforcements received were barely sufficient to replace the severe losses occasioned by famine and the sword.

“In this state of things,” says the French

official report of the retreat, "the Prince of Essling had three measures only presented to his choice. The first was to attack the English in their lines before Lisbon ; but the principles of military tactics forbade, inasmuch as his heavy artillery could not be brought up. The second was to pass the Tagus, and form a junction with the army of Andalusia, and thus open a communication with Badajos, Seville, and Madrid, and subsequently change the plan of the campaign and the line of operation. The third measure was to repass the Mondego, bearing upon Guarda, and thence to Ciudad Rodrigo, where the necessities of the army would be supplied. The last measure was that which the Prince of Essling decided on adopting."

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February.

In truth, it had become evident to Massena that the time for offensive operations had passed away. He saw that by retreat alone could his army be preserved ; and so great was the pressure of his immediate wants, that he found it impossible to await the result of the operations undertaken by Soult for his relief. Massena, likewise, knew that considerable reinforcements were daily expected by Lord Wellington, and

CHAP. II. that their arrival would place him, with an
 1811.
 March. army sickly and dispirited, in immediate danger of attack.

Preparations, therefore, were made for the retreat of his army with great secrecy and skill. The sick and wounded were moved gradually to the rear, followed by the baggage and a part of the artillery; and, at the beginning of March, exclusive of a few heavy guns, for which means of transport could not be procured, there remained in the French cantonments, only the men and horses fit for duty, and the munitions necessary for their use.

Mar. 5. On the night of the fifth of March, Massena broke up from his position, and put his army in motion for the frontier, by three routes. The right column moved by Thomar and Espinhel; the centre, by Anciao; and the third and largest, by the great road to Coimbra. As all of these routes, however, converged towards one common centre, it was apparently the intention of Massena to concentrate his army and offer battle.

Mar. 6. On the fourth, the long-expected reinforcement, of seven thousand men, arrived in the Tagus; and, on the morning of the sixth, the retreat of the enemy became known at British

head-quarters, and immediate measures were adopted for pursuit. General Houghton's brigade was directed to cross the Tagus, and, with the fourth, sixth, and part of the first divisions, under Marshal Beresford, to advance on Thomar, still occupied by the corps of Regnier. The light division, supported by the main body of the army, pushed forward by Leyria and Pombal.

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On the approach of Beresford, the French retreated from Thomar, along the foot of the Serra de Estrella, to Espinhel ; but the remainder of their army, having concentrated at Pombal, seemed determined to maintain its ground. Lord Wellington, accordingly, made preparations for a general attack on the following morning. After a short but smart skirmish, the enemy's advanced posts were driven in, and about two hundred prisoners secured by the light division. During the night, however, the French, having previously set fire to the town, fell back on Redinha, where a strong rear corps was found posted, on the following day, along a ridge of easy heights at the extremity of a defile. It was immediately attacked by the leading divisions as they

Mar. 11.

Mar. 12.

CHAP. II. came up, and, after an obstinate resistance, com-
 1811. pelled to retreat for support on the main body.
 March. The enemy's object, however, was gained,—the
 march of the British was delayed for several
 hours; and the baggage and artillery, which had
 been retarded by the difficulties of the road,
 were enabled to cross the Soure in safety.

The French army halted at Condeixa, where
 Massena again made demonstration of maintain-
 ing his ground. The position, thus occupied,
 consisted of a range of wooded heights of great
 strength, by which the road was completely
 commanded. An attack in front would have
 involved a great sacrifice of life; and Lord
 Wellington determined to dislodge the enemy
 Mar. 13. by a flank movement. Picton's division was
 accordingly directed by a considerable circuit to
 the eastward, to approach the only road open
 for his retreat. This manœuvre had the desired
 effect. Picton's movement was no sooner dis-
 covered, than the enemy broke up from his po-
 sition, and fell back to Caza! Nova.

On the day previous, Massena had detached a
 force of cavalry, under General Montbrun, with
 a few light guns, to summon Coimbra. That

place was occupied only by a small body of militia ; but the bold reply of the Governor to the message of Montbrun, led Massena to believe that the force in the city was considerable. Fearful, therefore, of committing his army, by waiting the reduction of the place, and pressed by the movement of Lord Wellington on his left, he gave up his intention of crossing the Mondego, and continued his retreat on the frontier by the road leading to the Ponte de Marcella. By the skilful manœuvres of Lord Wellington, therefore, the French were prevented from entering the strong and unexhausted country beyond the Mondego, and the communication of the allies with the northern provinces was opened.

The enemy now continued their retreat through a country presenting a succession of admirable positions, which continually afforded the means of retarding the pursuit. Of this circumstance they reaped the full advantage. At Cazal Nova, the rear corps, under Marshal Ney, halted in a strong position, and on the following morning, their outposts were driven in by the light division. In order to dislodge them, Lord Wellington directed movements on their

CHAP. II.

1811.

March.

Mar. 14.

CHAP. II. flanks; and Ney withdrew his force to a ridge
1811. nearly parallel, where he again stood firm, till
March. compelled by a similar manœuvre to retreat.
The French retired in fine order, on Miranda de
Corvo, maintaining a continued action throughout the day.

At this point, the corps of Regnier, which had marched by Espinhel, connected its movements with those of the main body of the army. The manœuvres of Lord Wellington again forced the enemy to retreat. The division of General Cole had, on the day preceding, been detached to Panella, in order to secure the passage of the Esa. Near that place, it was joined by Nightingale's division which had followed Regnier; and Massena, on observing the approach of this column on his flank, abandoned his strong position at Miranda de Corvo, having previously destroyed a considerable quantity of ammunition and baggage, for which means of transport could no longer be found.

Mar. 15. On the following morning a thick fog retarded the march of the allies for several hours. About nine the day cleared up; and the troops, renewing the pursuit, passed through the smoking ruins of Miranda de Corvo. The French

army were found in a strong position on the Ceira, a tributary of the Mondego, with one corps at Foz de Aronse, on the left of the river. Lord Wellington immediately directed movements on the flanks of this corps, and attacked it briskly in front. By these measures it was driven rapidly back on the bridge in great confusion. The loss of the enemy was very considerable. Many of their number were trampled down, and many drowned; and the darkness which came on contributed to increase the disorder. It has even been asserted that the bridge was blown up by the enemy, while crowded by their own soldiers; and two divisions, misled by their fears, opened fire on each other. A considerable quantity of baggage, and some ammunition carriages, were taken by the allies.

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During the night Massena continued his retreat, leaving the rear-guard to watch the ford. On the seventeenth the allies crossed the Ceira, having been compelled to halt a day to wait the coming up of supplies. The French army took post in a strong position behind the Alva, occupying the Ponte de Marcella, and the heights along the right bank of the river. Massena,

Mar. 17.

- CHAP. II. deeming himself secure for several days, in
this formidable position, sent out detachments to
collect provisions from the neighbouring coun-
try. Lord Wellington, however, directed two
divisions to ford the Alva near Pombeira, in
order to take the enemy in flank, and threaten
his communication with Celorico; and having
afforded sufficient time for their advance, made
a front movement on the Ponte de Marcella.
1811.
March.
- Mar. 18. These manœuvres were successful. Massena
fell rapidly back upon Mouta, without waiting
to collect his foragers, many of whom were made
prisoners; and the greater part of the allied
army crossed the river at Pombeira on the same
evening.

Lord Wellington was at length compelled, by
the want of provisions, to relax in the active
pursuit he had hitherto maintained. The Por-
tuguese troops, whose commissariat depended
altogether on the supplies which could be pur-
chased in the country through which they passed,
were in a state approaching to famine; and to
enable them to move on, it had been found ne-
cessary to share with them the supplies intend-
ed for the British. A halt, therefore, was found
necessary to give time for the arrival of forage

and provisions from the rear, while Lord Wel- CHAP. II.
 lington followed the enemy with the cavalry 1811.
 and light troops, supported by two divisions. March.
 Owing to this circumstance the enemy were en-
 abled to reach Celorico with little further moles- Mar. 21.
 tation.

In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington had de-
 termined on detaching a strong corps for the
 relief of Badajos. The division of General Hill,
 with the exception of General Houghton's brig-
 ade, was already on the south of the Tagus;
 and the fourth division, and General de Grey's
 brigade of heavy cavalry, and General Hamil-
 ton's division of Portuguese, were directed to
 join it. General Hill having recently returned
 to England, the command, *ad interim*, of this
 considerable force was bestowed on Marshal
 Beresford. Of its operations we shall speedily
 have occasion to speak.

Massena, on reaching Celorico, instead of fall-
 ing back on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, de-
 termined to take up a position in the neighbour-
 hood of Guarda, with the view of connecting his Mar. 23.
 operations with those of Soult on the Alentejo
 frontier.* After a few days halt the British

* Marshal Ney, at this period, quitted the army. In his

CHAP. II. army resumed the pursuit, and on the twenty-eighth reached Celorico. On the following day it moved forward in five columns, supported by a division in the valley of the Mondego ; the militia, under Trant and Wilson, covering the movement at Alverca, against any attempt which might be made on that side.

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March.

The position occupied by the enemy, was one of the most formidable strength. The town of Guarda is situated on the summit of a steep and isolated mountain, which forms part of the Estrella range, and commands the whole country by which it is surrounded. Massena availed himself of these natural advantages, and by their means expected to maintain his army within the frontier of Portugal. His officers, little apprehensive of attack in a position so secure, relaxed in their accustomed vigilance, and at length con-

opinion it should have moved on Almeida, and with his characteristic impetuosity he urged the necessity of this measure in the strongest manner. Massena was irresolute. Orders and counter-orders were issued during the whole of the twenty-second. At length he decided against the opinion of Ney, and that officer immediately resigned his command in disgust. Massena dreaded the responsibility of entering Spain without orders from the Emperor, and was anxious to maintain at least some portion of the Portuguese territory.

gratulated themselves on the termination of the pursuit. CHAP. II.

So accurate were the calculations by which the movements of the attacking columns were regulated, that they almost simultaneously appeared on the different sides of the mountain, and succeeded in nearly reaching the summit before they were discovered by the enemy. The latter precipitately retreated without firing a shot, and the whole French army was driven across the Coa. A brigade of infantry, under General Maucune, posted considerably in front of Guarda, with difficulty escaped being cut off. 1811.
March.

Mar. 29.

Driven from Guarda, Massena determined on a final effort to maintain himself within the frontier, by posting his army in a strong position along the banks of the Coa. The right flank extended to Ruivina, guarding the ford of Rapoula de Coa, with a detachment at the bridge of Ferrereas. The left was at Subugal, and the eighth corps at Alfayates. The right of the allied army was opposite Subugal, the left at the bridge of Ferrereas; and Trant and Wilson crossed the Coa below Almeida, to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and the French army.

CHAP. II. The enemy was posted so strongly that his position was only approachable by the left flank ; and on the morning of the third of April, the light division was directed to cross the Coa, at a ford several miles above Subugal, in rear of the corps of Regnier, while the third and fifth divisions should attack him in front ; the latter crossing the river at the bridge of Subugal, the former at a ford a short distance above it. The sixth division remained opposite to Ruivina, and a battalion of the seventh observed their detachment at the bridge of Ferrereas.

1811.
April.
Apr. 3. The day was dark and cloudy, and a deep mist occasionally overspread the horizon, accompanied by storms of rain, which narrowed the scope of vision to the distance of a yard or two. A part of the light division had already crossed the river, when one of these impervious fogs came on. The enemy's piquets were driven in, and the troops advancing in pursuit, came at unawares on the left of the main body of Regnier's corps, which it was intended they should turn.

The consequence was that the advance was driven back on the forty-third regiment ; and Regnier, by a partial dissipation of the mist, having ascertained the smallness of the force

opposed to him, directed on it a strong column of infantry, supported by artillery and horse. This attack encountered a spirited repulse; and Colonel Beckwith's brigade advanced in turn against the enemy's position, where they were attacked by a fresh column of infantry on the left, and by a regiment of cavalry on the right. Under these circumstances the leading battalion would probably have been sacrificed, had not Colonel Beckwith, with great promptitude, retreated behind some stone enclosures, which enabled him to maintain his ground. The combat was then waged with vigour and pertinacity on both sides. Colonel Beckwith's brigade made another charge, drove back the enemy, and had gained possession of a howitzer, when the French cavalry advancing on their flank, again forced them to retire to their post. There they were joined by the other brigade of the light division, and Colonel Beckwith again advanced with his own brigade and the first battalion of the fifty-second. They were once more charged in flank by a fresh column of infantry supported by cavalry, and Colonel Beckwith took post in an enclosure on the top of the height, which enabled him to pro-

CHAP. II.

1811.

April.

CHAP. II. tect the howitzer, in the capture of which so much gallantry had been displayed.

1811.

April.

In this state of things, when Regnier was disposing his troops for another attack, the head of Picton's division came up and immediately opened fire. At the same moment, the fifth division, under General Dunlop, having forced the bridge, was seen ascending the heights to the enemy's right, and the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of the left. Regnier then observing himself to be nearly surrounded, retreated with great precipitation to Alfayates, leaving the howitzer and above three hundred men dead on the field. About an equal number were made prisoners. The loss of the allies in killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to one hundred and sixty one.

Considering the great numerical disparity of the parties in this well-fought engagement, the conduct of the light division was admirable. Under circumstances of disadvantage impossible to be foreseen, they maintained a contest of the most unequal description, and executed their manœuvres in presence of a superior enemy, with the most imposing steadiness and precision. "Although the operations of this day,"

says Lord Wellington, " were by unavoidable accidents not performed in the manner I intended they should have been, I consider the action that was fought by the light division—by Colonel Beckwith's brigade principally—to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in." Had the retreat of Regnier not been favoured by the fog, the results of the engagement would have been yet more brilliant and decisive.

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April.

The cavalry continued the pursuit as far as Alfayates, at which place the whole French army crossed the frontier and entered Spain. Massena hastened to concentrate behind the Agueda; and on the eighth, not a Frenchman remained in Portugal, except the garrison of Almeida, for the blockade of which Lord Wellington made immediate preparations. On the seventh, Sir William Erskine, who had been despatched with six squadrons of cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery, to reconnoitre Almeida, and drive in the enemy's posts, fell, unexpectedly, on a brigade of French infantry at Junça. Nothing could exceed the coolness and courage with which this body received the attacks of the assailants. The French commander formed his troops into a square, on which the cavalry

Apr. 8.

CHAP. II. could make no impression, though supported by
1811. the guns, which occasioned great havoc in the
April. ranks. In this manner did the brigade continue its retreat, till it reached Duas Casas, carrying off the commanding officer, who was severely wounded, and affording a fine example of discipline and courage. The cavalry, however, succeeded in securing many prisoners, and, altogether, the loss of this gallant body was considerable.

The allied army then took up a position on the Duas Casas, with its advanced posts on Gallegos and the Agueda. The militia under Trant and Wilson were at Cinca Villas and Malpartida; and the communication of Almeida, both with Ciudad Rodrigo and with the French army, was cut off.

Thus terminated the invasion of Portugal;—that invasion by which it was boastingly predicted that the British would be driven into the sea, and the conquest of Portugal be decisively achieved. From the moment of its advance from Almeida, the French army of Portugal had encountered a long, unbroken series of disaster and defeat. Massena had been baffled in all his plans by the skill of his opponent. In every

engagement he had been worsted; and at length, with the loss of nearly half his numbers, had been driven headlong from the kingdom, without the achievement of a single exploit which could serve to mitigate his discomfiture. By the aid of a British army, one of the weakest and most insignificant kingdoms of Europe, had successfully bidden defiance to the arms of France, and vindicated her claims to liberty by the sword. To the people of Portugal, is the honour due of having first given to Europe the spectacle of a mighty armament, led by one of the great captains of Napoleon, retreating, baffled, dispirited, and defeated, from the territory of the kingdom it had vainly attempted to subdue.

It is true, that a success so signal was not, and could not have been effected by the single and unaided efforts of the Portuguese nation. The age of miracles has passed—never to return. The Portuguese did all that a people so situated, so animated, and so suffering, could be expected to achieve. But it is to the zealous, ardent, and honest co-operation of England; to the consummate military talent of a British

CHAP. II. general; and to the gallantry and discipline of
1811. British soldiers, that a large share of the honour
must be awarded.

The government of France had hitherto treated the efforts of Britain for the liberation of the Peninsula, with scorn and derision. England, they said, invincible on her native element, is insignificant on shore. Her generals are without boldness—without skill—without experience. The career of Wellington, they declared, had been one unvaried series of pertinacious blunder and fortunate escape. He was “*un homme borné*”—a dull and plodding follower of vicious precedent, incapable of conducting war on an extended scale, or of improving the advantages offered by the blunders of his opponents “*en grand general*.” British soldiers, it was said, though tolerable dischargers of firearms in a stationary position, were laggards in manœuvre, and only formidable from the stupidity which kept them ignorant of their danger, or the intoxication which emboldened them to brave it. Yet it was by these very men, and by the raw Portuguese levies which they disciplined and commanded,—by that very general whose talents

they denied, that Massena, in spite of all his boasting, had been driven triumphantly from Torres Vedras into Spain.

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1811.

A spectacle was thus exhibited to the nations of the Peninsula which could not fail to exhilarate their hopes, and animate their exertions. Nay, more, Europe was at length taught that proud lesson which led eventually to the overthrow of the most gigantic system of usurpation of which modern history bears record. There was not a province of his mighty empire in which the moral tenure of the tyrant was not weakened. The yoke was loosened from the shoulders of his vassal sovereigns, and they waited but for the occurrence of a favourable moment when they might cast it from them, and assert their claim to independence.

It would be unjust to deny that, as a military movement, the compulsory retreat of Massena was conducted with consummate skill. The French army retreated *en masse*, their rear covered by a strong body under command of Marshal Ney. It was impossible to exceed the skill and boldness with which that officer, taking advantage of every favourable position, foiled and delayed the pursuit of a force ten times more

CHAP. II. numerous than that which he commanded. Re-
1811. sistance was uniformly made till the very last
moment, when it could be continued with safety.
All his movements were marked by a prompti-
tude and precision highly admirable; by a fear-
less confidence, ever bold, yet never degenerat-
ing into rashness.

From the moment, however, when Ney quitted
the army, a decrease of vigour and energy was
discernible. Worn by privation and fatigue, and
looking back on a campaign which presented few
features calculated to lighten and redeem the
gloom by which it was overspread, the French
soldiers no longer felt confidence in their leader.
All that was gallant and daring in the retreat,
was attributed to Ney; while the timid policy
of Massena was made responsible for the misfor-
tunes of the campaign. The knowledge that a
difference of opinion existed between these cele-
brated tacticians, tended still further to excite dis-
satisfaction. The departure of Ney was regarded
as a misfortune by the whole army; and the
lingering hope that the campaign might yet ter-
minate in some honourable and distinguished
achievement, gave place to forebodings of mis-
fortune. These anticipations were not belied by

the event. Massena, by the want of due vigilance, was driven disgracefully from his position at Guarda; and he at length entered Spain with an army whose moral confidence was gone.

CHAP. II.

1811.

During the retreat, the loss of the French army may be calculated at about five thousand men; while that of the allies amounted to little more than six hundred.

From the moment they crossed the frontier of Portugal, the invaders commenced a course of barbarous devastation, which continued unbroken till they were driven forth from its territory. The necessities of an army, forced to subsist on such produce as the surrounding country could afford, rendered pillage, to a certain degree, inevitable; and, in such circumstances, it was scarcely to be expected that acts of violence should not occasionally occur. But the gratuitous and wanton cruelty with which those inhabitants were treated, who, trusting to the promises of Massena, remained peaceably in their dwellings, must cast enduring infamy on all, by whom such a course of inhuman outrage was perpetrated or abetted.

“The conduct of the French army,” says Lord Wellington, “throughout this retreat, has

CHAP. II. been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled,
1811. and never surpassed. Even in the towns of
Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which
the head-quarters of some of the corps had been
for some months, and in which the inhabitants
were induced by promises of good treatment
to remain, they were plundered, and many of
their houses destroyed on the night the enemy
withdrew from their position; and they have
since burned every town and village through
which they passed."

The track of the French army to the frontier
was marked by desolation. The town of Ley-
ria, with the Bishop's palace, was burned.
The Convent of Alcobaça, one of the most
ancient and magnificent structures in the king-
dom, shared a similar fate. Batalha, a religi-
ous edifice of equal beauty and antiquity, was
likewise destroyed. In the hearts of these de-
graded barbarians, all human sympathies seem
to have been dried up. The claims of age or
sex afforded no protection from their murder-
ous outrage. The bodies of murdered Por-
tuguese were seen lying unburied, by the
road, many of them—especially those of priests
—mutilated in a manner disgusting to huma-

nity. "This is the mode," says Lord Wel-
 lington, in a tone of honourable indignation, CHAP. II.
1811.
 "This is the mode in which the promises
 have been performed, which were held out in
 the proclamation of the French commander-in-
 chief, in which the inhabitants of Portugal were
 assured, that he was not come to make war on
 them, but, with a powerful army of one hundred
 and ten thousand men, to drive the English into
 the sea. It is to be hoped that the example of
 what has occurred in this country, will teach the
 people of this and other nations what reliance is
 to be placed on such promises and assurances ;
 and that there is no security for life, or for any
 thing that renders life valuable, except in decid-
 ed resistance to the enemy."

But the extent of the demoralization of the
 French army can be conceived only by those
 who saw the state of the cantonments in which
 they had been stationary for several months.
 There was something revolting, and even de-
 grading, to human nature, in the spectacle of
 extreme uncleanness which they exhibited. In
 the houses inhabited by the soldiers, all the in-
 stinctive decencies, by which man, even in his
 mere animal nature, is raised above the brutes,

CHAP. II. had been habitually disregarded.—But on such

1811. a subject it is unpleasant to enlarge. Let it
suffice that history can produce no instance of
civilized and Christian man, reduced to a state
of debasement more abject and humiliating, than
that of the French army, in this war of unprin-
cipated spoliation.

CHAPTER III.

SIEGE OF BADAJOS—BATTLE OF BAROSSA.

IN England, the precipitate abandonment of Portugal by the enemy, contributed to revive the hopes of the people, and consolidate the power of the government. Convinced that there was now a fair, though distant, prospect of ultimate success, both Parliament and the country gave their cordial support to the policy of prosecuting the war with a vigour, firmness, and energy, worthy of England, and of the glorious cause of which she stood forth the chief champion. This was the general sense of the nation; and, supported by its voice, the ministry of Mr. Perceval were enabled to overcome all the difficulties by which they were surrounded. These indeed were of no trifling magnitude. The illness of the King occasioned

1811.

CHAP. III. the appointment of a regency, which threatened
1811. an entire change in the members of the government. In both houses of Parliament the decided preponderance of talent was on the side of the Whigs; and the opposition which government had to encounter was powerful and systematic. With a blindness scarcely reconcilable with their acknowledged astuteness of intellect, or with an unfairness, which the ordinary prejudices of party can but partially excuse, the great Whig leaders endeavoured, by fallacy and misrepresentation, to raise the fears and depress the hopes of the people, at a crisis of difficulty and danger, when the destinies of England hung trembling in the balance. They knew that the honour of their country was, at length, irretrievably committed in the cause of the Peninsula. They knew it to be impossible to withdraw the British army, not only without danger to the national safety, (for the danger might have been braved,) but without disgrace. Yet, knowing this, they did not hesitate to advocate a policy which must have cast a deep tarnish on the honour of their country. They vehemently urged ministers to retire from a contest at once hopeless and absurd. Portugal, they declared,

could not be defended. The retreat to Torres Vedras was designated as a hopeless abandonment of the whole kingdom to the enemy. When Massena was triumphantly driven beyond the frontier, the country was gravely told that his movement was a mere change of position from the Zezere to the Agueda—a manoeuvre to lead the allies to a distance from their resources, while the enemy would enjoy the advantage of removing from a ravaged and desolate country, to one comparatively fertile and unexhausted. The honour of Napoleon, they said, was pledged to effect the subjugation of the Peninsula; and, unfortunately, his power was commensurate with his ambition. Under these circumstances, it was worse than folly to expect that a British army could prevent the consummation of his projects. The resistance of England should be confined to that element on which her power was undisputed and irresistible.

Such was the language of the Opposition; fortunately, it was not in unison either with the judgment or the feelings of the nation at large. It contributed to lessen the popularity of the Whigs, and to weaken the influence which the leaders of that party had maintained over the

CHAP. III.
1811.

CHAP. III. public mind. The Prince Regent, from respect

1811.

to his father, expressed his determination to make no immediate change in the servants of the crown. The prime minister, Mr. Perceval, displayed a talent and aptitude for business of the highest order ; and the precarious tenure by which the 'ministry held office, occasioned no diminution of the vigour of their measures. A grant of one hundred thousand pounds was voted by Parliament, for the relief of the suffering Portuguese ; and large subscriptions for a similar purpose were made throughout the kingdom. By this generous aid, the lives of thousands, who must otherwise have perished, were preserved ; many of them to fight the battles of their country, and contribute to the downfall of that despotism from which they had suffered.

One of the first measures of Lord Wellington, after the territory of Portugal had been freed from its invaders, was to issue a proclamation warning the people to prepare against future efforts of the enemy. He recommended that every man in the kingdom, capable of bearing arms, should become familiarized with their use. That, in each district, places of safety should be prepared, to which the inefficient part

of the population might retire in case of need ; CHAP. III.
that every one should bury his more valuable
effects, keeping the place of deposit secret from all
not interested in the concealment ; and that such
stores of provision, as were not capable of removal or secretion, should be destroyed. If such
measures of precaution were adopted, Lord Wellington assured the Portuguese, that the subjection of their kingdom could not be effected by any invading force, however numerous and formidable. The issue of such attempts, he declared, was certain. They would terminate in the independence of Portugal, in the happiness of its inhabitants, and in the eternal honour of those by whose unshrinking firmness and patriotism the freedom of their country had been achieved.

1811.

Lord Wellington, having issued this proclamation, and made arrangements for the blockade of Almeida, distributed the remainder of his army in cantonments, and set out for the Alentejo, where operations of immediate moment appeared to demand his presence.

On the defeat of Mendizabel, Soult completed the investment of Badajos, and pushed forward the siege with increased vigour. Parallels were thrown out to the right and left of the Pardale-

CHAP. III. ras, and enfilading batteries thrown up for their

1811.

March.

protection. Unfortunately, the Governor, General Menacho, who had hitherto conducted the defence with great spirit, was killed by a cannon-shot, when standing on the ramparts to observe the effect of a sortie. His successor, General Imaz, was a man of less energy; and, from the moment he assumed the command, the vigour of the resistance was evidently decreased. Soult, on the other hand, having received intelligence of the retreat of Massena, was unremitting in his efforts for the reduction of the place. They were successful. On the ninth of March, the breaching battery opened,

Mar. 10. and, on the day following, the place was given up, though the Governor was made aware, by a telegraphic despatch, that a strong force was advancing to his relief. On the eleventh, the garrison, nearly eight thousand strong, marched out by the gate of the Trinity, deposited their arms on the glacis, and were made prisoners of war. It was conceded by Mortier that the grenadiers should enjoy the privilege of marching out by the breach; but, to effect this purpose, several hours' labour was found necessary: a sufficient proof of the pusillanimous conduct of the

Governor in surrendering the city. The indignant comment of Lord Wellington, on the unworthy dereliction of their duty by the Spanish leaders, is worthy of record. "Thus," he says, "were Olivença and Badajos given up without any sufficient cause: while Marshal Soult, with a corps which was never supposed to exceed twenty thousand men, besides capturing these two places, made prisoners and destroyed above twenty-two thousand Spanish troops."

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1811.

March.

On the fall of Badajos, Mortier advanced against Campo Mayor. The town was of little strength, and the works in bad order, and partly dismantled. It was garrisoned by a small detachment of militia, and only five guns were mounted on the ramparts. Under all these disadvantages, however, it held out for eleven days, and did not surrender till a practicable breach had been effected.

Mar. 23.

A detachment, under Latour Maubourg, was also sent against Albuquerque. The place—which was formerly one of great strength, and still capable of resistance—surrendered without firing a shot. The French thus gained possession of seventeen brass guns, of large calibre, which were immediately sent off to Badajos.

CHAP. III. The satisfaction of Marshal Soult at the successful course of the campaign in Estramadura, must have been considerably diminished by a reverse experienced about the same time by the corps of Victor before Cadiz. In the month of January, the Spanish government, in concert with General Graham, had determined on making a combined attack on the rear of the French entrenchments. In order to remove all feeling of jealousy on the part of the Spaniards, General Graham consented that the chief command should be assumed by General La Pena. The enterprise seemed to promise success, since the corps remaining before Cadiz did not exceed twelve thousand men,—and the allies would be enabled to attack them with a force numerically superior.

It was accordingly concerted that the expedition should be conveyed by sea to Tariffa ; and on being joined by the Spanish force at St. Roque, the combined army should advance against Victor ; and, driving him from his lines, destroy the extensive works which had been erected from the bay of Cadiz to the mouth of the Santi Petri. An attempt was likewise to be made by the troops remaining in the Isla de Leon, under

General Zayas, to open a communication with the allied force, and bear part in the operations.

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February.

On the twenty-first of February the expedition sailed; but the wind becoming violent it was found impossible to land at Tariffa, or any port in the neighbourhood. It was decided, therefore, to proceed to Algesiras, though from that point there was no road practicable for artillery. By the indefatigable exertions of the sailors, however, the guns were conveyed in boats to Tariffa, in spite of the formidable impediments of wind and current.

On the evening of the twenty-seventh, the whole combined force was assembled at Tariffa; and on the following day continued its advance on Casas Viejas, and Veger, in hope of surprising the detachments by which they were occupied. The enemy retreated with some loss from these places. In the meantime General Zayas had succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Santi Petri, and forming a *tête de pont* for its protection. On the nights of the third and fourth, the post was attacked by the enemy, but on both occasions they encountered a repulse. On the fifth, the allied army having been joined by the troops from St. Roque, after a long and

Feb. 27.

Mar. 5.

CHAP. III. fatiguing march, arrived on the low ridge of
1811. Barossa, when General Lardizabel, with his di-
March. vision, was directed to advance against the
French entrenchments near the mouth of the
Santi Petri.

In the execution of this mission, the Spaniards conducted themselves in a manner worthy of applause. They attacked the enemy with gallantry and success, and forced him, after some resistance, to withdraw. La Pena having thus opened a communication with the Isla de Leon, moved forward, with the main body of the Spaniards, to the heights of Bermeja, to secure the advantage thus acquired, and directed General Graham to advance with the British to his support.

This order, notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops, was promptly obeyed; and General Graham had already commenced his advance, when two divisions of the enemy were suddenly discovered, one of which directed its march on the heights of Barossa, still occupied by the rear-guard, while the other bore directly down on his flank.

The scene of approaching encounter was a rugged and extensive plain, nearly circled by a

pine-forest, which sweeps from the Santi Petri round its northern extremity to the sea. The plain is intersected by several ridges of rough and sandy eminences, which stretch directly inland from the shore. The ridge of Barossa is about a league distant from the mouth of the Santi Petri; and the Bermeja height, in a direct line, is nearly equidistant from both of these points. At its termination, near to the sea, stands a ruinous tower.

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On discovering the approach of the enemy, General Graham immediately directed his force to counter-march, with the determination of assuming the offensive, at once perceiving that to retreat under such circumstances could not but endanger the safety of the whole army. General Graham, accordingly, formed his troops into two divisions. Of these, the right, commanded by General Dilkes, advanced towards the Barossa heights. The left, under Colonel Wheatley, hastened to clear a wood which intervened on the left and attack the enemy's column in that direction. The latter came first into action. Unchecked by the fire of the British guns, which being judiciously posted, and admirably served, did great execution, the

CHAP. III. enemy's right wing under General Laval pressed on gallantly to meet the attack which the British were preparing. A warm fire of musquetry was for some time maintained by both parties, the brigade of Colonel Wheatley continuing its advance. At length a decisive charge, led by the eighty-seventh regiment, and three companies of the Coldstream Guards, drove the enemy back in confusion, with the loss of a howitzer and an eagle, which remained in possession of Major Gough of the eighty-seventh. The pursuit was continued across a narrow valley ; and a reserve formed beyond it was routed with facility, all attempts to re-form being prevented by the destructive action of the British guns.

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The right wing was not less successful. The enemy had gained the heights of Barossa with little difficulty ; the rear-guard and Spanish battalions, by which it was occupied, retiring after some shew of resistance. General Ruffin, by whom this division of the enemy was commanded, confident in his numbers and in the advantage of position, advanced to meet the assailants on the brow of the ascent. A warm engagement ensued. The fire of musquetry and artillery from the heights, occasioned great loss to

the British ; but after a severe and sanguinary contest, the enemy were driven from the heights in complete disorder.

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Thus defeated at all points, Marshal Victor thought only of retreat. The exhausted state of the troops rendered pursuit impossible, and General Graham halted for several hours on the eastern side of the heights which had been the theatre of struggle. The results of this victory were the capture of an eagle and six pieces of artillery, with nearly five hundred prisoners, including two generals, (Ruffin and Rousseau,) who both died of their wounds. The enemy lost nearly a third of his number, upwards of three thousand being killed, wounded, or made prisoners. The victors also suffered severely, considering the smallness of the force engaged. Their loss amounted to about twelve hundred.

During the whole of this brilliant engagement, General Graham received no support from the Spaniards under La Pena. Two battalions, indeed, which were attached to his division, and had remained with the rear-guard on the height till ordered to retire, made every effort to rejoin him, but did not come up till the enemy were in

CHAP. III. full retreat. With a force greatly superior in
1811. number to that of Villatte, who, with four thou-
April. sand men, was posted on the Santi Petri, for the
protection of the lines, had La Pena thrown him-
self between that body and the centre, and push-
ed forward on Chiclana, the most important con-
sequences must have resulted. The manœuvre
would of necessity have been decisive. Victor
could only have saved himself by instant and
precipitate retreat ; and Villatte must either have
at once abandoned the whole of the posts on the
Santi Petri, or his retreat would have been cut
off. This golden opportunity of achieving the
entire object of the expedition, either through
ignorance or cowardice, was lost by La Pena.
During the whole engagement he remained in-
active at Bermeja, satisfied with maintaining a
position which the enemy were in no condition
seriously to attack.

General Graham was naturally indignant at
the disgraceful conduct of the Spanish general.
After such a lesson, it was impossible that in
any future operations he could place any reliance
on the support of such a man. He, therefore,
withdrew from his command ; and early on the
next morning crossed the Santi Petri. La Pena

for several days remained at Bermeja, anxious, CHAP. III.
as he declared, to follow up the victory which
British blood and British courage had alone
achieved. Yet, with a force under his own
immediate command, of fifteen thousand men,
he refused to advance against the enemy, with-
out the aid and presence of those troops, which
in the moment of peril he had betrayed.

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During this period several landings were effected by marines and sailors of the squadron, at different points of the harbour, who succeeded in dismantling all the sea defences of the enemy, from Rota to Sta. Maria, with the exception of Catalina. Victor, alarmed at his situation, hastened to Seville to demand reinforcements, concentrating nearly his whole force at Xeres, a small guard only being left for the protection of the principal works before Cadiz. Even under circumstances so favourable, however, La Pena remained pertinaciously inactive. At length the French, who at first were panic-stricken by the defeat they had encountered, emboldened by the timidity of their opponents, made an offensive movement. This operated as the signal of retreat. La Pena immediately withdrew his troops into the Isla de Leon, and

CHAP. III. destroyed the communication across the Santi
1811. Petri.

Such was the lame and impotent conclusion of an expedition, which in all its operations had been crowned with greater success than could reasonably have been anticipated from the circumstances under which it was undertaken. We say this, because from the very moment when preparations commenced, the enemy must have been aware of the object for which they were intended. They commanded a view of the whole harbour ; they saw in fact the whole progress of embarkation ; the fleet steering for the Straits was clearly discernible from the coast ; and opportunity was thus given to Marshal Victor of calculating the movements and counteracting the object of the expedition.

In truth, however, Victor had long been aware of the measure which the Spanish government was busied in arranging. He accordingly wrote to Sebastiani at Seville, entreating him to unite his army with that before Cadiz, or at least to embarrass the allied force by manœuvring on its flank and rear. Had Sebastiani acceded to the desire of Victor, the situation of Graham and La Pena would have been one of the greatest

danger, since it would have been impossible for an army, so discordant in materials as that which they commanded, to oppose the combined forces of their opponents, with any prospect of success.

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That such a junction did not take place was owing solely to the jealousy of the French commanders. Sebastiani, intrusted with a sphere of independent command, did not choose to place himself under the orders of Victor ; and the opportunity afforded of overwhelming the allied army was thus suffered to escape. But such expectations could form no part of the calculations on which the enterprise was undertaken. The allied leaders were not entitled to calculate on the occurrence of such a contingency, when they knew the enemy had full notice of the intended attack.

In this view we conceive the project, acted on by the allies, to have been radically faulty. In other respects it seems to have been concerted with skill and prudence ; and had the element of secrecy been added to its other features, we should hold it to have been altogether unexceptionable.

The indignation excited by the conduct of La Pena, was not confined to the British army and

CHAP. III. people. His own countrymen joined in censur-
1811. ing the apathy or ignorance, by which all the
beneficial consequences that might have resulted
from the expedition had been sacrificed. The
Cortes addressed the Regency, and demanded a
complete investigation of the circumstances to
which a failure so disgraceful was to be attri-
buted. A Court of Inquiry was accordingly ap-
pointed, which exonerated La Pena from the
charge of cowardice, but not from the stigma of
incapacity and want of enterprise.

March. In the Alentejo a considerable corps of the
allies, commanded by Marshal Beresford, was
advancing to check the French in their career of
conquest. He was directed to invest Badajoz,
if possible, before the garrison should have time
to repair the defences, and make the necessary
preparations for standing a siege. The nature
of the intelligence from Cadiz had induced Soult
to return to Seville ; and Mortier, who succeed-
ed to the command, fell back on the approach
of Beresford, leaving a small force under La-
tour Maubourg, at Campo Mayor, to watch the
movements of the allies. Shortly afterwards he
was recalled to France.

Mar. 17. On the seventeenth of March, the troops from

the north of the Tagus crossed the river at Tan-
cos ; and after a halt of a few days near Por-
talegre, to recruit their strength, exhausted by
a long succession of heavy marches, Beresford
continued his advance on Campo Mayor. He
reached that place on the twenty-fifth; and
from a height about a mile distant, the enemy
were seen running from the town, and hastily
forming in order of march, while a convoy of
artillery, ammunition, and provisions, was ob-
served to be in motion towards Badajos.

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March.

Mar. 25.

The enemy's force consisted of three battalions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and some horse artillery. Brigadier-General Long was directed to attack them on the right flank, and a charge made by the thirteenth light dragoons, under Colonel Head, supported by some squadrons of the seventh Portuguese cavalry, drove back the enemy's horse in confusion on their infantry, which halted, formed square, and in turn forced the assailants to retire.

The road from Campo Mayor to Badajos lies over a wide unbroken plain, which afforded to both parties ample scope for the display of military skill. The charges of the light cavalry were uniformly successful, yet productive of no

CHAP. III. important result. At one period a considerable
1811. part of the convoy was in possession of the thir-
March. teenth, but being unsupported, Colonel Head
found it impossible to reap the benefit of his
achievement. The convoy again moved on, and
succeeded in effecting its retreat to Badajos, with
no greater loss than that of a howitzer.

On the part of the allies the chief loss was sus-
tained by the thirteenth light dragoons, which
pursued the enemy to the very walls of Badajos,
and were fired on by the guns of the place. Had
Beresford employed his heavy cavalry to sup-
port the charges of the thirteenth, there can be
little doubt that the whole convoy would have
been taken; but alarmed at the boldness of
Colonel Head's attack, he refused to allow the
heavy cavalry to charge, observing that "the
loss of one regiment of cavalry was enough
for the day." The amount of casualties on the
part of the allies was ninety-four killed and
wounded, and seventy-seven missing. That of
the enemy was considerably greater.

Mar. 26. On the "day following, Beresford moved for-
ward to Elvas, where he halted for several days,
while preparations were in progress for crossing
the Guadiana. The task was one of difficulty.

The current of the river was rapid; and Beresford had brought with him no materials for the construction of a bridge. He depended, therefore, on such supplies as the country could afford; and so inadequate were these, that on the very morning of its completion, a sudden increase of the river entirely demolished the structure which had been laboriously erected. Rafts were then constructed; and on the sixth of April the passage of the troops was effected near Juramenha.

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April 6.

Head-quarters were then established at a small village on the left of the Guadiana, in the neighbourhood of which the army halted for several days. During this period of inaction, the enemy were on the alert. An out-piquet, consisting of a squadron of the thirteenth light dragoons, was surprised by a party of the enemy's cavalry in the night; and, with the exception of twenty men, the whole were made prisoners. The French, after this success, pushed forward to the village, from which Marshal Beresford with difficulty effected his escape. The alarm was at length given, but the party succeeded in reaching Olivença, bearing with them the men and horses they had captured, as trophies of success.

CHAP. III. diana, for the transmission of artillery and stores,

1811. had, hitherto, kept the army inactive. Two had
May. been constructed and swept away by the torrents
caused by a succession of heavy rains; by great
exertions, however, a third was established, and
Beresford at length found himself in condition
to commence operations against Badajos.

May 8. The place was completely invested on the
eighth of May, by Major-General Lumley,
on the right of the river, and by Major-Gen-
eral William Stewart, on the left. Ground
was immediately broken against Fort St. Chris-
toval, and a breaching battery established on the
eleventh, notwithstanding a vigorous sortie of
the garrison, which, though at first partially
successful, was, eventually, repulsed with con-
siderable slaughter. The breaching battery, how-
ever, produced little effect. The guns sent
from Lisbon being of brass, were soon injured
by the frequent firing. The Portuguese gun-
ners were raw and inexperienced, while the
fire of the fort was vigorous and well-directed.
The consequence was, that, in the course of a
few hours, the whole guns in the battery were
rendered unserviceable.

Fresh guns were then ordered to be brought

up ; and, on the night of the twelfth, ground was broken against the castle ; when Beresford, hearing that Soult, at the head of a considerable army, was advancing from Seville, relinquished the further prosecution of the siege, and advanced to meet him.

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May.

On the fourteenth, the army was put in motion on Valverde ; and the stores and artillery were removed under escort of General Cole's division. As the rear-guard commenced its march, the enemy made a sortie from the town in force, and a battalion of Portuguese suffered very severely.

May 14.

On receiving intelligence of the successful operations in Portugal, the Regent Blake had left Cadiz in hope of profiting by a conjuncture so favourable. He effected a junction with Castanos, who had been appointed to the command in Estramadura ; and on the fourteenth these leaders had an interview with Marshal Beresford at Valverde. It was then agreed to offer battle to the enemy, and on the day following the British army took post on the heights of Albuera.

May 15.

Before Beresford commenced operations against Badajos, it was deemed of importance to

CHAP. III. push the enemy as far as possible from the scene
of action; and a combined movement of Colonel
1811. Colburne, Ballasteros, and the Conde de Ville-
May. mur, commanding the Estramaduran cavalry,
induced Latour Maubourg to fall back to Con-
stantino. Soult, however, having by large drafts
from the corps of Victor and Sebastiani col-
lected a considerable force at Seville, joined
Latour Maubourg, and, with this united army,
was advancing to the relief of Badajos.

To oppose the progress of this formidable
May 15. force, Beresford, on the fifteenth, took post on
the heights of Albuera. During the night he
was joined by the Spaniards under Blake and
Castanos, who, with a liberality and self-denial
unusual in the Spanish character, insisted that
the chief command in the approaching engage-
ment should be vested in Marshal Beresford.

The ground occupied by the allies was a chain
of eminences, along the front of which flowed the
river Albuera, a narrow stream, and fordable in
many places above the position. Towards the
left, the great road from Seville leads over it by
a bridge, and subsequently divaricates to Bada-
jos and Olivença. On the left of this road, and
a short distance from the bridge, stands the vil-

lage of Albuera, containing a church and about an hundred houses, which had been deserted by their inhabitants. Below the bridge the Albuera was unfordable. The western bank occupied by the allies was of considerable altitude, and completely commanded all the ground to the eastward. A little above the bridge, a brook called the Ferdia joins the Albuera, and the banks of those streams, and the ground between them, is thickly covered with wood. The right of the position had no *point d'appui*, the range of heights being prolonged in that direction to an extent it was impossible to occupy.

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On the the fifteenth, the cavalry were driven back from Santa Martha; and in the evening the leading divisions of the French army took post on some wooded ground about a mile distant, which stretched in a simicircular sweep downward to the river. The remainder came up during the night; and Soult, with a force of eighteen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and forty pieces of caannon, found himself in presence of his enemy.

The allied army was somewhat superior in numbers. It consisted of a corps of twelve

CHAP. III. thousand Spaniards, which joined during the
1811. night; of thirteen thousand British and Portu-
May. guese infantry, two thousand cavalry, and thirty-
two guns.

Beresford occupied his position in the following manner:—The Spaniards were posted on the right in two lines, their left terminating on the Valverde road, where it joined the right of General Stewart's division which occupied the centre. General Hamilton's Portuguese division was on the left, supported by a brigade of German light infantry, which held the village of Albuera. General Cole's division—which only came up as the action commenced—and one brigade of General Hamilton's division, formed a second line in rear of the left and centre. A strong body of artillery was posted for the protection of the bridge, and the cavalry, under General Lumley, lent support to the Spaniards on the right.

May 16. About eight o'clock on the morning of the sixteenth, the French army were observed to be in motion; and shortly afterwards a strong force of cavalry, supported by two columns of infantry and several guns, issued from the wooded

ground between the Ferdia and the Albuera, and directed its march towards the bridge. The artillery immediately opened fire, and a heavy cannonade was kept up on both sides, with great effect on the part of the British, from their advantages of ground. In the meanwhile, Soult, crossing the Albuera, under cover of the wood, above the position, advanced with the main body of his army, and without opposition took possession of the heights on the right flank of the Spaniards. The combat then commenced. The Spanish troops, after a short resistance, were driven from their ground, and Soult then formed his army in a line, extending to the Valverde road, and raking that of the allies.

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It became instantly essential to the safety of the army, that the enemy should be driven from the commanding station he had thus assumed. Beresford directed a new alignment: General Cole's division was placed in an oblique line with its right flank thrown back, and an endeavour was made to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge. This failed. A heavy fire was kept up by the French artillery, and a charge

CHAP. III. of cavalry again forced them to retire in confusion. General Stewart's division, therefore, was brought up, and passing, through the Spaniards, advanced to gain possession of the heights. At this period a storm of rain came on, which completely darkened the atmosphere, and rendered it impossible to discern the movements of the enemy at any distance. The right brigade, under Colonel Colburne, consisting of the Buffs, the sixty-sixth, the second battalion forty-eighth, and the thirty-first, was in the act of deploying,—the two leading battalions alone, having completed the manœuvre,—when a regiment of Polish lancers, which under shelter of the mist had circled their flank, made a furious charge from the rear. The result was, that the whole brigade, with the exception of the thirty-first, which still remained in column, were driven forward into the enemy's line, and made prisoners.

General Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, then, took post beyond the right of the allies, waiting for the first indication of retreat, to execute a grand and decisive charge, and throw confusion into the movement. Their mo-

tions were watched by the heavy brigade, under General Lumley, and the horse artillery did considerable execution in their ranks.

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It was under such circumstances that the brigade of General Houghton was advanced to retrieve, if possible, the fortunes of the day. A contest of the most bloody and pertinacious character ensued. The leading regiment, the twenty-ninth, no sooner reached the summit of the heights, than it was assailed by a fire of musquetry and artillery which spread havoc through the ranks,—and in leading this regiment to the charge, General Houghton fell pierced with wounds. Unfortunately, the intervention of a steep but narrow gulley, rendered it impossible to reach the enemy with the bayonet, and the twenty-ninth was directed to halt and open fire. The fifty-seventh and forty-eighth then came up, and assuming their position in line, the struggle was maintained on both sides with desperate courage.

In this state of things, General Cole directed the Fusileer brigade to advance on the enemy's left, and ascend the disputed heights from the valley. In the execution of this movement, General Cole, and almost every individual at-

CHAP. III. tached to his staff, were wounded. The Fusileer brigade, on crowning the ascent, was received with a fire so tremendous, that it at first recoiled, but instantly recovering its ground, displayed, throughout the remainder of this desperate conflict, a degree of steadiness and intrepidity impossible to be surpassed. Colonel Sir William Myers, commanding the brigade, was killed early in the action, and his country was thus deprived of the services of a most gallant and accomplished officer.

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In the meanwhile, General Houghton's brigade had maintained its ground in spite of all the enemy's efforts to dislodge it. Above two-thirds of its number had fallen, yet the remainder continued unbroken, and not one inch of ground had been yielded. At length, the entire exhaustion of ammunition made it necessary to retire, and the retrogressive movement was made by the small number of survivors with the most perfect regularity. A brigade of guns was then advanced to the front, and immediately opened fire. They were charged in flank by the Polish lancers, and for a moment taken; but the Fusileer brigade coming up, the cavalry were driven back, and the guns withdrawn.

At length the French were forced from their position with immense slaughter, and retired across the Albuera. Marshal Beresford, from his great inferiority in cavalry, did not judge it prudent to continue the pursuit; and Soult, alarmed at the extent of his loss, made no effort to regain the post, the pertinacious maintenance of which had involved a sacrifice so prodigious.

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While these events were passing on the right, several attempts were made to gain possession of the bridge and village on the left. Though a great proportion of the troops had been withdrawn from this point, General Alten's light infantry brigade, and General Hamilton's Portuguese division, succeeded in repelling every attack.

About three o'clock, the firing had entirely ceased, and both armies took post on the ground they had occupied in the morning. Thus terminated, perhaps, the most fierce and murderous contest which took place during the war. Out of seven thousand five hundred British, four thousand one hundred and fifty-eight were killed, wounded, or missing. The total loss of the allies in the engagement, a-

CHAP. III. mounted to nearly seven thousand men. Soult, in his official despatch, rated the French loss at only two thousand eight hundred; but it was ascertained, by an intercepted letter from General Gazan, that upwards of four thousand wounded, were under charge of that officer. Taking this fact in conjunction with the number of killed and wounded left on the field, the loss of the French army cannot be reasonably calculated at less than nine thousand men,—an amount of slaughter on both sides, which, in proportion to the numbers engaged, is altogether enormous.

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During the following day, both armies remained in peaceful occupation of their respective positions. On the morning of the eighteenth, it was ascertained that Marshal Soult had withdrawn from his position, and was retiring on Seville. The cavalry, under General Lumley, were instantly detached to follow this movement; and at Usagre, a very gallant affair took place, which, without loss to the British, cost the enemy about an hundred and fifty of their number.

Honourable as the battle of Albuera unquestionably was to the prowess of British troops, it

did by no means succeed in adding a reputation CHAP. III.
for military talent, to the other accomplish-
ments of Marshal Beresford. The manœuvres 1811.
of Soult, before and during the battle, were bold and masterly. He seized at once on the vulnerable point of the position, and refused to relax his grasp while it was possible to retain it. Had he been opposed by other than British troops, in all probability Albuera would have witnessed a repetition of the scene of Ocana. Never, in truth, was an army in more imminent peril than that of the allies. Soult at one period had not only gained the key of the position, but had captured a whole brigade of artillery, above one thousand prisoners, and six stand of colours. So decided indeed was his success, that Beresford even talked of retreat, when retreat could have involved nothing short of the entire ruin of his army. From the execution of this purpose he was fortunately dissuaded by the earnest remonstrances of General Stewart; and by the sacrifice of more than half of his British force, he was enabled to regain that ground which ought never to have been lost.

In allotting the defence of the most important

CHAP. III. part of the position to the Spaniards, Beresford was guilty of an error of the first magnitude. He evidently expected that the chief efforts of the enemy would be directed against the bridge, but the right was the truly vulnerable point—the point, indeed, so obviously vulnerable, that its selection by Soult, as the chief object of attack, might have been anticipated by any General of ordinary accomplishment in his profession. Had such useful prescience been possessed by Marshal Beresford, he would scarcely have intrusted the key of his position to that portion of his force on which least dependence could be placed ; and, by a different disposition of his troops, he would, in all probability, have escaped the peril to which the army was subsequently exposed.

In one respect, at least, Marshal Beresford and the army he commanded were fortunate. General Cole and General Stewart were officers of the highest merit, and exerted themselves throughout the day with a talent, promptitude, and energy, impossible to be surpassed. General Stewart seemed everywhere in the field, animating and directing wherever danger seemed to

lower most darkly ; and we believe it was solely from the dictates of his own judgment that General Cole made that decisive movement in advance by which the victory was decided.

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On the whole, the victory of Albuera was utterly barren and unproductive. In raising the siege of Badajos, Beresford at once allowed Soult to gain the great object of his movement ; in fact, the only object, which, on the part of the allies, it was worth hazarding a battle to prevent. The armies fought ; and Soult returned to Seville, baffled indeed in the field, yet successful in achieving the important purpose for which he had advanced. Beresford, on the other hand, after a successful battle, gained nothing but the boast of victory, earned at a most ruinous price.

CHAPTER IV.

BATTLE OF FUENTES—CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA.

CHAP. IV. ON the twenty-eighth of April, Lord Wel-
 1811. lington returned from the Alentejo, and again
 April. established his head-quarters at Villa Formosa.
 Nothing of importance had occurred during his
 absence. Massena had been employed in re-or-
 ganizing his army, which the retreat from Por-
 tugal had reduced to a miserable condition ; and,
 having received a reinforcement of fifteen hun-
 dred cavalry of the Imperial Guard, he concen-
 trated his divisions in the neighbourhood of
 Ciudad Rodrigo. His chief object was to intro-
 duce supplies into Almeida ; and, on the second of
 May 2. May, the whole French army, consisting of the
 second, sixth, eighth, and ninth corps, with all
 the cavalry that could be collected in the pro-
 vinces of Castile and Leon, crossed the Agueda

and the Azava. Lord Wellington's inferiority in cavalry did not permit him to oppose their march in a country peculiarly favourable for the exercise of that arm, and the cavalry and light division fell back on their approach to Fuentes d'Honore.

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The numerical strength of the enemy was considerably greater than that of the allies; it amounted to forty thousand infantry, and five thousand cavalry, while Lord Wellington could only muster an effective force of thirty-six thousand men, of which not more than two thousand were cavalry. Notwithstanding this disparity, he determined to oppose Massena in his attempt to relieve Almeida; and accordingly concentrated his army to give battle.

Almeida stands on the right of the Coa, a river of considerable magnitude, which, from the steepness of its banks, affords few points at which it can be crossed by an army. The bridge immediately in rear of Almeida is within range of the guns of the fortress, and at the period in question was so dilapidated as to be nearly impassable. There is another at Castello Bom, about two leagues above Almeida; but this also was a most difficult communication. A little

CHAP. IV. higher up there is a ford, but between that point
1811. and Sabugal the river cannot be crossed. At
May. the latter place the road from Ciudad Rodrigo
leads across a stone bridge, affording the only
safe and convenient communication in case of
retreat.

Lord Wellington, therefore, was naturally anxious to adopt a position which should enable him at once to protect the approach to Almeida, and cover this important line of communication. He was fully aware, however, that the great extension of front thus rendered necessary, was highly disadvantageous; and, from the first, he contemplated the probability of being forced by circumstances to relinquish the communication by Sabugal, and concentrate his army in a more confined position, for the protection of Almeida alone.

Between the Duas Casas and the Tournon rivers, both of which run nearly parallel to the Coa, is a range of easy heights, along which Lord Wellington formed the centre of his army. In front of these is the village of Fuentes d'Honore, which, though not strictly speaking embraced in the position, was held as an advanced post, and contributed materially to its strength. General

Houston, with the seventh division, was posted on the extreme right of the line; and a body of Spanish cavalry, under Don Julian Sanchez, was placed in the village of Nava d'Aver, about two miles beyond it, to add to the security which that flank derived from the extreme difficulty of the ground in its rear. The first and third divisions were stationed on the height in rear of Fuentes d'Honore, their light infantry occupying the village. The sixth and light divisions were posted in rear of Almada, where the *Duas Casas* is crossed by a bridge. The fifth division formed the extreme left of the line, and guarded the great road to Almeida, with its flank resting on Fort Conception. The Portuguese brigade of General Pack, supported by a British battalion, was employed in blockading Almeida.

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On the third of May the enemy appeared in front of the position, and took post on a ridge which overhangs the village of Fuentes d'Honore, nearly parallel to that occupied by the allies. A brisk skirmish took place between the light troops, followed by a heavy cannonade, and a desperate attack on the village. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, with the light-infantry battalions of the first and third divisions, maintained this post

May 3.

CHAP. IV. with great gallantry and resolution ; but fresh
1811. numbers of the enemy pouring on to the attack,
May. it was found necessary to support him success-
sively with the seventy-first, the seventy-ninth,
and the twenty-fourth regiments. The contest
was continued on both sides with great obsti-
nacy and perseverance, till the approach of night,
when the assailants, repulsed in all their efforts,
took advantage of the darkness to retire.

May 4. On the fourth no engagement took place.
Massena employed himself in reconnoitring the
position of the allies ; and Lord Wellington, an-
ticipating that he would endeavour to turn his
right, by crossing the Duas Casas at Poço Vel-
ho, moved the division of General Houston to-
wards that point, with directions to defend the
passage of the river.

May 5. The expectations of Lord Wellington were
realized. On the morning of the fifth, the French
army were observed to have made a general
movement ; and the corps of Junot, with all the
cavalry, appeared in two columns on the oppo-
site side of the valley of the Duas Casas, in front
of Poço Velho. Lord Wellington, in conse-
quence, sent the light division and the cavalry
to the support of General Houston, and the

first and third divisions also made a movement to their right. CHAP. IV.

About seven o'clock the enemy drove in the advanced guard of the British, and took possession of the village of Poço Velho. The cavalry, under General Montbrun, having driven Don Julian Sanchez from Nava d'Aver, now executed a general charge, supported by infantry and guns, and forced the British cavalry to retire in some confusion beyond the infantry, which, opening fire, succeeded in checking the assailants.

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Though this attack was repulsed, the numerous cavalry of the enemy were observed to be collecting on the right flank, while large masses of infantry were forming in front. Under these circumstances, Lord Wellington decided on withdrawing his army to a more concentrated position, and giving up the communication by Sabugal. The seventh and light divisions, therefore, supported by the cavalry, were directed to retire, and a new alignment was taken up, extending from the Duas Casas to the Turon, nearly at right angles with that in which the army had hitherto been formed. The seventh division was posted on a height beyond

CHAP. IV. the Turon, which commanded the whole plain
1811. to Frenada; and the cavalry and light division
May. were directed to form in reserve in rear of the
left of the first division.

This retrogressive movement was executed with the most perfect regularity, though pressed by the enemy's cavalry, which, strongly supported by artillery, made repeated charges on the retiring divisions. Their superiority in this arm was too decided to admit of contest; but, occasionally, a few squadrons charged through the intervals of the squares, and succeeded in checking for a moment the progress of the assailants. During this movement the chasseurs Britanniques, in particular, distinguished themselves. They repulsed a furious charge; and, by a well-directed flanking fire, compelled the French cavalry to retire with considerable loss. The conduct of the horse-artillery, commanded by Captain Bull, was also admirable. Nothing could exceed the skill and boldness with which it was manœuvred; and, thus supported, the infantry accomplished its retrogression in unbroken order, and with a loss far inferior to that of the enemy.

When the divisions reached their ground, the

cavalry, in passing through the intervals of the new alignment, occasioned some confusion; and taking instant advantage of this circumstance, General Montbrun ordered his whole cavalry to charge. In order to protect the retiring divisions, the line of march had been flanked by two brigades of guns, which instantly opened fire on the approach of the enemy. The infantry likewise poured in several volleys; and, thus severely handled, the French cavalry retreated in confusion, and Montbrun desisted from further effort.

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In the meanwhile, the sixth corps, which, during these events remained opposite to Fuentes d'Honore, had made strenuous efforts to gain possession of that important post. About nine in the morning, several brigades of artillery were brought opposite to the village, and pointed in readiness to fire. At length, on a given signal, the whole of their guns opened fire on the village, and several columns of infantry moved forward to the attack. A struggle of the fiercest and most obstinate character ensued. The seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and twenty-fourth regiments defended the village with the greatest gallantry,

CHAP. IV. disputing every inch of ground. In this state

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of things, Colonel Cameron of the seventy-ninth, commanding the brigade, was killed, and the enemy continuing to pour in fresh columns, at length succeeded in overpowering the defenders. No sooner, however, did the assailants attempt to form beyond the houses, than the eighty-eighth, seventy-fourth, and eighty-third regiments, advancing to the charge, drove them back into the village with the bayonet, where the contest recommenced, and continued to be kept up on both sides with great vigour and obstinacy, till the streets may be said literally to have been covered with dead.* To

* Nothing could exceed the gallantry and devotion of the French troops in this part of the engagement. The forty-fifth French regiment in particular, distinguishable by their long red feathers, attracted the admiration of all who witnessed the contest. They came on to the sound of music in all the regularity of a field-day, and subsequently maintained their ground in spite of every effort made by the seventy-first and seventy-ninth to dislodge them. The eagle of the regiment was then planted on the outward wall of the village nearest to the British position, and maintained there while a sharp engagement was carried on with the eighty-third, which, animated by the hope of gaining so splendid a prize, fought with the greatest courage. The forty-fifth were at length forced to retire, and an incessant fire having been kept up on the eagle, nearly an hundred of their number were found dead within grasp of the pole.

wards evening the fire on both sides gradually slackened, and the village, as if by mutual consent, was divided by the combatants, the upper part being occupied by the British, the lower by the enemy.

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The result of these repeated efforts convinced Massena that he had nothing to hope from continuing the contest. During the whole of the sixth an unbroken tranquillity reigned in both armies, and on the morning of the seventh he withdrew his troops from the front of the allied position. In order to repair as much as possible the reverse he had experienced, orders were secretly transmitted to the Governor of Almeida, directing him to blow up the works, and escape across the Agueda with his garrison, at Barba del Puerco or San Felices. On the seventh, Marshal Marmont arrived from Paris, with authority to assume the command of the army.

May 7.

With this event, the military career of Massena may be said to have closed for ever. The short period of his service in the Peninsula had considerably impaired his reputation, and the charm of his name, as a watch-word to victory, had been tried in vain. Though

CHAP. IV. his faculties were entire, it was evident that
1811. age had considerably impaired their activity.
May. He was no longer what he had been, when
celebrated as the hero of Zurich, the defender
of Genoa, and the unconquered opponent of
Souvaroff. At Busaco, at Guarda, at Sabugal,
and at Fuentes, he had not only been out-
fought but out-manceuvred; and he returned
to France, shrunk from the gigantic dimen-
sions with which men's opinion had invested
him, to the stature of a common man. At
Fuentes d'Honore, during the whole of the
third, his efforts were confined to the single
object of gaining possession of the village,—
a sort of nibbling hostility, which was unsucces-
ful, and deserved to be so. His operations on
the morning of the fifth gave hope of better
things. By directing his efforts against the
right of the allied position, he took advantage
of the most vulnerable point; and in driving
a British army from ground which they attempt-
ed seriously to defend, he achieved a temporary
success, to which no parallel can be afforded in
the whole war.

His subsequent manœuvres are not equally

entitled to praise. The charges of his cavalry—
 in which arm his superiority was overpowering
 —were not supported by his infantry, and were
 therefore productive of little benefit. By some
 unaccountable timidity he appeared unwilling to
 commit the fate of his army to the chances of a
 battle, and no sooner did he perceive that Lord
 Wellington again fronted him in position, than
 he drew off his forces. He thus remained inac-
 tive at the very moment when having achieved
 an advantage, his troops felt something of that
 exhilaration, which the spectacle of a retiring
 enemy is certain to inspire. The position of
 the allies presented no feature of imposing
 strength. It was in many places unavoidably
 exposed, and open to the attack both of cavalry
 and artillery. The thick woods in front offered
 secure cover for the formation of his attacking
 columns; and thus favoured, he might have
 poured the full mass and volume of his force
 on any point of the position.

It is nothing to say that in such a powerful
 and concentrated effort he might have encoun-
 tered repulse. If Massena was not prepared to
 fight for the relief of Almeida, why did he ad-
 vance? If he was so prepared, was it possible

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CHAP. IV. that he could have engaged his enemy under
1811. circumstances more favourable than those in
May. which he gave up the contest ?

But the *gravamen* of the charge against Massena, is not that he did not attack his enemy's position, but that *he did nothing*. By throwing his cavalry across the Coa, a movement which, having lost Sabugal, it was no longer in the power of Lord Wellington to prevent ; he might have penetrated to the rear of the allies, and compelled them to regain their communications, by crossing the Coa at points of great difficulty. Such a manœuvre must have utterly deranged the plans of the allies, and it was probably in reference to its adoption that Lord Wellington was currently believed to have declared, " That had Massena not been blind, he must have beaten him at Fuentes."

Of the manœuvres of Lord Wellington, little need be said. In the disposition and arrangement of his army, he displayed in an eminent degree that skill, sagacity, and confidence which marked him as a tactician of the highest order. His original position was too extended for his numbers, and Lord Wellington knew it to be so ; but the communication with Sabugal was of

too much consequence to be lightly given up, and he therefore determined to maintain it, so long as he might find it compatible with the more important object of covering Almeida. When the enemy's movements, however, made it prudent that he should concentrate his army for the protection of Almeida, he at once boldly relinquished the preferable line of communication, relying on his own skill and the valour of his troops to prevent the necessity of retreat.

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The loss of the allied army, in the actions of the third and fifth, amounted to about seventeen hundred men. That of the enemy, from their acting throughout as assailants, must have been considerably greater. In the village of Fuentes, the lanes, the church, the court-yards, and the gardens, were found literally piled with the dying and the dead. A considerable number of prisoners were likewise made by the allies.

The French had no sooner retired, than Lord Wellington, having received information that General Brennier intended to sally out with the garrison, made instant arrangements for a more vigorous blockade. General Campbell's division was accordingly ordered to invest the

CHAP. IV. place, a battalion was posted at Barba del Puerco, and a brigade on the high road to Rodrigo. These precautions, however, were insufficient. About midnight, on the eleventh, a tremendous explosion took place in the fortress, which blew down the *revetement* of two fronts, and General Brennier marched out with his garrison, taking the road to Barba del Puerco. He surprised and bayoneted a piquet; and, passing through the posts of the brigade on the Rodrigo road, was enabled to continue his march without serious molestation, and followed only by General Pack, who, with a few troops hastily collected, hung upon his rear, indicating, by the flashes of his musquetry, the direction taken by the enemy.

The object of Brennier was to reach Barba del Puerco; but mistaking his way, he followed a circuitous route which led him to some distance from the point of his destination. In the meanwhile the officer commanding the battalion at Barba del Puerco, imagining from the sound of the firing that the enemy were receding from his post, moved his corps to a ford higher up, in the hope of intercepting them. By this error, General Brennier, on reaching Barba del

Puerco found the town unoccupied ; but the CHAP. IV.
detour he had made, having enabled several re-
giments to close on his rear, a heavy fire was
opened as his troops were in the act of crossing
the bridge, and about two hundred, including
ten officers, were made prisoners. A consider-
able number also were killed or wounded.
With the rest of his force, Brennier succeeded in
joining the French army, having performed an
exploit remarkable at once for its boldness and
its success.

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The intelligence of this unfortunate event was accompanied by a general feeling of mortification and disappointment throughout the army. At his particular request the conduct of the siege had been committed to General Campbell ; and it is difficult to acquit that officer either of negligence, or unsound judgment in the discharge of his trust. Had proper precautions been adopted in the disposition of the blockading force, the fruits of the victory of Fuentes would not thus have been sacrificed, nor would the character of a British army have been lowered in the eyes of their opponents.

Marmont, on assuming the command, placed his army in cantonments in the neighbourhood

CHAP. IV. of Salamanca ; and Lord Wellington directed

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the works of Almeida to be repaired. It afforded a favourable point for the establishment of a general depôt of stores, whether he might still intend to remain on the defensive, or whether circumstances might enable him to penetrate into Spain. The information communicated by Marshal Beresford, determined him to detach two divisions to reinforce the southern army ; and setting out instantly in person, he reached Elvas on the nineteenth, where he received intelligence of the battle of Albuera. He also learned that the investment of Badajoz had been renewed on the same day, and that Soult was in full retreat towards Seville, followed by the allied cavalry.

May 19.

Lord Wellington immediately assumed the personal direction of the operations on the Guadiana. In a few days the divisions detached from the northern army came up ; and on the

May 27.

twenty-seventh the place was completely invested, on the right of the river by General Houston's division, on the left by those of Picton and Hamilton. Trenches were opened on

June 5.

the night of the twenty-ninth ; and on the fifth of June, the breach made in Fort St. Christoval

was considered practicable. On the night following it was assaulted. Owing to a blunder of the engineers, the attack failed. It had not been judged necessary to secure the ditch; and from the moment it became dark, the garrison had been employed in removing the earth and rubbish from the bottom of the breach, so that seven feet of the wall remained clear. An obstacle was thus unexpectedly presented, which the assailants were in no condition to surmount. Their ladders were too short; and though the gallantry of the men led them to attempt climbing the wall, their efforts proved unsuccessful. The enemy, from the parapet, hurled down on the assailants a shower of shells, grenades, stones, and other missiles, which occasioned great havoc; and the party were compelled at length to retire, with the loss of half their number.

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During the two following days the fire against the fort was continued, and on the ninth the breach was again judged practicable. At night a storming party of two hundred men, preceded by a forlorn-hope of twenty-five men, under Lieutenant Hunt of the engineers, advanced against the breach. The enemy, however, were better prepared for their reception than on the

Jun. 9.

CHAP. IV. former occasion. Reinforcements had been

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thrown into the fort, and unfortunately Lieutenant Hunt was killed on the glacis when leading on his party. The troops thus left without a leader, continued to press on with their accustomed gallantry. But the breach was again found impracticable, from the same cause which had occasioned the failure of the former assault. After many ineffectual efforts, the party was at length withdrawn, with the loss of one hundred and forty-five men in killed and wounded.

Jun. 10.

On the tenth, by an intercepted letter from Soult to Marmont, Lord Wellington received intelligence that these leaders were about to unite their forces, and advance against him. He, therefore, promptly determined on converting the siege of Badajos into a blockade ; and on the night of the twelfth, the last of the guns and stores were withdrawn to Elvas, without molestation from the garrison.

By other channels Lord Wellington had learned that Dronet, with a corps of eight thousand men, had marched from Toledo to join Soult, and reached Cordova on the seventh. He was aware, also, that Marmont had put his army in motion towards the south, and that Soult was

advancing to Merida to meet him. Lord Wel-
 lington, therefore, advanced to Albuera, and
 took post with his army in order to fight Soult,
 should he venture to advance alone to the relief
 of Badajos. Soult, however, having drawn all
 the disposable troops from the various towns
 possessed by the French in Andalusia, and be-
 ing joined by Drouet, marched on the twelfth
 from Llerena, and on the eighteenth establish-
 ed a communication with Marmont at Merida.
 From thence Soult and Marmont directed their
 march on Badajos, when Lord Wellington cross-
 ed the Guadiana, and took up a line on the river
 Caya, covered on the left by Campo Mayor, and
 on the right by Elvas.

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Jun. 12.

The combined force of the armies of Portu-
 gal and the south, amounted to about seventy
 thousand men, whereof ten thousand were ca-
 valry. That of Lord Wellington, including the
 corps of General Spencer, which had made a
 parallel movement with the enemy in its front, did
 not exceed fifty-six thousand, including four
 thousand cavalry. The smallness of this force
 may be accounted for by the unhealthiness of
 the army, upwards of twelve thousand British
 being in hospital. The Portuguese troops, ill

CHAP. IV. paid and ill supplied, were by no means in the
1811. same state of discipline and efficiency which had
June. marked them at an earlier period. The regularity
with which the British soldiers were paid and
supplied, could not but tend to excite comparisons
productive of discontent, and it was
judged necessary that Marshal Beresford should
resign his command, in order to restore discipline,
and silence complaint.

Under these circumstances, without dreading
*a battle, Lord Wellington determined not to
court one. He resolved to limit his object to
the defence of Portugal; and, with this view,
he formed an encampment in the woods along
the Caya, a small tributary of the Guadiana.*
This, forming the right of the army, was com-
manded by Sir Rowland Hill, who had recently
returned from England. The left, under
General Picton, occupied the heights in rear
of Campo Mayor, which flanked the front of
the position. The reserve, under Sir Brent
Spencer, remained at Portalegre, ready, in
case of need, to support the other divisions, or
to cross the Tagus, should the movements of
the enemy threaten danger in that quarter.

While the army was thus posted, Lord Wel-

lington induced General Blake, with a corps of about nine thousand Spaniards, to move into the Conde de Niebla, and thus at once to threaten Seville and the rear of the French army. Accordingly that leader set out on the eighteenth from Juramenba, and on the twenty-second reached Mertola. There he remained for two days to refresh his troops, then crossed the Guadiana ; but, instead of pushing for Seville, he advanced against Niebla, an old and ruinous town, with a castle of considerable strength. Blake attempted to carry the latter by escalade, and, as might be expected, failed ; and having fruitlessly spent three days before it, on receiving intelligence of the approach of a detachment sent in pursuit of him by Soult, he made for Ayamonte, where he embarked with all his artillery for Cadiz. From that city he soon after sailed to join the Spanish army, under General Freyre, in Granada.

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1811.

June.

Jun. 22.

In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington knew it to be impossible that the enemy could long subsist their forces when in a state of concentration, and he patiently waited the moment when they should find it necessary to break up from the frontier of the Alentejo. This took place

CHAP. IV. about the middle of July, when Soult returned
to Seville; and Marmont, re-crossing the Ta-
1811. gus at Almaraz, marched on Salamanca. Lord
June. Wellington, accordingly, leaving Sir Rowland
Hill, with the second British division, and the
Portuguese division of General Hamilton, and
two brigades of cavalry to guard the Alente-
jo, crossed the Tagus' with the remainder of his
army, and fixed his head-quarters at Fuente
Guinaldo. The troops went into cantonments in
the villages of Aldea de Bispo, Albergaria, Alma-
dilla, and El Bodon. In these quarters the
army remained upwards' of a month, without
disturbance from the enemy.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

DURING the summer of eighteen hundred and eleven, the country was quiescent and submissive to the intrusive government, in a degree unprecedented since the commencement of the struggle, and no advantage was taken of the powerful diversion by which the army of Massena was for so long a period withdrawn from the Spanish territory. Joseph remained at Madrid, endeavouring to organize a system of equitable government, by which the aversion of the people to their new sovereign might be gradually overcome. In this he did not succeed. The necessity of raising money, to meet the exigencies of the state, gave rise to numerous confiscations of property; and the cruelties and oppressive exactions of the French commanders, over whom

CHAP. V.

1811.

CHAP. V. he possessed little control, counteracted all his
1811. views. The Spaniards held Joseph responsible for every act of atrocity, or oppression, committed by the supporters of his cause; and the flame of insurrection, though less violent, was not extinguished.

The Cortes, holding their sittings in a distant corner of the kingdom, and cut off from all intercourse with the interior, possessed little influence with the nation at large. It was owing, perhaps, to a consciousness of this circumstance, that their attention was chiefly devoted to matters of speculative legislation, while subjects of immediate and pressing importance were entirely overlooked. It may be well, however, at the present moment, to cast a cursory glance over the different provinces of the kingdom.

Biscay and the Asturias were occupied by the French; but in the latter, Porlier with his Guerillas was in activity. On one occasion, by a sudden movement having appeared before St. Andero, he succeeded in capturing the garrison.

In Navarre, Espoz y Mina, allowed no opportunity to escape of harassing the French army,

and cutting off its communications. The rich valleys of Roncal and Roncesvalles, were still held by the natives. Galicia was free from the enemy; but its army, under General Abadia, was in a wretched state of equipment; and General Dorsenne, who had succeeded Bessieres in the north, was preparing to enter it.

CHAP. v.

1811.

In Arragon, Suchet had succeeded in allaying the storm of resistance which he had encountered in that kingdom. But numerous Guerilla parties were a-foot in the mountainous districts, and there was a small force of about four thousand regulars under Villa Campa.

In the two Castiles and Leon, the principal places were all held by the enemy. But in the province of Guadalaxara, the Empecinado allowed no opportunity to escape of inflicting punishment on the invaders. On one occasion, he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a strong detachment of the enemy, employed in escorting eleven thousand Spanish prisoners. There were likewise bands of Guerillas in La Mancha, and in the province of Salamanca.

Murcia was in possession of the Spaniards. Their army, commanded by Blake, was nearly

CHAP. V. twenty thousand strong, but miserably wanting

1811. in equipment and munitions.

Granada was occupied by the French, who had garrisons in the sea-ports of Almeria, Malaga, and Marbella.

In Andalusia, the Guerillas were numerous and active; but the chief towns were held by the enemy, with the exception of Cadiz, Ayamonte, and Algesiras. The army before Cadiz remained under the command of Victor.

Estramadura, while the French held Badajos, might be considered in their power.

Of Catalonia and Valencia we shall now speak.

The courage and enterprise of the Catalans had not been tamed by misfortune. The Supreme Junta were dissatisfied with the inactivity of O'Donnell during the siege of Tortosa, and displaced him from the command. His successor was the Marquis de Campoverde, whose conduct on previous occasions had raised him to
Jan. 16. distinction. In the meanwhile, General Sarsfield had taken post, with about six thousand men, at Vals, from which station Macdonald detached his Italian division, under General Eu-

gene, and a brigade of cavalry, to dislodge him. Sarsfield then fell back, and took up another position on the heights of Pla and Fruencaldas, where he waited the approach of the enemy. Eugene, with greater gallantry than prudence, determined on immediate attack. His troops were received by a fire so destructive as instantly to arrest their progress. The Spaniards then charged with the bayonet, and drove back the assailants with great slaughter. Eugene was himself mortally wounded in the engagement; and the whole of his division would probably have been cut off, but for the timely support of a brigade of infantry and some cavalry, detached by Macdonald to his assistance. On the arrival of this force, the action was renewed with alternations of success on both sides, but without decisive advantage on either.

For several days after this check, Macdonald remained inactive, though the Spaniards still kept their position. At length, on the night of the sixteenth, taking every precaution to conceal his march from the enemy, he withdrew to Lerida, where he placed his troops in cantonments.

Of the defeat sustained at Vals, no notice was taken by the French journals. It was part of

CHAP. V.

 1811.
 January.

Jan. 16.

CHAP. V. Napoleon's policy to praise the Italian troops, and to infuse a taste for military glory into the people. He feared that a reverse so signal as that of Vals might create disgust at the conscription, and aversion to bear part in a war of extermination, such as that waged in Catalonia. A severe censure on the conduct of Macdonald, was transmitted by the secretary of war ; and, to mark the Emperor's displeasure, he directed that the army about to besiege Tarragona, should be commanded by Suchet.

1811.
March.

About the end of March, Macdonald quitted Lerida for Barcelona. His route lay through a dangerous and difficult country, and Sarsfield was again on the alert. When Macdonald approached Manresa, an Italian brigade, which formed his advanced-guard, was assailed by a warm fire from a part of Sarsfield's corps, placed in ambush to receive it. It was immediately thrown into confusion, and driven back on the main body ; and the Italians, enraged at these repeated disasters, during the night set fire to the town of Manresa, in which the Marshal had established his head-quarters. The town was consumed to ashes, and many officers who were quartered there, were able with difficulty to

rescue their baggage and horses from the flames. CHAP. V.

—At Montserrat, where Sarsfield had taken post, the conflagration was distinctly visible. The spectacle filled his soldiers with rage, and being joined by all the inhabitants of the surrounding country, Sarsfield, on the following day, encountered the French columns in the defiles of the Col d'Avic, with every advantage of position. The French, with great gallantry, dislodged the Spaniards from every rock and acclivity on which they took post; but the latter, retreating from height to height, kept up a most galling and destructive fire. No quarter was given by the enraged Catalans; and so much did the necessity of carrying off the wounded impede the march of the French, that they were six hours in reaching the summit of the mountain.

 1811.

March.

In the meanwhile, Campoverde, having established his troops in a strong camp in front of Tarragona, made an unsuccessful effort to gain possession of Mont Jouy at Barcelona. He had endeavoured to prevail on some of the leading officers to betray the place; but his project becoming known to the governor, the garrison were prepared, and no sooner did his leading battalion enter the ditch, than it was almost annihi-

Mar. 19.

Mar. 20.

CHAP. V. lated by a tremendous fire from the garrison.

1811.

April.

The remainder of his force instantly retreated ; but their march was intercepted by detachments of the enemy, which occasioned great loss.

Another and more fortunate effort was made for the recovery of Figueras. A colonel of Miquelets, named Rovira, who to his military title joined that of doctor of theology, being a person of active and enterprising mind, had long amused himself in devising projects for regaining some of the important fortresses held by the invaders. These had been proposed to the successive commanders in the province, but rejected by all as visionary and impracticable. Cam-poverde, however, was at length induced to lend a favourable ear to the scheme of Rovira, and appointed General Martinez as his colleague in command.

Apr. 10. Having collected about one thousand volunteers, these leaders approached Figueras with great secrecy, halting in the woods by day, and marching by night. On the tenth they arrived at Paláu Surroco, a short distance from the fortress. Preparations were then made for the execution of the perilous enterprise in which they had embarked. The officers commanding

each division were acquainted with the works of the fort, and received the most minute instructions in regard to their duty. Intelligence had previously been established with three soldiers of the garrison, in the interest of Rovira. By these men, on the following night, the Spaniards were admitted into the castle; and the first sentinel they encountered was killed before he could give the alarm. The party then separated into detached bodies; and with such skill and accuracy had the duties of each been defined, that while the governor and garrison were yet sleeping in their quarters, the castle of Figueras was in the hands of the Spaniards. The whole of the garrison, amounting to about one thousand men, were made prisoners. The guns of the castle were then turned against the town, which also surrendered. The Baron d'Eroles, who was ordered to reinforce the victors, succeeded, in his march from Martorel, in capturing the forts at Castellfullit and Olot, by which upwards of five hundred of the enemy were made prisoners. •

So badly, however, was Figueras supplied with provisions, that towards the end of April it became necessary to throw an additional sup-

CHAP. V.

1811.

April.

- CHAP. V. ply into the place. With this view Campoverde
1811. left his camp near Tarragona, to escort a convoy
May. for its relief. In the meanwhile, General Bara-
guay d'Hilliers, who commanded in Upper Cata-
lonia, blockaded the town with the whole force
May 3. at his disposal. In attempting to approach the
town, Campoverde was attacked in flank and
rear, and forced to retreat in great confusion,
leaving the convoy and fifteen hundred prisoners
in the hands of the enemy. His loss in killed
and wounded amounted to about nine hundred.

- During the progress of these events, Suchet,
who had long been making preparations for the
siege of Tarragona, took advantage of the ab-
sence of Campoverde, and advanced against the
May 4. city. On the fourth of May, he drove in the
Spanish posts established in front of Fort Oliva,
and his artillery and stores were put in motion
from Tortosa and Lerida. The communication
with the former place was protected by Fort
Balaguer, and an entrenched post at Perillo ;
and, to secure that with Lerida, he fortified the
convent which commanded the town of Mont
Blanch.

Tarragona stands on the side and summit of
a steep and isolated height, situated between the

points where the rivers Gaya and Francoli dis-
 embogue into the sea. On the northern, west-
 ern, and southern sides, the rock is scarpèd and
 precipitate; but, on the east and south-east, the
 ground slopes down by a gentle descent to the
 harbour and the Francoli river. The upper town
 is encircled by an old wall which crowns the sum-
 mit of the rock; and the western side, on which is
 the approach from Barcelona, is besides protected
 by five *Lunettes*, which form a line reaching to
 the sea. There are likewise two large *Lunettes*
 on the northern face. Both present to the besieg-
 ers a front of naked rock, which renders any ap-
 proach on these sides peculiarly difficult.

CHAP. V.

1811.

May.

The lower town stands at the bottom of the
 height near the harbour, and is protected to the
 landward by a small bastioned square, called the
 Fort Royal, about three hundred toises distant
 from the *enceinte* of the upper town, and two
 hundred from the sea. Both this fort and the
 lower town are covered by a second wall, ex-
 tending from the upper town to the sea, and
 protected by three regular bastions, and several
 other works.

The Spaniards, having always contemplated
 the probability of a siege, had repaired the

CHAP. V. works, which were in condition for an obstinate
1811. defence. The garrison were in number nearly
May. equal to the besieging army, and a squadron of
British men-of-war were anchored in the bay,
thus securing the admission of reinforcements
and supplies.

Strong as Tarragona unquestionably was, the chief feature of its strength was the Fort Oliva, situated on a plateau of equal elevation with the upper town, from which it was about four hundred toises distant. It was armed with sixty pieces of cannon, and surrounded by a ditch twenty feet deep, which had been cut in the solid rock.

It was judged necessary by Suchet that this fort should be carried ; and approaches were accordingly made against it, and pushed on with great vigour. In order to check the fire of the men-of-war, which was found exceedingly annoying, and force them to draw off to a greater distance, a large redoubt was erected on the shore, which being found insufficient, three other batteries were erected nearer to the Francoli.

We shall not enter on the numerous and complicated details of this interesting siege. Suffice it, that in its progress the French engineers gave

proof of the highest accomplishment in their pro- CHAP. V.
 fession. The siege was pushed with a degree
 of vigour and skill, which the garrison, brave, 1811.
 but unpractised, were unequal to withstand. May.
 Fort Oliva was carried on the night of the twen-
 ty-ninth. It chanced that a column of twelve May 29.
 hundred men was in the act of entering the fort
 to relieve the garrison, when the signal of as-
 sault was given by the enemy. The rear of this
 body was attacked, and many of the assailants
 entered the gate, *pele mele* with the Spaniards.
 This distracted the defenders, the French co-
 lumns continued to press on, and the fort was at
 length carried. Fifteen hundred of the garrison
 perished in this assault ; about a thousand were
 made prisoners.* Memoires
 de Marechal
 Suchet.

The loss of Fort Oliva could not but depress
 the hopes of the garrison of Tarragona. On the
 following morning a column of three thousand
 men attempted to regain it, but without success.
 The enemy then pushed forward his advances

* Marshal Suchet, in his official report, makes the number of
 prisoners amount only to one hundred and sixty. In his me-
 moirs he rates them at one thousand. We are inclined to be-
 lieve the latter statement as most creditable to the French army
 and its commander.

CHAP. V. against the works of the upper town ; and the
breaching batteries were nearly complete when
1811. Colonel Skerret, with two thousand men, ar-
June. rived in the bay from Cadiz. Colonel Skerret
was prevented from throwing his troops into the
town, by the assurances of the Governor that
Tarragona was already amply garrisoned ; and
that the force he commanded would render far
greater and more important service by uniting
with Campoverde in an attack on the rear of the
besieging army. The Governor likewise stated,
that when the enemy should commence batter-
ing in breach, it was his intention to abandon
the place, considering the lives of his soldiers
to be of higher value than the ruins of Tarra-
gona.

Colonel Skerret, therefore, sailed in a man-of-war to join Campoverde, who had taken post with his army at Vendrels, about twenty-five miles to the eastward. Time was thus lost, and before any combined operation could be carried into effect, Tarragona had fallen.

Unfortunately, Contreras, instead of keeping secret his intention of abandoning the town, made it publicly known. The inhabitants, thus aware they were about to be forsaken by their

defenders, became stupified with fear; and Su-
chet, having gained intelligence of the design, CHAP. V.
was enabled to defeat it. 1811.

June.

No time was afforded for the proposed retreat. The French batteries opened at daylight on the twenty-eight, and by ten o'clock a practicable breach had been formed. In a few hours the assault was given. The defence was trifling; for the views of the garrison had been directed to retreat, and panic reigned throughout the city. A scene of terrible slaughter ensued. All within the city were put indiscriminately to the bayonet; and a continued fire from the batteries swept away crowds of trembling fugitives, who fled to the shore in hope of rescue by the boats of the squadron. To many this hope was not broken. The British sailors, animated by compassion for the sufferers, persevered, amid the enemy's fire, in conveying the fugitives to the ships moored in the offing.

Jun. 28.

We have the assurance of Marshal Suchet, that the officers of his army made strenuous exertions to put a stop to the carnage. But the soldiers, with hands already steeped in blood, would not be restrained. Within and without the town the slaughter continued with unabated ferocity. The

CHAP. V. claims of age and sex were disregarded. Those
 1811. who sought refuge in the churches, were massacred even at the altar. Beauty, innocence, and
 June. helplessness, did not save life, though they ensured violation. More than six thousand unresisting persons were butchered. "And thus," said Marshal Suchet, in his official report, after detailing the circumstances of the massacre, "has the terrible example which I predicted taken place, and it will long be remembered by the Spaniards."*

* In allusion to this dreadful scene of slaughter, and atrocities even worse than slaughter, Colonel Jones, in his able and excellent history of the war, makes the following observations:—"There is something so exceedingly revolting in the picture of these severities, that the mind cannot divest itself of feelings of abhorrence towards the individual who directed them; or, otherwise, were the subject coolly and dispassionately considered, the censure would be equally divided between the aggressors, and the commander of the suffering party. It is the paramount duty of every general to use every means in his power to bring his operations to a successful termination, and to preserve the lives of his own men; and there seems no other such effectual mode of preventing similarly obstinate defences to those of Gerona and Zaragoza, as for the assailants to avail themselves of every power of retaliation which victory furnishes. It is no more than the custom of war justifies, and self-preservation demands. In a battle, if a division stand the charge, the successful party make no scruple to bayonet all those whom they overtake, and no reason can be assigned why troops, fighting behind a wall, should be differently treated, and have the privilege of destroying their opponents till the last moment, and when they can no longer do

No sooner was Suchet master of Tarragona CHAP. V.
 than he proceeded to Montserrat, where the Ba-
 1811.

July.

so with impunity, be greeted with friendship. Till a certain point of the attack, it is perfectly safe to continue the defence; if the garrison persevere longer they do it at their own risk,—it is optional with them. It was so at Tarragona; and the principle of putting to the sword, after the assault of a breach, all those found with arms in their hands, seems so fully justified by right and policy, that General Suchet, on the abstract consideration of the subject, cannot be censured for having done so. The peculiar nature of the contest, however, ought to have made him hesitate in its application to the Spaniards, a people merely defending their homes against unprincipled aggression. The idea of so severely punishing an act of pure self-defence should have revolted his own feelings and those of his officers. Such not having been the case, and the ferocious acts of which they were guilty towards the unarmed inhabitants, equally with the garrison, having been publicly avowed, give rise to many reflections on the abasement of the moral character under military despotism. In what country, enjoying a sufficient share of freedom for impartial discussion, would a man, after such deeds, be received in society? or what government, having the voice of a free and enlightened people to control their acts, dare to confer rewards upon him?"

In these ingenious remarks of Colonel Jones there is much truth, and we think some little inconsistency. On the general principles of military ethics, he asserts that a general is authorized in directing the massacre of the garrison of a town carried by assault. In this we cannot coincide. It is unquestionably true, that, when two hostile parties are contending against each other, the laws of reason and necessity authorize the exercise of every means in the power of either, to ensure its own safety by destroying its opponent, or reducing him to a condition in which he can inflict no further injury. But the law of self-preservation, which alone can sanction the destruction of an enemy, places like-

CHAP. V. ron d'Eroles had established large magazines,
and from whence he made incursions into the

1811.

July.

wise a limit to that right. Wherever security can be obtained by means less revolting than that of actual slaughter, the infliction of death becomes an act of mere wanton barbarity, irreconcilable with moral principle, and adverse to that eternal code imprinted in the heart of man. In no case, therefore, can death be justifiably inflicted on men who lay down their arms, and who, by the privation of their liberty, can be prevented from endangering the future safety of the conquerors. In the case of a town carried by assault, it must frequently happen that rude, ignorant, and unprincipled men, who compose the mass of all armies, and whose passions have been excited to the highest pitch, will burst the shackles by which at other times they are bound, and give full sway to a sentiment of ferocious revenge. But such an event must be considered as an unavoidable misfortune, not as the voluntary and justifiable infliction of an authorized retribution. It is a great and terrible evil, which every exertion should be made to modify or avert, and which no general is warranted, not merely in openly sanctioning, but in passively permitting.

But Colonel Jones, admitting that the massacre of Tarragona was fully sanctioned by the abstract principles of war, denies the application of these principles to the case of a people struggling in defence of their rights against unprincipled aggression. Thus, the Spaniards, in Colonel Jones's opinion, fighting in the cause of liberty, would have been justified in the slaughter of a French garrison under circumstances similar to those of Tarragona, and the reciprocity only of this privilege of massacre is denied. Now, the fallacy of Colonel Jones's reasoning consists in this: He confounds the motive or *cause* of war, which may be just or unjust, with the *laws* of war, which exclusively regard the conduct of its details. In a monarchical government, it is the king exclusively who declares war; who decides when the national safety is so much endangered as to require an appeal to arms. To him the justice or injustice of a war is

neighbouring country. On the twenty-fourth CHAP. V.
of July, Suchet was joined by a detachment from 1811.
the garrison of Barcelona, commanded by Gen- July.
eral Maurice Mathieu.

Montserrat is a mountain of very singular cha-

a matter of conscience,—a question, the right solution of which involves a high degree of moral responsibility ; but it is one on which the soldiers who fight his battles are not called on to decide. The war, whether just or unjust, when once undertaken, must be conducted on certain fixed principles ; and it is for the fair application of these that the commander of an army is alone responsible.

The question, therefore, of Marshal Suchet's culpability in the present case, may be reduced to this : If, for the sake of striking terror, by a terrible example, he voluntarily permitted the slaughter in Tarragona to exceed the limits necessary for the immediate security of his army, there is no degree of indignation too great for his offence ; if, on the other hand, the massacre proceeded solely from the untameable excitement of the soldiery, which every practicable measure was adopted to check and allay, then the evil was inevitable, and Suchet stands absolved from that charge of moral turpitude which must otherwise affix a deep stigma on his name.

On these principles, we fear it is impossible that Suchet can be altogether justified. We may admit that the exertions of the officers were ineffectual to prevent the perpetration of atrocities in the town ; but what can be said of the slaughter of the helpless and unresisting crowds who were swept away by grape-shot, and sabred by the cavalry on the shore, and on the road to Barcelona ? It is but fair, however, to state, that the Governor Contreras, in his official report, not only declares that he himself, wounded and made prisoner, was treated with the greatest humanity, but that every effort was made by the French officers to check the excesses of their troops.

CHAP. IV. FACTOR. Situated at a short distance from Barcelona, Igualada, and Manresa, it commands the principal roads, and the numerous heights by which it is surrounded. It consists of a congregation of vast pyramidal heights, rising from insulated rocks, from which singular peculiarity it derived its name of Monte Serrado, or the Sawed Mountain. On the summit stands the celebrated convent, so difficult of access and so commanding in situation as to form a post of very extraordinary strength. The Spaniards had increased the difficulties of attack, by obstructing the road leading to the convent, and by constructing redoubts on very steep rocks, to the summits of which artillery had with great difficulty been conveyed.

1811.
July.

Suchet, aware that the force of d'Eroles was insufficient to defend the place, if attacked at numerous points, directed an attack on three redoubts at the foot of the mountain, whilst several columns of voltigeurs climbed the rocks wherever they were found accessible. The peasants, stationed on the summits of the heights, received the assailants with a brisk fire, and rolled down stones and masses of rocks on the advancing columns. This, however, did not

check their progress—the whole position was carried by the bayonet, and d'Eroles himself was only enabled to escape by the darkness of the night, and his intimate knowledge of the passes.

After the capture of Montserrat, Maurice Mathieu returned to Barcelona, while Suchet repaired to Arragon to make preparations for invading the kingdom of Valencia.

After the failure of Campoverde's attempt to throw provisions into Figueras, the blockade of the place was continued without interruption by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. During a period of four months, the garrison held out in spite of the miserable condition to which they were reduced by the entire exhaustion of their provisions. At length General Martinez, encouraged by the success of the garrison of Almeida, determined to sally from the place, and force his way through the enemy's lines with the bayonet. By the treachery of a Spanish officer, Macdonald received intelligence of this project, and was prepared to frustrate its execution. Lines of contravallation had been formed, covered by a strong *abattis*. During the day the French posts were doubled, and at night the troops were placed in bivouac, in the direction towards which it was

1811.

July.

CHAP. V. considered probable the garrison would direct
1811. their flight.

August.

On the night of the sixteenth Martinez, at the head of three thousand men, sallied from the town, and succeeded in forcing their way to the *abattis*. Here, however, his progress was arrested. 'After eight gallant attacks, he was forced to return to the town, with the loss of four hundred men.

Martinez then felt that all hope was at an end. Every horse and domestic animal within the place had been consumed for food. He, therefore, determined to capitulate ; but before doing so, he employed two days in destroying every thing within the place which could be useful to the enemy. Macdonald granted honourable
Aug. 19. terms, and on the nineteenth the place was given up ; and the whole of the fortresses of Catalonia were in possession of the French.

The spirit of the Catalonians, however, was not broken by the misfortunes of the campaign. A new general was appointed to command the army, which, at that moment, existed rather in *posse* than in *esse*. Fortunately, General Lacy was a man of enterprise and spirit, suited to the times. He issued a proclamation, calling on the

people to return to the standard of their country. **CHAP. V.**
 On the first of September, d'Eroles, whose ac- **1811.**
 tivity was ever conspicuous, succeeded, with the **September.**
 assistance of a British frigate, in recovering the
 islands of Las Medas, which had been lost in
 the preceding campaign. These being consid-
 ered of importance were occupied by a consid-
 erable force, and measures were speedily adopt-
 ed for strengthening the works.

Soon afterwards, when the French forces had
 concentrated at Tortosa, General Lacy deter-
 mined to attack a series of fortified posts, which
 the enemy had formed from Barcelona to Leri-
 da. He accordingly marched rapidly on Igua- **Oct. 4.**
 lada, where a convent had been strongly forti-
 fied by the French. The town was surprised,
 one hundred and fifty of the enemy were killed,
 and twenty-five made prisoners. The remain-
 der escaped into the convent; and, at daylight,
 Lacy, learning that succours were approaching
 from Montserrat and Casa Masana, fell back on
 Manresa.

The enemy, little apprehensive of further at-
 tack, moved forward with a convoy, destined for
 the supply of the garrison of Igualada. Lacy
 formed his force into two divisions. The first,

CHAP. V. under d'Eroles, intercepted the advance of the
1811. convoy ; while Lacy, with the second, cut off
October. its retreat. A column, with artillery, from Igua-
lada, sallied out to the assistance of their coun-
trymen ; but the day went in favour of the Span-
iards. The whole convoy was taken ; upwards
of two hundred of the French were killed and
wounded ; and the remainder with difficulty ef-
fected their escape into the convent.

After this achievement, Lacy, finding his pre-
sence necessary in the Junta, to forward the
formation and organization of the army, left the
command to d'Eroles. The enemy, weakened
by their recent losses, soon after abandoned
Igualada, Montserrat, and Casa Masana, and
withdrew to Barcelona.*

D'Eroles then marched against Cervera. The
French, on his approach, retired from the town
into the university, which had been fortified ;

* It is a remarkable fact, that, about the middle of eighteen hundred and eleven, when his armies in the east of Spain were in full career of success, Napoleon appears to have anticipated the necessity, to which he was afterwards reduced, of abandoning the Peninsula. Observing that the spirit of the gallant Catalans remained unbroken under every reverse, and aware that a war of extermination must eventually terminate in the defeat of his projects, he gave orders that preparations should be made to destroy the fortifications of Barcelona.

and a party of five hundred foot, and thirty horse, which were approaching from Lerida, instantly retraced its steps. A detachment was sent in pursuit of this body; and d'Eroles, with one ten-pounder, proceeded to attack the buildings occupied by the enemy. The gun opened fire, and the French, not aware that it was the only one in possession of the assailants, agreed to capitulate. Upwards of six hundred men were thus made prisoners, at an expense to the Catalans of only ten in killed and wounded.

CHAP. V.

1811

October.

Oct. 10.

This success was followed by another of a similar kind. At Bilpuig, a body of the enemy were posted in the castle which commanded the town. Here the solitary gun, which had done good service at Cervera, was again brought into action. Though without engineers, three mines were formed, the explosion of which reduced the castle to ruins. Of the garrison, which consisted of four hundred men, one hundred and eighty were made prisoners,—the rest perished.

By these several successes, the whole country between Lerida and Barcelona was freed from the enemy. An attempt made by the French to intercept d'Eroles failed. By a bold and skilful

CHAP. V. movement that leader entered France, where
 1811. he levied heavy contributions on the inhabitants.
 October. It is highly honourable to d'Eroles, that, during
 the whole of this incursion, he succeeded in preventing any retaliation of those atrocities which had marked the progress of the French in Spain. Having collected a considerable quantity of corn and cattle, and a considerable sum in specie, this enterprising leader succeeded in regaining his native mountains.

Blake, on reaching Cadiz after his unsuccessful attempt on Niebla, prepared again to take the field; and, embarking with a corps of choice troops, landed at Almeria, and joined the Murcian army near Baeza. Soult immediately advanced with his whole disposable force to attack him; and, on the ninth of August, an engagement took place near Lorea. The Spaniards were driven with great loss from their position; and, being closely pursued, the retreat became a complete rout, and they fled to the mountains near Caravaca. The Spanish cavalry in this action behaved with great courage, and gave protection to the fugitives who had taken
 Aug. 9. the road to Murcia; but, on the tenth, they were attacked by the whole of the French ca-

valry, and about five hundred were killed, wounded, or made prisoners. The remainder, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, retired precipitately to Murcia.

CHAP. V.
1811.
August.

In a few days, however, the army of Blake, the greater part of which had been dispersed, again collected in the neighbourhood of Lebrilla; and that leader being appointed to the chief command in Valencia, his force was increased by reinforcements to thirty thousand men, and included nearly all the veteran troops of Spain. Generals Zayas, Sardizabel, Carlos O'Donnell Mahy, and Juan Caro, most of whom had earned distinction in the service, held subordinate commands in the army; and Soult having returned to Seville, Blake found himself at liberty to employ his whole force for the defence of Valencia.

Shortly after the fall of Tarragona, Macdonald was removed from the command, and General Decaen appointed his successor. To ensure unity in the operations of both armies, this officer was made subordinate to Marshal Suchet, who, on the fifteenth September, advanced from Tortosa, with the whole disposable force from Arragon and Catalonia, to achieve the conquest

September.

Sep. 15.

CHAP. V. of the rich province of Valencia. On the nineteenth he reached Oropesa, and found the castle, which commanded the direct road to Valencia, in possession of a Spanish garrison. Suchet, considering celerity of movement to be essential to the complete success of his operations, determined to proceed by a route impracticable for artillery; and, on the twenty-seventh of September, the army reached Murviedro, a town which stands on the site of the ancient Saguntum, about four leagues to the eastward of Valencia.

Blake, with thirteen thousand of the flower of his army, fell back to Valencia on the approach of the French. The town was immediately occupied; and, on the following day, an attempt was made to carry the fort by escalade, which terminated in the repulse of the assailants with considerable loss. From this event till the coming up of his artillery, Suchet directed his attention to the Spanish troops in the field. He detached General Robert to attack a division of Blake's army, under General Obispo, at Segorba. Obispo was defeated with great loss; and, being pursued vigorously by the cavalry, his force dispersed and sought shelter among the mountains.

The next operation was to attack the corps of O'Donnel, which was formed in position near Benaquazil. The Spaniards, after a trifling resistance, retreated across the Guadalaviar in some disorder, but with little loss.

CHAP. V.

1811.

After these successes, Suchet was enabled to continue his operations against Murviedro without interruption. On the tenth, the castle of Oropesa surrendered, at the moment when the besiegers were about to assault the breach. The road to Murviedro was now open, and the heavy battering-train arrived before that place on the sixteenth. A breach was soon effected; and, on the eighteenth, the French attempted to storm it, but encountered a severe repulse. On the nineteenth, the assault was again given, but without more favourable result. The garrison, under General Andrioni, were animated by the best spirit; and, confident in the hope that Blake would advance to the relief of the place, entertained no thought but of resistance.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 19.

In the meanwhile, Blake, at first unwilling to hazard all on the chances of a battle, determined to confine himself to movements on the flank and rear of the French army, and detached a force under Mahy, to surprise a detachment in

CHAP. V. Cuenca, and thus interrupt the communication
1811. of Suchet with Madrid. The attempt, however,
September. proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with his
division to the main body of the army.

In Arragon, however, Duran and the Empe-
cinado, with about four thousand men, attacked
Sep. 26. the town of Calatayud, garrisoned by three batta-
lions of the enemy. Nearly the whole of these
were slain and made prisoners. Nor was Mina
Oct 16. less active or fortunate. He captured a detach-
ment of eight hundred men in Ayerba, hav-
ing previously surprised and defeated a party
advancing to their relief. By these movements,
the situation of Suchet had been rendered one of
difficulty and danger. With the army of Blake in
his front, he was compelled to detach a corps of
four thousand men to protect Teruel, and escort
a convoy expected from Zaragoza. Had a junc-
tion been effected by Mina, Duran, and the Em-
pecinado, and had these leaders attacked the
French posts, and cut off the communication with
Zaragoza, it is in the highest degree improbable
that Suchet, whose communication with Tortosa
was already intercepted by the peasantry, would
have ventured to maintain his ground in Valencia.
But the Guerilla leaders, influenced by petty jea-

lousies, were little disposed to act in unison, and allowed the opportunity to escape.

CHAP. V.

1811.

October.

Unfortunately, too, Blake at length resolved to fight a battle for the relief of Murviedro. On the twenty-fourth of October, he took post on the heights of Pache, with his right towards the sea, supported by the fire of some English vessels, and his left resting on the village of Betara. On his approach, Suchet, leaving six battalions to continue the investment of Murviedro, advanced with his army, and took up a line, extending from the sea, in rear of Puzol, to the mountains beyond the village of Val de Jesus.

On the following morning, Blake put his army in motion for attack. The right wing was commanded by Zayas, the centre by Carlos O'Donnel, and the left, in which were the Valencians, by Villa Campa. Mahy, with the Murcian division, formed a second line in rear of the left; while Blake, with another body of reserve, remained on El Puig.

At eight in the morning, the French light troops were driven in. General Zayas then advanced in fine order, and, seizing posses-

Oct. 25.

CHAP. V. sion of the village of Puzol, changed his front
1811. on the extremity of his left, while with his
October. right he moved on to gain an isolated height
which commanded all the ground in its front.
At the same time, the left wing of the Spaniards, by a wide movement, attempted to turn the enemy's right flank, by which the centre was inconsiderately weakened. Suchet immediately took advantage of this error, and directed a powerful attack on the Spanish centre, in order to isolate the wings. In this quarter the Spaniards fought bravely, and though forced at first to retire, again rallied and drove back the enemy with signal courage. Don Juan Caro made a desperate charge with the cavalry under his command on the enemy's horse, which were supported by artillery, and posted behind a mud wall. The Spaniards, very gallantly, leaped the wall, charged the guns, and cut down the gunners at their posts. No advantage, however, was reaped from this exploit. A fresh column of the enemy came on, the Spanish cavalry were driven back with considerable loss, and Caro himself was made prisoner. The centre at length gave way; but Lardizabel, hav-

ing collected some horse, continued to show front to the enemy, and covered the retreat of the infantry.

CHAP. V.

1811.

October.

On the right, the battle had been waged with the utmost gallantry, by the troops under Zayas. A severe struggle took place for the possession of the height, in which the Spaniards were at first successful, but subsequently compelled to retire. Though this wing was isolated by the retreat of the centre, it still continued the contest with pertinacity and vigour. The French cavalry, in all their charges, were driven back in confusion. Both parties made strenuous efforts to maintain the village of Puzol, and in this quarter the slaughter was very great. The Spaniards kept up a warm fire from the roofs and windows of the houses; but after repeated alternations of success on both sides, Puzol remained in possession of the French. Zayas then retreated to the heights, near Puig, where he was again attacked both in front and flank. When driven from this last position, he executed his retreat in good order, by the road leading to Valencia along the shore.

The left wing having also been repulsed, the whole army retreated, and Blake was unfortu-

CHAP. V. nately induced to make a second stand, in the
1811. strong ground behind the rivulet Betara. From
October. this measure no benefit resulted. The retreat

was continued with greater rapidity and less order than before; and it was with great difficulty that he succeeded in throwing himself with the remains of his army across the Guadalaviar.

The loss of the French in this engagement was somewhat above seven hundred in killed and wounded; of the Spaniards, nearly four thousand seven hundred were made prisoners, and about one thousand killed and wounded. Twelve cannon, four standards, and upwards of four thousand musquets—nearly all English—were captured by the victors.

The garrison of Murviedro beheld from the summit of their walls, which commanded all the neighbouring country, the defeat of that army in the success of whose efforts were centred all their hopes of relief. The place surrendered on the following morning, and the garrison, two thousand five hundred in number, were made prisoners. Blake, after his defeat, took up a position on the right of the Guadalaviar, which he strengthened by entrenchments. His left flank rested on the villages of St. Onofie and

Manises, which had been strongly fortified. His right was covered by canals, and appuied on the city of Valencia.

CHAP. V.
1811.
September.

Before engaging in further operations, Suchet determined to await the arrival of the reinforcements he had solicited from the governments of Paris and Madrid. In the meantime, he halted on the left of the river, with his left at the Grao or port, his right at Liria, and his centre in the suburb Serano. He strengthened the front of his position with strong redoubts, and for nearly two months no occurrence of importance took place.

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES—
IN ANDALUSIA, AND VALENCIA.

CHAP. VI. ON the separation of Marmont and Soult, it
1811. was agreed that Dorsenne, with the army of the
September. North, should enter Galicia, by a rapid move-
ment, seize Corunna by a *coup-de-main*, fortify
Lugo, and thus once more obtain military pos-
session of the province. In pursuance of this
project, Dorsenne, abandoning the Asturias,
moved towards Astorga, where the Gallician
army under General Abadia had taken post.
An attack was ordered, the Spaniards retreated
after a feeble resistance, and Dorsenne continued
his advance into the province. In the mean-
while, Lord Wellington, having collected his
army on the Coa, blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo.
Marmont, alarmed for the safety of so important
a fortress, recalled Dorsenne, with the view of

raising the blockade, and throwing copious supplies into the place. CHAP. VI.

 1811.

September.

By compelling the enemy to concentrate their forces, for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington gained two important objects. He relieved Galicia, and drew the corps of Souham from Navarre, where it had been sent for the purpose of keeping down the strong Guerilla parties, from which great loss and annoyance were experienced. It was with a view to such benefits, rather than any immediate hope of reducing the fortress, for the siege of which he was not yet prepared, that Lord Wellington had formed the blockade. On learning the approach of Marmont, he therefore prepared to abandon it, and occupy a defensive position, which would enable him to ascertain the force of the enemy, and regulate his future movements as circumstances might direct.

As a point of support, therefore, by which he might be enabled to keep out a strong advanced corps to the latest moment, he caused the heights in front of Guinaldo to be strengthened by field-works, and posted his troops in readiness to concentrate in the position, whenever such a measure should become necessary. The division of Gen-

CHAP. VI. eral Picton was placed in advance on the heights
 1811. of El Bodon, between Guinaldo and Pastores. The
 September. light division was on the right of the Agueda,
 near Martiago, its right resting on the mountains
 which divide Castile and Estramadura. The left
 of the army, under General Graham, who had
 succeeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in com-
 mand, was on the Lower Azava. Don Carlos
 d'España, and Don Julian Sanchez observed the
 lower Agueda; and Sir Stapleton Cotton, with
 the cavalry, was on the upper Azava, in the
 centre. General Foy, having collected a body
 of troops in upper Estramadura, the fifth division
 was posted in rear of the right, to observe the
 road leading from Perales, and the fourth divi-
 sion remained at Guinaldo.

On the twenty-second September, the armies
 of Marmont and Dorsenne effected a junction at
 Tamames, about three leagues distant from Ciu-
 dad Rodrigo. Their combined force amounted
 to sixty thousand men, of which six thousand
 were cavalry. That of the allies, including four
 thousand cavalry, did not exceed forty thousand
 Sept. 23. men. On the twenty-third, the enemy appeared
 in the plain near the city, but again retired. On
 the day following, they came on in great force,

and escorted a large convoy of waggons, cars,^{CHAP. VI.}
and loaded mules, into the town. 1811.

During these operations, the allied army re- September.
mained passive in its positions ; and the enemy,
of course, were left in considerable uncertainty
as to the intentions of Lord Wellington. These,
however, Marmont took speedy measures to as-
certain. On the morning of the twenty-fifth, a
body of French cavalry, consisting of about thirty
squadrons, supported by a division of infantry,
and twelve pieces of artillery, was observed in
motion, along the great road leading from Ciudad
Rodrigo to Guinaldo, on the left of El Bodon.
To delay the progress of this formidable column,
and give time for the coming up of other troops,
Lord Wellington moved the brigade of General
Colville, consisting of the fifth, seventy-seventh,
and ninety-fourth regiments, to a height at some
distance on the left, commanding the road to
Guinaldo. This brigade had scarcely taken its
position, when the enemy's artillery came up,
and a brisk cannonade was maintained on both
sides. The cavalry made a furious attack on the
Portuguese guns, and succeeded in driving the
gunners from their posts. This, however, was
but the success of a moment. The fifth regiment

CHAP. VI. was ordered forward, and maintaining a brisk
1811. fire as they advanced, charged with the bayonet,
September. when within a few yards of the enemy. By
this singular manœuvre, the guns were regained.
The fifth, maintaining their advantage, pursued
the cavalry down the declivity of the height,
and across the ravine.

Though repulsed in this attack, the French
cavalry, led by General Montbrun, again executed
a charge of the boldest character, on the part
of the position occupied by the fifth and seventy-
seventh. These regiments suffered them to ap-
proach within a few paces, when firing a volley
with great effect, the French instantly retreated
in great confusion. In another part of the field
a few squadrons of British and German dra-
goons, shewed gallant front to the enemy, and,
notwithstanding the overwhelming superiority
of numbers by which they were opposed, con-
tinued to skirmish with great effect.

It was not, however, the plan of Lord Wel-
lington to commit his army by any serious en-
gagements. The divisions had previously re-
ceived orders to dispute the ground, but to re-
tire when pressed, on Guinaldo. But the ne-
cessity of a retrogressive movement became in-

stantly apparent, by the discovery that a column hitherto hid by the nature of the ground, was in the act of turning the right of the position. The heights, therefore, were abandoned, and the troops, formed in square, were put in motion on Guinaldo.

CHAP. VI.

1811.

September.

Nothing to a military eye could be finer than the scene which ensued. The battalions were repeatedly charged on their march by the enemy's cavalry, whom they repulsed with a gallantry and steadiness impossible to be surpassed. At one time, the fifth and seventy-seventh were charged on three faces of the square at the same moment. For upwards of two miles these regiments, and the twenty-first Portuguese, under Colonel Bacellar, continued their retreat in all the regularity of a parade movement, though entirely enveloped by the French squadrons. The chief loss sustained was from the Horse-artillery, which came up, and, firing on solid masses of infantry, did considerable execution.

*

Lord Wellington, having gained the object for which the position of Guinaldo had been fortified, would have immediately retired, had not an unforeseen circumstance prevented it.

CHAP. VI. By some mistake, the light division did not
1811. receive orders to retreat till all support had been
September. withdrawn; and General Crawford, apprehensive
that in crossing the Agueda at Robleda he
might be intercepted, and ignorant that Perales
was occupied by a strong corps of the enemy,
determined to retreat along the right bank of
the river. Orders, therefore, were instantly
sent to General Crawford, to retrace his steps,
and cross by the ford of Robleda, and the divi-
sions of Picton and Cole remained in Guinaldo
to cover his junction.

In the meantime, dispositions were made to re-
ceive the enemy, should he think proper to attack
the position. Fuente Guinaldo stands on a high
ridge, nearly three miles in length, stretching
from the Agueda across an extensive plain, by
which it is bounded on the left. To secure this
flank, two divisions were stationed at Nava
d'Aver. The heights were occupied by the
third and fourth divisions, and the brigade of
General Pack. A division was posted on the
right of the Agueda to face Perales, and coun-
teract any attempt of the enemy to pass the river
in rear of the position.

Sep. 26. The morning of the twenty-sixth, which was

expected to bring battle, passed over quietly. CHAP. VI.
Marmont contented himself with making an ex- 1811.
hibition of his force,—causing it to execute a va- September.
riety of manœuvres, the rapidity and precision of
which attracted the admiration of all who wit-
nessed them. During the time thus occupied,
the light division joined the army; and Lord
Wellington, at nightfall, unwilling to court bat-
tle in a position assumed for a mere temporary
object, put his army in retreat towards Alfayates,
and stationed his rear-guard at Aldea de Ponte.

On the twenty-seventh this village was at- Sep. 27.
tacked by the enemy, who twice succeeded in
gaining possession of it. Twice, also, they were
driven back by the gallantry of the fourth divi-
sion, who ultimately remained masters of the
disputed post. At night, the army were again
in motion, and fell back to a position on the
heights behind Soito, where an inflexion of the
Coa gave protection to both flanks.

In this position Lord Wellington determined
to offer battle. The manœuvres of the enemy
had hitherto been marked by the greatest confi-
dence and boldness. They betrayed throughout
an evident feeling of superiority, and something
even of contemptuous disregard for an opponent

CHAP. VI. whose policy had hitherto been wholly defensive. It was clearly the intention of Marmont to drive the allies across the Coa; but the army had already reached the ground which Lord Wellington had selected to give a decisive check to his progress. The natural defences of this position were strong, The flanks being covered by the Coa could not be turned; but it presented no avenue of retreat. The success of the enemy at any one point of attack must have proved fatal to the army; and the selection of such ground at once proved to Marmont, notwithstanding his immense superiority, how little apprehension was entertained by Lord Wellington of the result of a battle.

It did not, however, accord with the views of Marmont to accept the challenge thus offered.

Oct. 1. He retired to Ciudad Rodrigo, where his army separated; part, under Dorsenne, returning to the north; and the remainder, still retaining its designation as the Army of Portugal, moved towards the pass of Banos and Placentia. The allied army then went into cantonments, and head-quarters were established at Frenada.

But perhaps the most splendid achievement of the campaign was performed by General Hill.

That officer remained in the neighbourhood of Portalegre, covering the province of Alentejo against any incursion by the garrison of Badajoz, while Castanos was employed recruiting the Estramaduran army, which had been so miserably sacrificed by the imbecility of Mendizabel. On learning that Castanos had already embodied a considerable number of recruits, Marshal Soult directed Girard, with about four thousand foot, and a thousand horse, to march to Caceres, and scour the neighbourhood, in order to disperse these newly collected levies. The presence of this force was productive of much inconvenience. It narrowed the limits and resources of Castanos, whose troops (in the miserable state of the Spanish government and commissariat) depended solely for assistance on what the neighbouring country might afford. A movement, therefore, was concerted, by which a signal blow might be struck against Girard, and the province relieved from the burden under which it laboured.

The execution of this enterprise was intrusted to General Hill, who, on the twenty-second of October, with such force as was deemed sufficient for the service, set out from Portalegre to-

CHAP. VI.

1811.

October.

Oct. 22.

CHAP. VI. ward the Spanish frontier. On the day follow-

1811.

October.

ing he reached Albuquerque, where he learned that the cavalry of Girard had fallen back from Aliseda to Arroyo del Puerco. On the twenty-fifth, the Spaniards, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco. The French cavalry then fell back to Malpartida, which Girard occupied as an advanced post, his main body still remaining at Caceres.

Oct. 25.

On reaching Malpartida, at daybreak on the twenty-sixth, General Hill learned that the enemy had retired during the night, followed by a party of Spanish cavalry. It was soon after ascertained that Girard had quitted Caceres ; but as the direction he had taken was uncertain, General Hill remained at Malpartida to watch his movements.

Oct. 26.

Having ascertained that the enemy had marched on Torre Mocha, the allies were put in motion on the morning of the twenty-seventh, by Aldea de Cano, and Casa de St. Antonio. As this was a shorter route than the one followed by Girard, General Hill was not without hopes of being enabled to intercept and bring him to action. On the march, however, he learned that the enemy had quitted Torre Mocha in the

Oct. 27.

morning, and moved to Arroyo de Molinos, leaving a rear-guard at Albala. Satisfied, from this information, that Girard was ignorant of his movements, General Hill, on the same evening, made a forced march to Alcuesca, where he halted in bivouac, taking every precaution to avoid discovery by the enemy's patrols.*

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October.

About two in the morning the troops moved on from Alcuesca in one column towards Arroyo de Molinos, a village situated at the foot of a mountain crescent, generally inaccessible, which sweeps round it, and embraces a diameter of about two miles. There were three roads which it was necessary to occupy in order to cut off the enemy's retreat. That leading to Truxillo, which winds round the eastern horn of the crescent; that to Merida, which diverges at right angles from the route by which the allies were advancing, and that leading to Medellin.

Oct. 23.

Though the distance from Alcuesca was little more than a league, it was nearly seven o'clock before the troops had defiled from the mountains, and formed under cover of a low ridge* about half a mile from Arroyo de Molinos. General Hill then divided his force into three columns. The left column, consisting of the seventy-first

CHAP. VI. and ninety-second regiments, supported by the
fiftieth, and three pieces of Portuguese artillery,
1811. under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart,
October. was directed to carry the village at the point of
the bayonet.

The right column, consisting of Colonel Wilson's brigade, and the Portuguese brigade of Colonel Ashworth, under Major-General Howard, was instructed to move to the right, to cut off the retreat of the enemy towards Medellin, and finally to attack their left and rear.

The cavalry, under Sir William Erskine, was placed between the two columns of infantry, ready to act in front, or move round either of them, as occasion might require. Unfortunately, the British cavalry, mistaking the road in the darkness, were delayed in their advance; and the Spanish horse, under Penne Villemur, enjoyed the honour of first encountering the enemy;—the Spanish infantry remained in reserve, and bore no part in the engagement.

The route of these columns lay through a plain 'thinly covered with cork wood and evergreen oak; and, as day dawned, a violent storm of rain and mist came on, under cover of which the troops continued their ad-

vance. On the left, Colonel Stewart moved rapidly on the village, which they succeeded in gaining unperceived, though the enemy were in motion, and a brigade had marched an hour before for Medellin. The seventy-first and ninety-second then charged through the street, driving every thing before them at the point of the bayonet, and leaving the fiftieth regiment, by which they were closely followed, to secure the prisoners. The enemy's infantry, on escaping from the town, immediately formed into two squares, with the cavalry on the left, and opened fire on the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments. The former took post behind a wall and immediately opened fire; while the ninety-second formed line on the right flank of the French, supported by two Portuguese guns, which shortly after came up and did great execution. The ninety-second, which had hitherto been directed to reserve their fire, then received orders to charge; but the French, without waiting their approach, retreated rapidly, and in great confusion towards the mountain in their rear.

At this moment the column of General Howard approached, and the cavalry crossing the head of the retreating column, succeeded in separating

CHAP. VI.

1811.

October.

CHAP. VI. the French horse from the infantry, and, by repeated charges, threw it into confusion. General
1811. Howard, finding it impossible to get between
October. the enemy and the mountain, made a rapid movement round its base, and, ascending at a point opposite to that chosen by the enemy, encountered them on the shoulder of the hill.

No resource then remained to the enemy, but to disperse or surrender. All order was at an end ; the soldiers, throwing away their arms, fled, panic-stricken, towards the steepest parts of the ridge. Of the fugitives many were made prisoners ; and General Morillo, with the Spanish infantry, one British, and one Portuguese
* battalion, continued the pursuit for eight leagues. General Girard, with a few hundred men, mostly without arms, escaped in the direction of Serena.

In this brilliant affair fifteen hundred of the enemy, including General Brun and the Duke d'Aremberg, were made prisoners, and the whole of their artillery, baggage, stores, and ammunition were taken, at an expense, on the part of the British, of sixty-four killed and wounded, and of only seven on that of the Portuguese. The loss of the Spaniards was likewise very trifling.

General Hill returned to his cantonments at CHAP. VI.
 Portalegre, where he remained till the end of 1811.
 December. He then made a rapid movement on December.
 Merida, in hope of surprising a detachment of
 the enemy, under General Dombrowsky, which
 occupied that town. About three leagues from
 Merida, however, he fell in with a foraging Dec. 29.
 party, which, though briskly pursued, succeed-
 ed in effecting its retreat, and gave the alarm.
 The enemy, thus informed of his approach, im-
 mediately abandoned the town, leaving a consi-
 derable magazine of flour; and General Hill
 immediately directed his march against Drouet,
 who had taken post with part of his corps at
 Almandrelejo. On reaching that town, however,
 he found that Drouet had retired towards the
 south; and, having cleared this portion of the
 province from the enemy, General Hill placed
 his troops in cantonments in Merida, and its
 vicinity.

In Cadiz, and its vicinity, nothing of importance
 took place till the close of the year. The Cortes,
 occupied with matters of speculative policy, had
 done nothing to promote the interests, or acquire
 the confidence of the country. What Spain
 wanted, was a leader of skill, enterprise, and

CHAP. VI. genius, to give unity to her exertions, and conso-
 1811. lidate those resources which had hitherto been
 September. wasted and misapplied. But this truth, obvious
 to all reasonable men, was not appreciated by the
 Cortes or the government. After the abandon-
 ment of Portugal by Massena, it was proposed
 that the frontier provinces should be placed un-
 der command of Lord Wellington. On a mo-
 tion to this effect, a debate took place in the
 Cortes; and the proposition, being somewhat
 wounding to Spanish pride, was negatived by a
 large majority.

Ballasteros, who had been appointed to the
 command in Andalusia, remained in the neigh-
 bourhood of Gibraltar; and, adopting a desultory
 system of warfare, occasioned great annoyance
 to the enemy. Soult, who had already made se-
 veral ineffectual efforts to crush so annoying an
 Sep. 28. opponent, at length despatched General Godinot
 with a force of about eight thousand men to exe-
 cute this service. Ballasteros, by a variety of
 skilful manœuvres, avoided engaging a force su-
 perior to his own, and when pressed by the
 Oct. 10. enemy sought shelter beneath the guns of Gib-
 raltar.

In the meanwhile, a detachment from Cadiz,

under Colonel Skerret, and a Spanish force under Copons, were sent to occupy Tariffa, as a diversion in favour of Ballasteros. Tariffa was important in other respects. It afforded a secure point from which the allies might annoy the rear of the corps before Cadiz, and cut off their supplies. Godinot, therefore, on receiving intelligence of its occupation, immediately advanced against it. On the eighteenth, his artillery, with a considerable escort, moved towards Tariffa by the pass of La Pena ; but as the road lay along the shore, the British ships of war assailed the column with so heavy a fire as to force it to return.

CHAP. VI.

1811.

October.

Oct. 10.

Ballasteros now assumed the offensive ; and, attacking the rear-guard of the enemy, drove it back in confusion, and succeeded in making many prisoners. A more important advantage soon followed. General Semele had taken post at Bornos, on the right bank of the Guadalete, with two thousand foot, some horse, and three pieces of artillery. Ballasteros, by a night-march, came unexpectedly on this force, and, putting them to the route, succeeded in capturing about one hundred prisoners, with the whole of the artillery and baggage. The unfortunate result of his opera-

Nov. 5.

CHAP. VI. tions so affected the mind of General Godinot,
 1811. that on reaching Seville, whither he had been
 December. recalled by Soult, he put a period to his existence.

The views of Soult were then directed towards Tarriffa; and General Leval, with about ten thousand men and eighteen guns, was directed to reduce it. On the nineteenth of December that officer appeared before the place, and on the following night it was completely invested, though not without considerable opposition on the part of the garrison.

Tarriffa was a place of little strength; its only defence being an uncovered wall, flanked imperfectly by small projections. It communicated, however, with an island, on which were two half-moon batteries and a martello tower; and a secure point of embarkation was thus afforded, should it be found necessary to abandon the town. The garrison consisted of twelve hundred British under Colonel Skerret, and about nine hundred Spaniards, commanded by Don Francisco Copons.

Dec. 24. On the night of the twenty-fourth, the besiegers broke ground within four hundred yards of the place, and continued to push on their ap-

proaches, though annoyed by the fire from the town, which did considerable execution. On the twenty-ninth, two batteries were completed ; one of which opened fire on the gun-boats at anchor in the bay, the other on the town. On the thirtieth, General Leval sent a summons to the governor, which drew from Copons a bombastic reply. On the thirty-first, a practicable breach had been effected, and preparations on both sides were made for the assault. On the following morning a strong body of the enemy were seen advancing towards the breach. Colonel Gough, of the eighty-seventh, then drew his sword, and directed the band of his regiment to play the Irish air Garry Owen. The soldiers immediately cheered, and opened a very destructive fire on the advancing column. The forty-seventh, in particular, who lined a wall descending from the south-east tower, did great execution. The French halted for a moment, as if stunned,—then, rushing forward, gained the bottom of the breach. Unable to effect an entrance they hurried off under the wall to the right, and made an effort to gain the portcullis. Defeated in this, and finding themselves cut up by a flanking fire of artillery, and overwhelmed by

CHAP. VI.
1811.
December.

Dec. 30.

1812.
Jan. 1.

CHAP. VI. showers of musquetry and hand-grenades, they
1812. hastily retreated, with the loss of five hundred
January. of their number.

After this failure, no further attempt was made against the town; and Leval having buried his artillery, which the state of the roads rendered it impossible to remove, on the night of the fourth of January withdrew from the town by order of Marshal Soult, who, alarmed by the movements of General Hill, was concentrating his army at Seville.

The loss of the enemy was estimated to amount to two thousand five hundred men,—a number exceeding that of the garrison. This calculation, perhaps, exceeded the truth; but their loss was unquestionably very great; and the French, for the first time, learned what was to be expected from British soldiers when defending stone-walls. The siege lasted seventeen days; during seven of which the breach was open.

In Valencia, Suchet, having been joined by considerable reinforcements from the army in Catalonia, made preparations for the passage of the Guadalaviar. General Blake had strongly entrenched himself on the right bank of that river, with a force of twenty thousand

troops of the line, six thousand militia, and one hundred pieces of cannon. His infantry occupied a line extending from the sea to Manisses; his cavalry were placed on the left towards Ribaroja.

CHAP. VI.

1811.

December.

During the night of the twenty-fifth of December, two bridges were thrown across the Guadalaviar, in front of Ribaroja, where the country was no longer intersected by that labyrinth of canals which gave great strength to the other parts of the position. At Mislata, a third bridge was constructed for the cavalry and artillery.

Dec. 25.

Early on the twenty-sixth, three divisions of French infantry crossed the bridges in face of the Spanish cavalry, which was driven back in confusion on Torrente. The Murcian division at Manisses, observing the French columns on their left, became apprehensive of being surrounded, and, abandoning their posts, fled in great disorder towards Coterroja, on the road to Murcia. They were pursued by General Harispe, who made some prisoners, though unable to come up with the main-body.

Dec. 26.

At other points, the assailants were less successful. The division of Palombini, which pass-

CHAP. VI. ed at Mislata, were unable to penetrate the canals by which they were surrounded, and were driven back in confusion on the Guadalaviar.

1811.

December.

The troops, however, rallied; and General Habert coming up to their support, they were enabled to maintain their ground, till Blake, who beheld one division of his army already cut off, gave up the contest, and retired within the defences of the city.

Valencia stands on the southern bank of the Guadalaviar, and is surrounded by a wall flanked by towers, to which some works had been added requiring regular attack. It was, moreover, covered by a strong line of retrenchments, in which the suburbs were included; and no expense had been spared in accumulating an ample supply of arms, guns, and ammunition, for the defence of works so extensive.

1812. Suchet immediately prepared for the regular
Jan. 1. siege of Valencia. On the night of the first of January, trenches were opened against the eastern extremity of the line, near Mont Olivete; but the chief attack was directed against the salient part of the line, which covered the suburb of St. Vincente.

The works of the besiegers were pushed on

with great vigour ; and, on the morning of the fifth, the garrison, dispirited by their recent misfortunes, abandoned the defence of their lines, and retired into Valencia. The French then bombarded the city ; and on the eighth, Blake consented to capitulate. The garrison, amounting to upwards of eighteen thousand troops of the line, including twenty-three general officers, were made prisoners ; three hundred and ninety-three pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of stores and ammunition, fell into possession of the victors.

CHAP. VI.

1812.

January.

Jan. 8.

Thus did Suchet conclude a campaign, illustrated by a series of successes more brilliant than any which were destined to grace the French arms in the Peninsula. In every point of view, the conquest of Valencia was of vast importance : it gave the richest province of Spain into the grasp of the French ; it enabled the armies of Arragon and Catalonia to connect their operations with those of Soult ; it gave strength and consolidation to the French power in the interior provinces ; it gave a great though temporary downfall to the hopes of the Spanish nation, which beheld the annihilation of its last effective army. Napoleon, to

CHAP. VI. mark his sense of the distinguished services of

1812.

Suchet, bestowed on him the title of Duke d'Albufera, and the rank of Marshal of France. This elevation was accompanied by a grant of the royal domain of Albufera, in the neighbourhood of Valencia, to be held as an unalienable fief of the empire.

The conduct of Blake, in the operations which led to the surrender of Valencia, has subjected his integrity to vehement though unreasonable suspicion. He cannot be held as having betrayed that cause which he had supported throughout the war with zeal and steadiness, if not with judgment. That he committed several flagrant errors, is unquestionable. He intrusted the defence of the river, from Manisses to Ribaroja, solely to his cavalry; he shut up his army in Valencia, instead of retiring into Murcia; and thus sacrificed the hopes of his country in a futile attempt to hold a town which was in no respect calculated for a protracted defence. Valencia might have furnished a national guard, which, with the addition of a few thousand regular troops, would have been sufficient to garrison the city. Had Blake then manœuvred in the rear of the besieging army, or boldly

thrown himself into Catalonia, it is probable he would have arrested the tide of Marshal Suchet's success, even in the fulness of its flood.

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1812.

But Blake, with all his faults, must be admitted to have been a man of high courage and unshaken patriotism. His chief failing was one he held in common with the great mass of his countrymen—a presumptuous self-confidence ; and to this the long train of disaster, which unfortunately marked his career, may be attributed.

CHAPTER VII.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO,

CHAP. VII. WHILE the army remained in cantonments,
1812. the ever active mind of Lord Wellington was engaged in devising measures by which the supply of his army might be improved. It had been found by experience, that the transport of the country, even in conjunction with the numerous commissariat mules attached to each division, was inadequate to the requisite conveyance of stores and provisions. The waggons of the natives were of the rudest mechanism, and in many instances of little use. Lord Wellington, therefore, gave orders for the construction of a certain number, on a more improved model, to be attached to the army, under the denomination of the Commissariat Waggon Train.

Upwards of six hundred of these vehicles, each

capable of conveying a load of eight hundred weight, were constructed during the winter at Lisbon, Oporto, and Almeida, and were formed into divisions and sub-divisions, with conductors, artificers, and other subordinate persons attached to each. By this judicious arrangement, the army became possessed of a wheel transport of its own, and the necessary requisitions on the inhabitants were rendered less burdensome and vexatious.

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But this was not all. By the exertions of the engineer officers, the Douro was rendered navigable to the confluence of the Agueda, a point about forty miles higher than boats had ever previously been able to proceed. A great distance of land carriage was thus saved, at a moment when the whole means of transport, at command, were required for the conveyance of the battering-train to be employed in the approaching siege.

In the meanwhile, Marmont, satisfied from the facility with which he had succeeded in re-victualling Ciudad Rodrigo, that it was in no immediate danger of attack from Lord Wellington, remained tranquil in his cantonments on the Tagus. The activity of General Hill, in the

CHAP. VII. south of Estramadura, tended perhaps still further to increase his security, by inducing the belief that Lord Wellington had detached a large portion of his army to the Alentejo. Under this impression, he not only quartered his army in very extensive cantonments, but even ventured to detach General Montbrun, with three divisions, to assist Suchet in his operations in Valencia. The division of General Bonnet had likewise been detached, by Dorsenne, to occupy the Asturias; and another, under General Dubreton, was scouring the province of Las Montanas.

Lord Wellington, accurately informed of these details, determined instantly to commence the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Accordingly, on the sixth of January, head-quarters were transferred from Frenada to Gallegos; but the ground being covered with snow, and the weather inclement, the army did not move till the eighth. The light division alone crossed the Agueda, and formed the investment; but the other divisions took part in all the duties of the siege, and were prepared, if necessary, to move to the support of the investing force.

Jan. 8. Shortly after dark, on the same evening, par-

ties from the third, fourth, and light divisions CHAP.VII.
 broke ground before the fortress, under a heavy
 fire ; and a redoubt, situated on the great Te- 1812.
 son, was gallantly stormed by a party of the light January.
 division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colburne.—
 The immediate direction of the siege was en-
 trusted to Sir Thomas Graham, who had suc-
 ceeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in command.

By the capture of the redoubt, a powerful pre-
 liminary obstacle to the operations of the besieg-
 ers was removed. On the night following, the
 first parallel was established, and the batteries
 traced out. On the night of the thirteenth, a Jan. 13.
 fortified Convent, situated on the right of the
 captured redoubt, was attacked and carried by
 a detachment of light infantry companies, sup-
 ported by Lord Blantyre's brigade. The as-
 sailants succeeded in approaching the Convent
 unobserved ; and, effecting an entrance, took
 the garrison by surprise. As this post was of
 considerable importance, a lodgment was form-
 ed in it, and the sap was carried on to the line
 of the second parallel. •

On the fourteenth, the garrison took advan- Jan. 14.
 tage of a moment when the trenches were un-
 guarded, to make a sortie. By a culpable neg-

CHAP. VII. ligence, the guard, quitting the trenches, were
1812. accustomed to depart on observing the approach
January. of the relief. For a moment, therefore, the
enemy were successful; the workmen, armed
only with spade and mattock, hastily retired;
but the alarm was instantly given, and the as-
sailants were driven back, without effecting
more injury than that of upsetting a few ga-
bions into the sap.

In the meanwhile, intelligence was received that Marmont, ignorant of the operations of the allies, was approaching, with the view of throwing supplies into the place. But as this ignorance could be but of short duration, Lord Wellington determined to push forward his advances with the utmost rapidity, in the hope of carrying the town, before Marmont and Dorsenne should be enabled to collect their forces for its relief. In case, however, he should be defeated in this object, preparations were made for encountering the combined army in the field. The divisions, in the more distant cantonments, were moved up to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and General Hill was directed to throw two brigades across the Tagus, to move
s occasion might require.

It was considered of importance to gain possession of the convent of St. Francisco, by which the approaches were enfiladed on the left. Batteries were accordingly erected against it, which speedily destroyed the defences; and, on the night of the fourteenth, it was carried by assault. The second parallel was then completed, and progress made by sap towards the crest of the glacis. Advances were likewise made from the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill, and fresh batteries established, from which an incessant fire was kept up on the *fausse braie*, and body of the place.

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January.

Jan. 14.

On the nineteenth, two practicable breaches were completed, one in the *fausse braie*, the other in the main wall, and preparations immediately made for storming them, though the sap had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire.

Jan. 19.

The attack of the main breach was committed to the division of General Picton, consisting of the brigades of Major-General Mackinnon, and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell. The column was to be preceded by a storming-party, consisting of the light companies of the division under Ma-

CHAP. VII. **1812.** **January.** **for Manners** of the seventy-fourth; and, to divert the attention of the garrison, a demonstration was to be made on the right by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Toole, with five companies of the ninety-fifth rifle corps, and the light companies of the eighty-third and ninety-fourth.

The light division, consisting of the brigades of Major-General Vandeleur and Colonel Barnard, was directed to assault the smaller breach, headed by a storming party of three hundred men, led by Major Napier of the fifty-second regiment.

General Pack was instructed to make a false attack with his brigade on the outwork of St. Iago, and the convent of La Caridada, with instructions to convert it into a real one, should circumstances prove favourable.

Jan. 19. Soon after dark, on the nineteenth, the troops were under arms, and at seven o'clock advanced to the assault. In order to facilitate the advance of the main storming party, under General Mackinnon, and remove such impediments as the enemy might oppose to their ascent of the main breach, Colonel Campbell, with the ninety-fourth regiment, and second battalion of the fifth, which had been placed as near as possible to the

town, descended the counterscarp, by means of ropes, and moved silently to the breach, which they succeeded in reaching without discovery. Not meeting with any serious obstacle to retard their progress, and aware of the danger of delay at such a crisis, Colonel Campbell, on his own responsibility, formed the daring resolution of storming the town, though such an attempt was not warranted by his orders. At this moment he could only avail himself of the battalion of the fifth, and the right wing of the ninety-fourth, but placing himself at their head, he instantly commenced ascending the breach.

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The enemy were now on the alert; and Colonel Campbell had nearly reached the summit of the breach, when he distinctly heard the enemy's artillery men receive orders to fire. With great promptitude he instantly ordered the men to throw themselves flat on their faces. No sooner had this been done than a shower of shot and shells swept over them; and the troops, springing to their feet, again poured onward, and in a few moments the breach was cleared.

In endeavouring to reach the ramparts on the right, an unexpected obstacle occurred. The enemy had cut a wide ditch between the breach

CHAP.VII. and the ramparts ; but here one of those fortunate incidents occurred, on which the most important events frequently depend. Across the ditch two planks had been placed by the enemy, and in the confusion of their retreat, they had removed one of them, but neglected the other. Along this temporary bridge the troops passed to the ramparts on the right, driving the artillery men from the guns, and carrying every thing before them.

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January.

New difficulties, however, soon presented themselves. The storming party, under General Mackinnon, had not yet appeared ; and the garrison, recovering from their panic, made a powerful attack on their assailants. Under these circumstances Colonel Campbell ordered a volley, and then charging at the head of his detachment, the French immediately fled, throwing down their arms. Such had been the celerity of Colonel Campbell's movements, that when on the ramparts, his men were fired at by the light troops from without the town, who were ignorant of it, having been already stormed.*

* That the fifth and ninety-fourth regiments had entered by the breach before General Mackinnon's brigade came up, is not gen-

It was at this period that the column of Gen-eral Mackinnon commenced its attack. It was received by a shower of grape and musquetry, which did great execution ; but the troops pressing onwards, succeeded in clearing the breach. Unfortunately an expense magazine, on the rampart, accidentally caught fire, and General Mackinnon and many of his followers were killed by the explosion. Notwithstanding this misfortune, and a destructive fire kept up by the garrison from behind an interior retrenchment, the assailants maintained their ground, till the troops which had already entered came to their assistance, when the enemy gave way.

In the meanwhile, General Vandeleur's brigade of the light division, which had formed behind the convent in the suburb, nearly opposite to the lesser breach, advanced at the appointed moment to the assault. General Crawford—than whom the service boasted no more zealous and accomplished officer—received his death wound on the glacis while leading on his division ; and General Vandeleur, Colonel Col-

erally known. The fact is in perfect accordance with the account given in the despatch of Lord Wellington, though not with the minuter details of Lord Londonderry or Colonel Jones.

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CHAP. VII. burne, and Major George Napier, who led the storming party, were likewise wounded. The courage of the soldiers, however, was not daunted. Notwithstanding the tremendous fire by which they were assailed, the column continued its advance. The breach was carried in spite of every obstacle ; and the troops having hastily formed, swept round the ramparts to the larger breach.

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The column of General Pack had likewise been successful in their escalade, and the town was carried at all points. The garrison fled in confusion, throwing away their arms, and the whole of the survivors were made prisoners.

This successful achievement was followed by the usual scenes of riot and excess. The men, no longer amenable to discipline, ransacked the houses in search of plunder. The cellars were broken open and emptied of their contents ; many houses were wantonly set on fire ; and the yells of brutal triumph uttered by the intoxicated soldiers, were heard in wild dissonance with the screams of the wounded. Thus passed the night. In the morning, by the exertions of the officers, discipline was partially restored. The soldiers by degrees returned to their duty, and


SKETCH

of the

Siege of

CIUDAD-RODRIGO

1812



the blind appetites of their brutal nature became again subjected to moral restraint. CHAP.VII.

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January.

The loss of the allies in the siege and storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, was considerable, though not more than might have been anticipated in such an operation. It amounted to one thousand three hundred and ten men killed and wounded. Of the garrison one thousand seven hundred were made prisoners, and their loss in killed and wounded was estimated at a thousand. In the town were found a battering train of forty-four pieces, an immense quantity of ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and considerable stores of provisions.

The reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, was unquestionably an operation of great brilliance. It was effected in the depth of winter, with a rapidity for which Marmont was altogether unprepared. The following are extracts from his reports to Berthier :—"I had collected five divisions for the purpose of throwing supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo ; but this force is now inadequate to the object. I am, therefore, under the necessity of recalling two divisions from the army of the north. I shall then have above sixty thousand men, with whom I shall march

CHAP. VII. against the enemy. You may expect events as fortunate as glorious for the French army."

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January.

Thus did Marshal Marmont write on the sixteenth of January. On the twentieth, he is forced to record the failure of his hopes. "On the sixteenth, the English batteries opened their fire at a great distance. On the nineteenth, the place was taken by storm, and fell into the power of the enemy. There is something so *incomprehensible* in this, that I allow myself no observation. I am not yet provided with the requisite information." The warmest admirer of Lord Wellington, need desire no more honourable testimony to his skill, activity, and boldness, than is afforded by these extracts.

The Spanish government and nation were not slow in expressing their gratitude for the signal service which had been rendered to their cause. *Te Deum* was sung in the churches of Cadiz; a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington passed by acclamation in the Cortes; and, as a permanent memorial of Spanish gratitude, they conferred on him the dignity of a grandee of the first class, with the title of Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Nor were his own government and country more backward in manifesting their deep sense

of so splendid an achievement. It raised the confidence of the people in their army and its leader. Lord Wellington, with the approbation of all classes, was raised to the dignity of an Earl of the United Kingdom ; and the Parliament, besides a vote of thanks to the army, annexed to the title an annuity of two thousand pounds a year, as a testimony of the national gratitude.

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It might have been expected that the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo would have animated the Spanish people into measures of vigour and activity. It had not this effect. Throughout the whole provinces, with the exception of Catalonia, there was an utter absence of energy ; no advantage was taken of the opportunities afforded of combined and efficacious exertion. In the north, Dorsenne had been compelled to evacuate the Asturias and part of Leon, to collect forces for the succour of Ciudad Rodrigo. The retreat was precipitate, yet the Spaniards took no advantage of it. Galicia had long been freed from the presence of an enemy, yet what had the inhabitants of that province done for the liberation of their country ? Had a strong Gallician army been in the field, it would have become im-

CHAP. VII. possible for Dorsenne to have joined Marmont,
1812. and the whole scheme of the enemy's operations might at once have been overthrown. But Galicia did nothing. Her liberation had not been the signal of energetic preparation, but of inaction ; and the sole fruit of her patriotism had been the collection of a force of ten thousand men, perhaps worse disciplined and provided than any other force in the Peninsula.

In Catalonia, a better spirit prevailed under circumstances of disadvantage immeasurably greater. A long succession of misfortune had raised instead of depressing the energies of the people. If, by the atrocities of Tarragona, Suchet hoped to quell the gallant Catalans into submission, he was deceived. If the spirit of patriotism and revenge, which glowed within them, could have been quenched by the most profuse outpouring of blood, it would long have ceased to burn. But this was not so. The Catalans, in undiminished numbers, continued to flock to the standard of their country, ready to peril all for the vindication of their freedom ; and in spite of the vindictive and disgraceful cruelty with which they had been persecuted, Catalonia was still in arms.

During the siege of Valencia, General Lacy, who had succeeded Campoverde in the command of the Catalan army, took advantage of the moment to make an attempt on Tarragona, assisted by a British squadron then cruising in that quarter.

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Having drawn together a force of ten thousand Miquelets and regulars, Lacy accordingly advanced to blockade Tarragona. On receiving intelligence of this movement, General Decaen despatched a division under Maurice Mathieu, to raise the blockade, and bring Lacy to battle. Having been joined on his march by a detachment of three thousand men from Barcelona, the force of the two armies was nearly equal. On the twenty-second of January, the French arrived at Villa Franca, and in order to deceive Lacy with regard to the amount of his force, the troops were brought up, not in a body, but in successive detachments.

This stratagem was successful. Lacy, imagining he had only to deal with a brigade, raised the blockade to give battle. He was attacked on the twenty-fourth, on the heights of Altafulla, and after a severe contest, in which victory long wavered between the armies, was

Jan. 24.

CHAP. VII. compelled to retreat through the mountains towards Cervera, with the loss of his artillery.

1812.

January.

While Maurice Mathieu was thus employed in raising the siege of Tarragona, Decaen manœuvred against the forces under Sarsfield and Rovira, in the direction of Vich and Manresa. A desultory and irregular warfare ensued, in which the native troops, from their activity and knowledge of the country, had generally the advantage.

Marshal Suchet was not slow in taking advantage of that brilliant train of success which had hitherto marked his progress, to push his conquests still further. He gained possession of Guardia, Denia, Alzira, and St. Felipe; and from the Pyrenees to the gates of Alicante Peninsula was the only fortified place in possession of the Spaniards.

Shortly after the fall of Valencia, General Montbrun, with three divisions of the army of Portugal, arrived at Almanza, and anxious to signalize his zeal, he marched to Alicante, in hope of intimidating the governor into a surrender of the city. This enterprise, which was undertaken in opposition to the opinion of Marshal Suchet, failed. The governor at once re-

jected the proposals of Montbrun; and that officer, having thrown a few shells into the town, found it necessary to retreat, and shortly afterwards rejoined the army of Marmont.

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January.

Suchet then detached a division of his army under General Severoli, to commence operations against the fort of Peniscola. Peniscola is a place of great strength, built on an isolated rock, jutting out into the sea, and connected with the mainland by a narrow isthmus. The garrison was commanded by General Navarro, and consisted of a thousand men. On the twenty-eighth of January, the French batteries opened fire, and on the fourth of February, the governor disgracefully capitulated. So lost to shame was this man, that he even made a merit with Severoli of his cowardice. At the moment of surrender, he boasted of having means of resistance for two months, and of having refused to admit the English, who wished to lend aid to the garrison. In Peniscola, the enemy gained possession of sixty-six guns, and large stores of provision and ammunition.

Feb. 4.

In the south, some partial successes were achieved. On the sixteenth of February, Balasteros attacked the French General Maransin,

Feb. 16.

CHAP. VII. near Cartama, with a force of about three thousand men. The numbers on both sides were nearly equal, but the Spaniards had the advantage of ground ; and Ballasteros, concentrating his choicest troops, made a furious attack on the left of Maransin, and drove back that part of the line. The conflict was extremely obstinate, and lasted for three hours. At length, the French fled in confusion, and were pursued as far as Malaga.

CHAPTER VIII. .

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF BADAJOS—ATTACK
ON ALMARAZ.

ON the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wel-
 lington took immediate measures to repair the
 works, and put the fortress in a defensible state.
 Having effected this, and supplied the place with
 the requisite stores of provisions, he placed it
 under command of a Spanish governor, and
 returned to Frenada.

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1812.

February.

He then determined on the bold project of
 throwing his army with suddenness and secrecy
 across the Tagus, and reducing Badajoz before
 Soult and Marmont should be able to take effec-
 tive measures for its relief. At this period there
 were none of the enemy's troops in Estramadura,
 except a part of the fifth corps at Villa Franca,
 and a division under General Darican at La Sere-
 na. But Marshal Soult could readily concentrate

CHAP.VIII. a force of forty thousand men, while that of

1812.
February. Marmont was yet more considerable. Should these armies unite, it would be impossible to effect any thing, in face of numbers so utterly overwhelming.

The success of the enterprise, therefore, depended on secrecy and rapidity of movement, and every means were adopted by Lord Wellington to conceal his intentions from the enemy till the last moment. With this view, the artillery for the siege was embarked in large vessels at Lisbon, for a fictitious destination, and subsequently transhipped at sea into small craft, by which it was conveyed up the river Sadao to Alcacerdo Sal. From thence it was conveyed in carriages across the Alentejo to Badajos, by a route towards which it was not probable that the suspicions of the enemy would be directed.

In all the details of preparation the same prudent caution was observed ; and at length the arrangements being completed, the army on the sixth of March broke up from its quarters, and moving rapidly to the south, reached Elvas on the eleventh. One division only, covered by a few cavalry posts, remained on the Agueda.

Mar. 16. On the sixteenth of March, the army crossed

the Guadiana, and Badajos was immediately CHAP. VIII
 invested by the third, fourth, and light divisions, 1812.
 under command of Marshal Beresford and Gen- March.
 eral Picton. Sir Thomas Graham, with the
 first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry,
 and General Slade's and General Le Marchant's
 brigades of cavalry, advanced to Los Santos, Za-
 fra, and Llerena; and Sir Rowland Hill, with
 the second division, and the Portuguese division
 of General Hamilton, and one brigade of caval-
 ry, moved from his cantonments near Albuquer-
 que to Almandrelejo and Merida.

General Dronet, part of whose corps was sta-
 tioned at Villa Franca, finding himself thus
 threatened in front and flank, immediately fell
 back to Hornachos.

In the meantime the siege went on. On the
 seventeenth, the weather, which had hitherto Mar. 17.
 been remarkably fine, became cold and tempestu-
 nous. During the afternoon, and throughout
 the night, the rain fell in torrents; and taking
 advantage of the obscurity, ground was broken
 within one hundred and sixty yards of Fort Pi-
 curina, undiscovered by the enemy.

During the eighteenth, in spite of the ele- Mar. 18.
 ments, the troops persevered in their labours in

CHAP. VIII the trenches. A heavy cannonade was kept up
1812. from the town, but with little effect.

March.

On the nineteenth, the rain continued with increased violence. The troops were without shelter of any kind, and the duties of the siege were uncommonly severe. In the evening, a spirited sortie was made by the garrison, in which Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer, was wounded. They were speedily charged back into the town by the brigade of General Bowes; after which, the troops resumed their labours, and continued to persevere in spite of every obstacle. The loss on this occasion, amounted to one hundred and twenty men in killed and wounded.

Mar. 21. During the night of the twenty-first, the bridge across the Guadiana was carried away by a sudden swell of the river. Owing to this misfortune, great difficulties occurred in bringing up the supplies necessary for the troops. The only communication was by a flying bridge, which could only be worked with great difficulty, and the quantity of provisions thus procured, was found so utterly inadequate to the demand, that the most serious consequences were apprehended.

There were likewise other impediments to be overcome. The trenches on the low ground were flooded, and the earth became saturated with moisture. To palliate this evil, double working parties were employed in the trenches. Some with buckets baling out the water, while others pushed forward the works. By these extraordinary exertions, favoured by a change of weather, several batteries were completed on the twenty-fourth, and, on the following day, opened fire on Fort Picurina, which Lord Wellington determined to carry by immediate assault.

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Mar. 24.

The attack was made by five hundred men of the third division, formed into three detachments. The right, under command of Major Shaw of the seventy-fourth; the centre, under the Honourable Captain Powis of the eighty-third; and the left, under Major Rudd of the seventy-seventh. Two of these columns advanced from the flanks of the parallel, and attacked the work in its gorge, while the third, consisting of one hundred men, under Captain Powis, escaladed the front, at a point where the palisades had been much injured by the fire of the batteries.

Mar. 25.

The latter soon succeeded in effecting an en-

CHAP. VIII trance, and a short but violent contest ensued.

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The assailants and defenders were mingled in a confused *melee*, and the issue was yet undecided, when the two columns, which had attacked the work by the gorge, having succeeded, though with great difficulty, in effecting an entrance, appeared to the assistance of their comrades. This at once decided the issue of the attack. Of the garrison, consisting of two hundred and fifty men, one officer and thirty-three men alone escaped. The commander, three officers, and eighty-six men were made prisoners, and the remainder were either killed in the fort, or drowned in attempting to cross the inundation of the Rivillas. All the leading officers of the attacking columns were killed or wounded, and the total loss on the part of the besiegers exceeded two hundred men.

While the contest was going on in the fort the alarm bell was rung in the town, fire balls were thrown up in all directions, and a random fire of cannon and musquetry, was opened from every part of the ramparts. At the same time, a battalion of the garrison made a sortie from the ravelin St. Roque, but they were instantly driven back, by the detachment stationed to pro-

tect the attack. Throughout the night, a heavy fire was kept up on the fort, which did little execution.

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By the capture of Picurina, the besiegers were enabled to establish their second parallel with little loss; and, on the night of the twenty-sixth, two breaching batteries opened fire, within three hundred yards of the body of the place. On the thirtieth, the fifth division under General Leith, which Lord Wellington had deemed it necessary to withdraw from Beira, arrived at Elvas, and joined the camp before Badajos.

Mar. 26.

Mar. 30.

It was now known that Soult, with his whole disposable force, was advancing to the relief of the place; and that Generals Graham and Hill—the former of whom had pushed on to Llerena—were retreating on Albuera. In the north, Marmont having collected his forces, took advantage of the absence of the allied army to cross the frontier; and masking Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, marched by Sabugal upon Guarda and Castello Branco, plundering the country as far as Covilhao in the Sierra de Estrella. The allied cavalry, which had been left to observe his motions, retreated towards the Tagus; and

CHAP. VIII a considerable body of militia, under Generals

1812. Trant and Wilson, fell back on Celorico.

April. Under these circumstances, the operations of the siege were pushed on, if possible, with increased rapidity ; and, on the sixth of April, three extensive breaches having become practicable, orders were immediately issued for the assault. The plan of attack was as follows :—

Apr. 6. General Picton, with the third division, was to make an attempt on the castle by escalade.

General Picton, with the third division, was to make an attempt on the castle by escalade.

The fourth and light divisions, under Major-General Colville and Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard, were to storm the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and Santa Maria, and in the connecting curtain.

General Leith, with the fifth division, was to escalade the rampart near the western gate ; and the left brigade, under Major-General Walker, was to make a false attack on Fort Pardaleras, which he was to turn into a real attack should circumstances prove favourable.

Brigadier-General Power, with his Portuguese brigade, was to threaten the *tête-du-pont*, and the other works on the right of the Guadiana.

At ten o'clock, on the night of the sixth, Gen-eral Colville and Colonel Barnard moved out of the trenches, and led on their divisions to the assault. On reaching the glacis they were discovered by the garrison; and instantly a tremendous fire opened. Though the carnage in the ranks was very great, the troops continued their advance, and entered the covered way at the points where the palisades had been destroyed by the batteries. The ladders were then fixed down the counterscarp, and the descent into the ditch was quickly effected.

Though the formation of the troops was necessarily broken in these operations, they immediately advanced against the breaches, and soon succeeded in gaining the ascent; but such were the obstacles prepared by the enemy, that it was found impossible to surmount them. Not only had the summits of the breaches been obstructed by chevaux-de-frize, but deep and wide trenches had been dug, in the bottom of which were planted iron spikes, and the whole of the surrounding buildings were casemated and occupied by light infantry. To overcome these obstacles, many gallant but unsuccessful attempts were made by the troops; but after persevering with

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CHAP.VIII a courage impossible to be surpassed, they were
1812. at length compelled to retire. The attack was
April. again renewed, but without more favourable
issue; and nearly all the superior officers being
disabled, the troops were withdrawn to prepare
for fresh efforts when the day should dawn.

In the meanwhile, the third division, led by General Kempt, and *commanded by General Picton, advanced to escalade the castle; and on approaching the Rivillas, were received by a heavy fire from all the works to the eastward of the town. They speedily descended into the ditch, and planted their ladders. These, unfortunately, were found too short, and did not reach within four feet of the summit of the rampart. This obstacle, though not insuperable, materially diminished the rapidity of the ascent, and kept the troops longer exposed to a destructive fire than would otherwise have been necessary. Showers of grenades, stones, and rafters of wood, were likewise poured down on them by the enemy, and the slaughter was very great. General *Picton and General Kempt were carried from the field severely wounded, and the command of the division devolved on Colonel Campbell of the ninety-fourth. Under this offi-

cer, the attack lost nothing of its energy. The troops, anxious to escape from the dreadful fire to which they were exposed in the ditch, eagerly mounted the ladders, and as they reached the summit, formed on the rampart. A short struggle then ensued,—and in a few minutes the division were in possession of the castle. •

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Soon afterwards, the brigade of General Walker, after forcing the barrier on the road to Olivença, succeeded in entering the town by escalade. Before this was effected, several of the ladders broke, and General Walker was disabled by a severe wound. The troops, however, persevered in the assault with a spirit and gallantry which drew the applause of Lord Wellington, who witnessed their efforts from a small eminence near the trenches, from whence he directed the whole movements of attack. The brigade of General Walker then advancing by the ramparts, attacked in rear the troops posted for defence of the breaches, and immediately dispersed them.

No sooner did Lord Wellington receive intelligence of the success of the third and fifth divisions, than he directed the fourth and light divisions again to advance on the breaches; and

CHAP. VIII fresh troops being thrown into the town, all resistance ceased on the part of the garrison. General Philippon and his staff, with about four hundred men, escaped across the river to Fort St. Christoval, and shortly afterwards surrendered.


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The whole of the garrison, amounting nearly to four thousand, were made prisoners. A considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, one hundred and seventy-two pieces of artillery, and more than eighty thousand shot, were found in the place. The expenditure of life, on the part of the allies, during this extraordinary siege, was very great: by the returns, the number of killed and wounded amounted to nearly five thousand.

Considering the boldness of the effort and the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome, the capture of Badajos is one of those events in our annals, of which Englishmen may well feel proud. "Never, probably," says Colonel Jones, "since the discovery of gunpowder, were men more exposed to its action than those assembled in the ditch to assault the breaches. Many thousand shells and hand-grenades, numerous bags filled with powder, every kind of burning composition and destruc-

SKETCH
of the
Siege of
BADAJOS
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tive missile, had been prepared and placed along the parapet of the whole front ; these, under an incessant roll of musquetry, were hurled into the ditch without intermission for upwards of two hours, giving to its surface an appearance of vomiting fire, and producing sudden flashes of light more vivid than the day. Description, however, conveys but a faint idea of the imposing nature of such a mode of defence. The doors of success were certainly thrown open ; but they were so vigilantly guarded, the approach to them was so strewn with difficulties, and the scene altogether so appalling, that instead of its being a disparagement to the troops to have failed in forcing through them, is it not rather a subject for pride and exultation that they had firmness to persevere in the attempt till recalled ?”

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The fall of Badajos took the French generals even more by surprise than that of Ciudad Rodrigo. General Lery, engineer in chief to the army of the south, wrote to General Kellerman respecting it in the following terms : “ The fall of Badajos cost me eight engineers. I am not yet acquainted with the details of that fatal event. Never was there a place in a better state, better

CHAP. VIII supplied, or better provided with the requisite
 1812. number of troops. There is in that event a
 April. marked fatality. I confess my inability to account for its inadequate defence. Very extensive works have been constructed. *All our calculations have been disappointed.* The army of Portugal withdrew to a greater distance from us when it should have drawn nearer; and thus Lord Wellington has taken the place as it were in presence of two armies, amounting together to about eighty thousand men. This is the consequence of the want of a supreme chief. In short, I think the capture of Badajos *a very extraordinary event*; and I should be much at a loss to account for it in any manner consistent with probability."

The truth is, that had Soult and Marmont profited by the lesson taught them at Rodrigo, and displayed that energy and activity which the crisis demanded, it seems more than probable that Lord Wellington would have been defeated in his object. Notwithstanding the

Relation des sieges et
 Defences de Olivença et
 de Badajos. secrecy⁴ with which the preparations for the
 siege of Badajos were conducted, Soult was not
 taken by surprise. The Governor, General
 Philippon, was too shrewd an observer, not to

read aright the signs of the time ; and he no sooner learned that the troops in Elvas were employed in the construction of fascines and gabions, than he apprised Soult that the allies were certainly on the eve of besieging Badajos. At all events, from the moment he became aware that Lord Wellington's army had crossed the Tagus, Soult had, and could have no doubt of the proximate and immediate object of this movement. In such a state of things, that he did not immediately concentrate his forces and march to the relief of Badajos, must be attributed to a gross blunder in calculation. On the seventeenth or eighteenth of March, he must have been aware of the arrival of Lord Wellington at Elvas. A week was sufficient to have enabled him to concentrate at Seville an army of forty thousand men ; and at the head of this force he might have reached Albuera on the third or fourth of April.

Instead of this, Soult appears at this important juncture to have been unaccountably bereft of that energy and activity which eminently distinguished him. He was slow and dilatory in his movements ; he did not conceive that Lord Wellington would have pushed the siege with

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CHAP. VIII such unusual vigour and rapidity ; and relying

1812. on the skill of the Governor, and the courage of the garrison, he calculated on a protracted defence. It was not till the eighth of April, that he reached Villa Franca, where he received the mortifying intelligence of the fall of that fortress, which, by greater rapidity of movement, he might have relieved. Nothing then remained, but to retrace his steps to Seville.

But if Soult be thus open to censure, what shall be said of Marmont ? That leader had a high game before him. Had he with one half of his army laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo, and with the other marched rapidly to Merida by Almaraz, and formed a junction with Soult, he might have repaired the past, and prevented the future disasters of the campaign. On the tenth of March, the allied army was in full march for the south, and in the course of a week from that period, Marmont might have been on the Agueda. He did not arrive there till the twenty-fifth, and was then satisfied with ravaging Lower Beira, and a few piddling advantages gained over the militia. It was impossible that any important consequence could result from his advance to Castello Branco. The movement excited no alarm in

Lord Wellington, who continued his operations CHAP. VIII
against Badajos, in the certain conviction, that, 1812.
on its fall, Marmont must instantly retire before him.

The only plea by which Marmont can be acquitted of flagrant incapacity, is, that he was actuated by jealousy of Soult. That such was the case is far from improbable. The French leaders in Spain, were each intrusted with a separate and distinct sphere of independent command, and receiving their instructions from Paris, were jealous of interference on the part of those who solicited assistance which they were not specially directed to afford. This feeling was perhaps aided by a sentiment of rivalry, which occasioned a want of zeal and cordiality in their combined movements. At all events, had Soult been joined, as he might have been, by twenty thousand of the army of Portugal, on the second or third of April, it is not too much to assert, that the allied army would have been forced to relinquish the siege, and march with all speed to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. In the movements of the French armies at this period, there is a laxity and tardiness in remarkable discordance with the necessity of the crisis. Lord Welling-

CHAP. VIII ton, on the other hand, was ever watchful and
 1812. alert, and in deciding on the bold and brilliant
 April. enterprises which marked this campaign, he may
 be supposed to have been influenced less by the
 abstract chances of success, than by those chances
 taken in conjunction with his observations on the
 qualities of his opponents. That these calcula-
 tions were sound, the event proved.

Soult, on receiving intelligence of the fall of
 Badajos, immediately retraced his steps to Se-
 ville, followed by the cavalry under Sir Staple-
 Apr. 11. ton Cotton. On the evening of the eleventh,
 the brigades of Generals Anson and Le Mar-
 chant, succeeded in coming up with his rear-guard
 at Villa Garcia. General Le Marchant immedi-
 ately charged in gallant style, and drove the ene-
 my in the utmost confusion to Llerena. In this
 engagement, upwards of one hundred and thirty
 of the enemy were made prisoners. On the
 same day, Soult continued his retreat to Seville,
 and General Drouet likewise falling back to
 Fuente Ovejuna, the province of Estramadura
 was thus entirely freed from the presence of
 the enemy.

In the meantime, the Conde de Penne Villemur,
 with some thousand men, left the county of

Niebla, and approached Seville on the fifth of April. He had several skirmishes with the garrison, and forced them to retire within their works; but the smallness of his force prevented him from undertaking any thing of importance.

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Unfortunately, there existed no unity of action or purpose between the Spanish leaders and their allies. Had Ballasteros joined Villemur in attacking Seville, it is probable the inhabitants, influenced by the appearance of such a force, would have risen on the garrison, composed chiefly of invalids, and the city would have been taken. Such a blow must have been most disastrous to the French army. Even had the place been abandoned on the approach of Soult, time would still have been afforded to remove or destroy the immense magazines which the enemy had collected in the city.

In the north, the Guerilla warfare was waged with increased vigour. Merino, a bold enterprising chief, suddenly attacked a considerable body of the enemy near Aranda, and made upwards of five hundred prisoners. This success enabled him to make a just, though severe retaliation for the execution of three members of

Apr. 16.

CHAP. VIII the Junta of Burgos, and of some of Merino's

1812.

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soldiers who had fallen into his hands. The prisoners immediately suffered in the proportion of twenty for each member of the Junta, and of ten for each soldier. This act of retribution was accompanied by a declaration, that similar measures would be resorted to, on every renewal of the enemy's atrocities.

The Empecinado, Mina, and Sanchez, were likewise in full activity, and continued to occasion great losses to the enemy. General Abadia, with the Gallician army, advanced into Leon, but retreated on the approach of the enemy. The Asturias was occupied by General Bonnet, with his head-quarters at Oviedo.

After the fall of Badajos the allied army was put in motion for the north; and the corps of General Hill alone remained on the south of the Tagus, taking post in the neighbourhood of Merida. Marmont, who, during the siege of Badajos, had pushed on to Sabugal and Castello Branco, was no sooner informed of Lord Wellington's approach than he retired hastily to Ciudad Rodrigo, and, raising the blockade of that place, fell back on Salamanca. Head-quarters were then established at Fuente Guinaldo, and

the army went into cantonments between the Agueda and the Coa. CHAP. VIII

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Lord Wellington then prepared to prosecute the ulterior objects of the campaign. He determined to transfer the seat of war from the frontier to the interior provinces of Spain; but, in order to prevent the junction of the French armies, he deemed it necessary, as a preliminary measure, to gain possession of Almaraz, where the enemy had a bridge of boats across the Tagus. As all the permanent bridges had been destroyed, Almaraz was, in truth, the only line of communication below Toledo, between the armies on the north and south of the Tagus; and the enemy, aware of the importance of this bridge, had thrown up works on each side of the river for its protection, while the castle and redoubt of Mirabete, about a league distant, contributed to its security. Upon the southern bank of the river, the bridge was defended by a *tête-du-pont*, and a strong field-work, called Fort Napoleon, on a commanding height. On the opposite side was another called Fort Ragusa, of very considerable strength. These works were garrisoned by about one thousand men, with eighteen guns.

CHAP. VIII Lord Wellington directed Sir Rowland Hill

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to move forward with his corps, and gain possession of this important post. Accordingly, on the twelfth of May, Sir Rowland Hill broke up from Almandrelejo, with his little army, and on the sixteenth reached Xaraicejo. At night he continued his advance, having formed his troops into three columns.

May 16.

Great obstruction, however, was experienced from the badness of the roads, and it was found impossible for the troops to arrive at their several points of destination before daybreak. Sir Rowland Hill, therefore, perceiving there was no longer a chance of taking the enemy by surprise, gave orders to halt in a mountain range about five miles distant from Almaraz, and the attack was delayed till the morning of the nineteenth.

May 17.

In the meanwhile, the enemy were discovered to have raised so formidable a barrier, on the only road by which artillery could be brought from the south, against the works of the bridge, that Sir Rowland Hill determined to leave his guns, and proceed by a mountain track leading through the village of Romangordo. Accordingly, about ten

May 18.

o'clock on the night of the eighteenth, General

Howard's brigade, and the sixth Portuguese regi-
ment of the line, descended into the plain by a
most difficult and narrow path, which, in many
places, did not admit the passage of more than
one file at a time. By daybreak the head of this
column had arrived within a few hundred yards
of Fort Napoleon; but such had been the mag-
nitude of the obstacles encountered, that several
hours elapsed before the rear came up. The or-
der for attack was then given, and the troops,
advancing from a ravine by which they had
hitherto been concealed, rushed on to the as-
sault. General Howard had formed his detach-
ment into three columns: one, consisting chiefly
of Portuguese, remained in reserve; another,
composed of the fiftieth and one wing of the
seventy-first regiment, directed their efforts a-
gainst Fort Napoleon. The ninety-second and
the other wing of the seventy-first, formed the
third, which was ordered to storm the *tête-du-*
pont and Fort Ragusa, at the same time that the
attack was made on Fort Napoleon.

The column, destined for the attack of the
fort, was no sooner discerned than the garri-
son, aware of the vicinity of an enemy, from a
feint which had been made early in the morning

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1812.

May.

May 19.

CHAP. VIII on the works of Mirabete, poured in a vehement and destructive fire, which did not succeed in checking the progress of the assailants. The ladders were soon planted; the troops gained the parapet, and in less than ten minutes the fort was carried.

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Thus driven from the fort, the garrison endeavoured to cross the river, pursued by the British, who entered the *tête-du-pont pêle mêle* with the fugitives. There all hope of escape was unexpectedly cut off. The officer commanding in Fort Ragusa, alarmed at the approaching danger, had cut the bridge, and the whole of the garrison on the southern bank were under the necessity of submitting as prisoners of war.

Intimidated by this success, Fort Ragusa was abandoned without even an effort at resistance, and the whole of the enemy's stores, which were very considerable, fell into possession of the victors. The loss sustained by the allies in these operations amounted only to one hundred and seventy-seven in killed and wounded. Of the enemy two hundred and fifty-nine were made prisoners. The works, the bridge, the cannon, and all the stores which could not be conveni-

ently removed, were immediately destroyed; CHAP. VIII
and on the day following Sir Rowland Hill set
out on his return.

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Marmont no sooner received intelligence of the march of General Hill than he broke up from Salamanca, and put his army in motion towards the Tagus. Drouot, also, made some movements which indicated an intention of intercepting his retreat; but on learning that General Hill had reached Truxillo on the twenty-first, he retired into Cordova.

In regarding the operations of the present period of the war, nothing is more remarkable than the glaring miscalculations of the French generals, in regard to the activity and enterprise of their enemy. They continually put their armies in motion to relieve fortresses which had already fallen. The English, they had brought themselves to believe, were slow, cautious, and prudent, most clumsy and elaborate in their operations; and their leader, though not without his tact and talent, was incapable of snatching success by a brilliant infringement of the rules of art. The reverses they had incurred at Oporto, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajos, were considered as isolated and unaccountable misfortunes,

CHAP.VIII arising from temporary contingencies, and in no

1812. degree attributable to the skill and boldness of
their opponent.

Accordingly, Soult and Marmont were never ready at the right moment. There was great bustle and preparation out of season. Marches were followed by countermarches; advances by retreats. Their anticipations of events had almost uniformly been erroneous. They suffered themselves to be robbed piecemeal of advantages which they were in full condition to have retained. Their calculations had been falsified; their hopes baffled. They had not been defeated in any general engagement, but they had been, what was even more mortifying, *out-generated*.

CHAPTER IX.

OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIED ARMY—BATTLE
OF SALAMANCA.

DURING the progress of the events which we have imperfectly attempted to detail, the seeds of war, which had been plentifully sown throughout Europe, were already bursting into blossom. Implacable in his hostility to England, Napoleon determined on the gigantic attempt of excluding her commerce from the whole continent of Europe. By the treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor Alexander had acceded to this system of exclusion, which he speedily found to be subversive of the interests of his empire, and incapable of being rigidly enforced. Napoleon, however, was little disposed to modify his policy by the circumstances or necessities of other nations. He insisted on a rigorous adherence to that prohibitory system, by which he trusted that the wealth

CHAP. IX.

1812.

CHAP. IX. and resources of England would eventually be
1812. exhausted.

In few undertakings could Napoleon, with the mighty means at his command, be expected to fail. But a war on trade, is, in truth, nothing less than a war on all the habits and propensities of mankind.* It is a war unattended by the pride, the pomp, and circumstance of glorious achievement, but one whose sufferings come home with peculiar force to the business and bosoms of all men. It is a war against enjoyment,—against the comforts and luxuries of civilized life, and affecting the interests of every individual, from the monarch to the peasant. The very attempt to enforce such a system as that demanded by Napoleon, was absurd, and followed by a signal failure. In spite of his decrees, British produce circulated by a thousand secret channels into all the markets of Europe.

In Russia, great relaxation took place in the observance of “the continental system.” Napoleon, not unwilling, perhaps, to take advantage of a plausible pretext for war with that power, made forcible seizure of the Duchy of Oldenburgh. For a time, it was the policy of Alexander to be quiescent under this injury;

but vigorous preparations were made on both sides, and war at length followed. On the ninth of May, Napoleon set out from Paris, to place himself at the head of that immense army, by whose approaching victories, Russia was to be humbled to the dust, and his supreme authority established throughout the civilized world.

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Hitherto the undivided energies of France had been directed towards the conquest of Spain. That had now sunk into a secondary object, and the contest was about to assume a new character. Henceforth, it was scarcely possible that reinforcements should be poured into Spain, with the extraordinary profusion, which, in time past, had enabled the French leaders, amid multiplied disasters, to maintain their hold on the Peninsula. The prodigal expenditure of life to which they were subjected, could now be less easily repaired ; and the hopes of many brave hearts, which, amid the darkness lowering on the cause of freedom, had hitherto but faintly glimmered, now rose into brighter flame.

At this critical juncture, however, the amount of the French forces in the Peninsula was very great. The army of the south, commanded by

CHAP. IX. Marshal Soult, was fifty-eight thousand strong.

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That of Portugal, under Marmont, fifty-five thousand. The army of the north, under command of General Souham, mustered about ten thousand. There were forty thousand commanded by Suchet, in the eastern provinces ; and there were about fifteen thousand of the army of the centre, to maintain the security of the capital ; forming, in all, the large aggregate of one hundred and seventy thousand men, chiefly veterans, experienced in the nature of the war in which they were engaged.

The army of Lord Wellington had received, since the commencement of the year, considerable reinforcements, and had become more formidable, both in numbers and discipline, than at any former period of the war. The corps of General Hill, who, by the successful attack on Almaraz, had established a communication with all the allied forces throughout the whole province of Spanish Estramadura, consisted of about ten thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry. The force which Lord Wellington could muster for offensive operations on the north of the Tagus, amounted to about forty thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry.

With such a force, Lord Wellington, though CHAP. IX.
 fully equal to cope singly with either of the 1812.
 great French armies, could effect nothing in case June.
 they should succeed in forming a junction. Before advancing against Marmont, therefore, he took every precaution to prevent the occurrence of an event which could not fail to occasion the necessity of instant retreat. General Hill held Almaraz, and Soult was thus cut off from his only direct communication with the north. To keep Marshal Suchet in check, and fix the attention of the French commanders on Granada and Valencia, a considerable body of troops, from the Sicilian army, were to land at Alicante or some other favourable point on the eastern coast. Soult and Drouet, it was hoped, would then find it necessary to withdraw from the western provinces ; and the allies might at length expect to secure the full fruits of their victories.

Assured that the Sicilian troops had sailed, Lord Wellington, having completed the formation of magazines at Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and upon the Douro, at length put his army in Jun. 13.
 motion, and advanced on Salamanca. Marmont fell back on his approach, leaving a garrison of about eight hundred men in some neighbouring

CHAP. IX. forts which commanded the bridge across the
Tormes.

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The allied army crossed the Tormes on the seventeenth of June, by the fords above and below Salamanca ; and preparations were immediately made for the reduction of the forts. These works had been constructed on the ruins of different convents, and formed collectively a post of considerable strength, which could only be reduced by regular attack. The siege was conducted by the sixth division, under Major-General Clinton ; while the remainder of the army remained in readiness to oppose the army of Marmont, who still endeavoured to keep up a communication with the forts.

Jun. 19.

Ground was broken on the night of the seventeenth, and on the nineteenth the guns opened fire. Unfortunately, the ammunition became exhausted before the breach was rendered practicable, and Lord Wellington determined on an attempt by escalade. In this unfortunate attack, Major-General Bowes and one hundred and twenty men fell. The conduct of this gallant officer had been, on all occasions, conspicuous. In leading on the storming party he received a wound, which was no sooner dressed than he returned

to the post of honour, and died gloriously in the service of his country. The monument of a soldier can bear no prouder epitaph than the record of such facts.

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On the twentieth, Marmont arrived in front of the position of St. Christoval, and made a strong demonstration with his cavalry in the plain. A pretty warm skirmish was the consequence. They were gallantly charged by the twelfth light dragoons, commanded by Colonel Ponsonby; and Captain Bull's troop of Horse-artillery was ably manœuvred. The enemy at length retired, leaving twelve horses on the field.

Jun. 20.

On the twenty-first, the French shewed themselves in force in the plain in front of St. Christoval. On this occasion, they displayed a force of not less than fifteen thousand men, as if to tempt the British General to descend from his vantage ground, and try the fortune of a battle. This Lord Wellington declined. During the night, however, the enemy established a post on the right flank of the position, from which General Graham was directed to dislodge him. He accordingly advanced with the seventh division,

Jun. 21.

CHAP. IX. and the enemy were immediately driven from

1812.

June.

the ground, with considerable loss.

On the morning of the twenty-third, it was discovered that Marmont had withdrawn his army during the night, and taken a position with his right at Cabeça Velosa, his centre at Aldea Rubea, and his left on the Tormes near Huerta, where he made demonstration of passing a large force across the river. As it was evidently the object of Marmont, in this manœuvre, to communicate with the forts, Lord Wellington, directing a brigade of cavalry to cross the Tormes, changed the front of his army, placing the right at the ford of Santa Martha, and the advanced posts at Aldea Lengua. During the night, Marmont crossed the Tormes with the greater part of his army; but observing that Sir Thomas Graham had likewise passed the river with two divisions, he re-crossed at Huerta, and again took up his former position.

Jun. 26.

In the meantime, supplies of ammunition having been brought up, on the twenty-sixth the fire on the forts was recommenced. On the twenty-seventh, the buildings in the largest fort, St. Vincente, were in flames; and another fort

being breached, the commander of St. Vincente expressed a desire to capitulate at the expiration of three hours. Lord Wellington, however, perceiving that the object of this proposal was to gain time, ordered an immediate assault. The party employed in this service, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Davies of the thirty-sixth regiment, performed it in the most gallant manner. The smaller forts were carried; and the attack on St. Vincente had already commenced, when the Governor sent out a flag, to notify his acceptance of the terms offered by Lord Wellington; and the whole garrisons, in number about seven hundred men, were made prisoners of war.

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June.

Jun. 27.

The forts thus captured, were found to be of great strength, the enemy having been engaged for nearly three years in their construction. They were armed with thirty pieces of artillery; and in St. Vincente was found a large quantity of clothing and military stores, which was given to the Spaniards. The whole of the works were immediately destroyed. •

The forts had no sooner fallen than Marmont broke up from his position, and retired towards the Douro. During this movement he was closely

CHAP. IX. followed by the allies ; and on the second of July,

1812.
July. the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, succeeded in coming up with the rear-guard of the enemy, which they instantly attacked and drove in confusion across the Douro. On the night following, both armies halted in position on opposite sides of the river. That of Marmont occupied a range of high ground, stretching from Pollos to Simancas on the Pisuerga, with the centre posted at Tordesillas, to defend the passage of the Douro. The British took up a line, extending from La Seca to Pollos, and head-quarters were established at Rueda.

Both Toro and Zamora had been strongly fortified by the French ; and the few other points at which the river could be crossed had likewise been put in a state of defence. Lord Wellington, therefore, considered the enemy's position on the Douro too strong for attack, and both armies remained inactive for about a fortnight, during which period Marmont was joined by General Bonnet, from the Asturias, with a division of eight thousand men.

The march of that General had not been unopposed. The Spanish Generals, Mahy, Barcena, and Porlier, had drawn together a force of from

fifteen to twenty thousand men, with which it was determined to attack him on the march. To avoid this, Bonnet threw himself into the mountains, and by roads of great difficulty, succeeded in reaching Reynosa without encounter, and, afterwards, in joining Marmont on the Douro.

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We shall here take leave to offer a few cursory observations on the manœuvres of the hostile armies. The object of Marmont in his advance to the neighbourhood of the position of St. Christoval, was to relieve the forts, which he was well aware could not hold out much longer without assistance, and to take the chances of Lord Wellington's retiring, in case he should think it prudent to decline a general engagement. There can be little doubt that this movement was made under a false notion of the strength of his opponent, for at the period in question, it was in no respect the policy of Marmont to fight a battle. He was in daily expectation of being joined by the division of General Bonnet, and the possession of the northern bank of the Douro, and of all the bridges on that river, gave him a decided advantage over his opponent.

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July.

But in proportion as a battle was against the interest of Marmont, was it desirable to the British General. By tacticians of no mean order, therefore, Lord Wellington has been held guilty of an error, in not attacking his opponent on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth of June, when it was certainly in his power to have done so. That the forts of Salamanca had not yet been reduced, cannot be gravely urged as an objection to the measure. A garrison of eight hundred men could be held in check by a battalion; and the whole army were thus disposable for battle. That Lord Wellington could expect a more favourable opportunity of striking a decisive blow, can scarcely be established by any general reasoning on the subject; yet in a few days we find him marching to the Douro, in search of that very adversary who had already been within his grasp on the Tormes.

Once, on the Douro, the advantages of Marmont were very great. He had everywhere formidable positions at command, and the whole bridges* and fords were in his possession, and guarded by strong defences. The river, bending in its course, encircled the flanks of the allied army, and it was impossible for Lord Wellington

to anticipate the quarter from which the enemy might direct his attack. He might be deluded by a false demonstration at one point, while the real danger was approaching from another. By a single injudicious movement, he was continually liable to be cut off from Salamanca, by the French army being suddenly thrown across the Douro, at some of the numerous salient points formed by the windings of the river on either flank. On the other hand, Marmont, when pressed by the allies, had always a secure retreat open to him by crossing the Douro.

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July.

Had Marmont remained in his strong line on the Douro, in all probability the campaign would have terminated without any important result. But Lord Wellington knew it to be impossible that so large an army could long procure subsistence in any one position ; and aware that in his rear the Guerilla parties were in constant activity, he waited the moment when the increasing necessities of his army should compel him to a decisive movement.

Marmont, however, having received the expected reinforcements, was little disposed to remain inactive. The army he commanded was

CHAP. IX. composed of veterans, inured to the warfare of
1812. the country, and full of confidence in their own
July. discipline and prowess. In manœuvre the French
had uniformly proved themselves superior to the
troops of every other nation ; while the English
were proverbially deficient in that alacrity of
movement, on which the success of a contest
of tactic must generally depend. Marmont,
therefore, calculated with confidence on the nu-
merous advantages he enjoyed ; and relied on
his own skill, and the activity of his troops, to
compel Lord Wellington to retreat on Ciudad
Rodrigo, or fight a battle under circumstances
of disadvantage.

Both armies remained quiet in their positions
JUL. 16. till the sixteenth of July, when Marmont moved
his army to St. Roman, and passed two divi-
sions across the Douro at Toro. Lord Welling-
ton was not deceived by this manœuvre. Mak-
ing a feint of moving on Toro with part of his
army, he took up a strong position on the Gua-
rena, occupying Villaescusa, Fuente la Pena, and
Castrejon.

On the night of the sixteenth, the French re-
crossed the river at Toro, and having blown up

the bridge, marched about ten leagues higher up to Tordesillas. Here, in the course of the day, Marmont passed the Douro with his whole army, and made a forced march on Rueda, Nava del Rey, and Castrejon, of which places he took possession on the morning of the eighteenth, the allies falling back on his approach. During this movement, the right of the army, consisting of General Cole's, and the light division, were for some time in very imminent peril. The enemy attempted to cut off their communication with the centre and left, and it was only by a resolute and successful charge of cavalry, that they were at length extricated from their difficulties.

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Jul. 18.

By a brilliant manœuvre, therefore, Marmont succeeded in establishing his communication with the army of the centre, which was then advancing from Madrid to his support. The position of the allies now extended along the banks of the Guarena, a stream tributary to the Douro, which, near Canizal, separates into four branches, and again unites its waters, about a league below it. By thus posting his army, Lord Wellington kept his communications un-

CHAP. IX. broken; and in case of attack, the advantages
1812. of ground were decidedly in his favour. Mar-
July. mont likewise halted his army in position on the
opposite bank of the Guarena.

Shortly afterwards he pushed a considerable column across the river below the junction of the streams, which attempted to turn the left of the allies, and gain possession of the valley of Canizal, by which it would have been enabled to command the Salamanca road. This attempt was repulsed by the cavalry and General Cole's
Jul. 18. division. The twenty-seventh and fortieth regiments, supported by a brigade of Portuguese, advanced to the charge with bayonets; and the enemy retreated in confusion, leaving two hundred and forty prisoners in the hands of the victors. In this affair about four hundred of the enemy were killed and wounded. The loss of the allies was more considerable, amounting in all to five hundred and fifty men.

Jul. 19. On the day following, Marmont withdrew his right, and moved his left forward, making demonstrations against the right of his opponent. Lord Wellington made an instant counter movement. He crossed the upper Guarena at Vallesa and El Olmo, with his whole army, and

every preparation was made for the engagement CHAP. IX.
on the following morning.

On the twentieth, however, the enemy were observed still moving to their left along the heights of the Guarena, which they crossed without opposition, and halted for the night with their left at Babilafuente, and their right at Villamula. Lord Wellington, who, during the day, had closely followed the enemy in all his motions, encamped his army at Cabeça Velosa, placing a corps of observation at Aldea Lengua on the Tormes.

 1812.

July.

Nothing could be finer or more striking than the spectacle of the hostile armies during the greater part of the march on the twentieth. They moved in parallel lines within half cannon-shot of each other, in the most imposing order and regularity. As the diversities of ground gave either party a temporary advantage, the artillery opened fire; but though both armies were prepared in a moment to form line of battle, no collision took place.

Jul. 20.

On the morning of the twenty-first, the two armies again moved forward in lines nearly parallel towards Huerta, between which place and Alba de Tormes the French army crossed

Jul. 21.

CHAP. IX. the river, leaving only a small body in occupation of the heights of Babilafuente. Marmont then directed his march to the left, threatening the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington immediately moved his army on the bridge of Salamanca, by which it crossed the Tormes in the evening, with the exception of the third division, and the Portuguese cavalry, under General D'Urban, which were left to observe the motions of the body of the enemy still remaining at Babilafuente.

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Jul. 22. Before daylight on the morning of the twenty-second, both armies moved into position. That of the allies extended from the Tormes to two steep and rugged heights, which, from their similarity, the natives generally distinguished by the name of the sister Arapiles. The position of the French was covered by a thick wood, and embraced the heights of La Pena, and the hamlets of Calvarasso de Ariba, and Calvarasso de Abaxo. In the morning a good deal of skirmishing took place. Detachments from both armies, endeavoured to seize the Arapiles heights, and the French succeeded in gaining possession of the external and more distant one.

The occupation of one of the Arapiles by the

enemy, occasioned some changes in the posi-
tion of the allied army. The right was extend-
ed *en potence* to the heights behind the village
of Arapiles, which was occupied by light infan-
try ; and General Pakenham, with the third di-
vision, and Portuguese cavalry, was directed to
cross the Tormes, and take post at Aldea Te-
jada, to lend still farther support to the right
flank.

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The morning passed in a series of manœuvres
on the part of Marmont, from which no conclu-
sion could be drawn with regard to his ultimate
intentions. Lord Wellington, therefore, content-
ed himself with keeping an accurate observation
on all the movements of his adversary, ready at
any moment to assume the offensive, and equal-
ly so, should sound policy require it, to retreat.

There can be no doubt that Lord Wellington
considered the latter alternative as by far the
more probable ; and every preparation had been
made to carry it into effect. It was unques-
tionably in Marmont's power, by turning the
right of the allied army, to have rendered its
position untenable. The baggage and com-
missariat, therefore, had already quitted Sa-


CHAP. IX. Iamanca ; and even some of the divisions had
commenced a retrogressive movement.

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July.

About two o'clock, however, a sudden and decisive change took place in the character of the enemy's demonstrations. Under cover of a heavy cannonade, and a skirmish along the whole front of his line, Marmont advanced his centre, making at the same time a movement to his left, as if intending to encircle the position of the allied army, and cut them off from the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. His line, thus unduly extended, was necessarily weakened, and the favourable opportunity of attack, thus presented, was immediately seized by Lord Wellington. The following was the disposition of the army at the moment of attack. The first and light divisions were on the left of the Arapiles, and formed the extreme left of the line. The fourth and fifth divisions were posted in a double line, in rear of the village of Arapiles, with the sixth and seventh divisions, and the division of Don Carlos d'España in reserve. On the left of the fourth division was the Portuguese brigade of General Pack ; on the right of the fifth was that of General Bradford. The third division, with the main body of the cavalry, formed the

(Battle of) SALAMANCA 22nd July 1812.



extreme right. While these arrangements were in progress, the enemy made repeated attempts to gain possession of the village of Arapiles, occupied by a detachment of the Guards; but no important change took place in their general dispositions. The third division was then ordered to advance obliquely to its right, to turn the left of the position, while General Cole's and General Leith's divisions should attack it in front.

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The arrangements being completed, the third division, led by General Pakenham, moved on to the attack. The division advanced in column of battalions, and was in the act of ascending the ridge occupied by the enemy, when the skirmishers were driven in by a large body of cavalry, who in a moment came sweeping along the brow of the ascent, on the right flank of the division. Fortunately the retreat of the light troops had given intelligence of their approach; and Colonel Campbell of the ninety-fourth, who commanded the brigade, had time to throw back the fifth regiment *en potence*, which, by a well-directed volley, caused them to retreat in disorder.

General Pakenham no sooner crowned the heights on the extreme left of the French, than

CHAP. IX. he formed line across their flank, and supported
1812. by General D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, and
July. some squadrons of the fourteenth, advanced towards the centre, carrying every thing before him. On every favourable point where they attempted to make a stand, they were charged with the bayonet; and with such vigour did General Pakenham follow up his success, that even the colours of the British regiments were often seen waving over battalions of the enemy. Sir Stapleton Cotton with the cavalry charged the enemy in front, and cut to pieces a brigade of French infantry, though not without sustaining a severe loss in General Le Marchant, who was killed at the head of his brigade. The whole left wing of the enemy was now retreating in confusion, and above three thousand prisoners had been made by the allies.

While the events just narrated were passing on the right of the army, the tide of success had not flowed with equal rapidity in the centre. The repeated attempts of General Pack to gain possession of the Arapiles height occupied by the enemy, were unsuccessful. On the retreat of the Portuguese, a body advanced from the height,

and made a gallant and very vehement attack on the flank of the fourth division, while warmly engaged with the enemy in its front. General Cole had been already wounded, and his division, disconcerted by this sudden attack, was compelled to retire in some confusion. The misfortune, however, was immediately repaired by the advance of a brigade of the fifth division, which, by a change of front, took the enemy in flank, and subjecting them to a cross fire, forced them instantly to retreat. The fourth and fifth divisions then continued to advance, uninterrupted by any further reverse, and gained complete possession of the crest of the position.

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July.

In the meanwhile the Arapiles was carried by General Clinton ; and the third division had advanced from the left, along the centre of the French position, attacking and dispersing the enemy in every encounter. Marshal Marmont had been wounded, and the command of the army devolved on General Clausel, who, with great skill and promptitude, now endeavoured to rally his defeated troops in a new position, running nearly at right angles with the original front. The ground was admirably chosen. Either flank of the position was supported by masses of cavalry ; and the artillery was so

CHAP. IX. posted as not only to sweep the whole face of
1812. the height, but to command all the ground in
July. the vicinity.

The assumption of so strong a position caused a pause in the movements of the allies. Lord Wellington having examined it, at length directed the* fourth division to dislodge the enemy by a flank movement on the left, while General Clinton's division, supported by the third and fifth, should attack it in front. It was in this part of the action that the loss on the part of the allies was most severe. General Clinton's division, during the whole of its advance, was exposed to a most destructive fire of artillery and musquetry, which it sustained with the greatest steadiness, till reaching the summit of the height, it at once charged with the bayonet, and the fourth division coming up, the enemy abandoned the position in great confusion, and fled towards Alba, where he crossed the Tormes. The allied troops continued the pursuit with great vigour till the approach of night, when the darkness and extreme fatigue of the troops, rendered it necessary to halt.*

* But for an unforeseen circumstance, the victory of Salamanca must have been attended with even greater results.

The immediate results of this most splendid victory, were the capture of eleven pieces of artillery, two eagles, and of seven thousand prisoners. Three French Generals (Ferey, Thomieres, and Desgraviers) were killed; Marshal Marmont, Generals Bonnet, Clausel, and Menne, were wounded. The total loss of the enemy cannot be calculated at less than fourteen thousand men.

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The number of killed and wounded on the part of the victors, was about five thousand two hundred, including six General officers, one of whom (Le Marchant) was killed, the others (Beresford, Leith, Cotton, Cole, and Alten) were wounded.

The enemy, taking advantage of the darkness, continued his flight during the night; and, at day-dawn, the pursuit was renewed on the part of the allies. The advanced-guard, consisting of Major-General Baron Bock's and General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the

Jul. 23.

When the enemy took up his second position, the light division was directed to march to Huerta, and the first division to Alba de Tormes, to cut off their retreat. These orders, so far as concerned the first division, were *not* executed, and the Spaniards having abandoned the Castle of Alba on the approach of the French, the latter were enabled to effect their retreat across the Tormes without impediment.

CHAP. IX. night, succeeded in coming up with the enemy's rear division, strongly posted behind the village of La Serna. The two brigades instantly charged; and the French cavalry, panic-stricken by their recent defeat, fled in great confusion, leaving the infantry to their fate. The whole of the latter, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners.

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July.

After this disaster, Clausel continued his retreat, by forced marches and in great disorder, towards Valladolid. Being joined, however, by a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery from the north, he succeeded in crossing the Douro, with little further annoyance from the allies, whose march was delayed by the difficulty of bringing up the supplies. Lord Wellington reached Valladolid on the thirtieth, but finding Clausel continued his retreat on Burgos in a state of great disorganization, on the day following he recrossed the Douro, and halted at Cuellar.

Lord Wellington then determined to march against the army of the centre, which, in order to favour the escape of the defeated force, had approached the flank of the allies. Preparations for this purpose were immediately set on foot,

August 7.

and on the seventh of August the army com- CHAP. IX.
menced its movement on Madrid, by the route of
Segovia, leaving a force under General Paget on
the Douro to observe the motions of the enemy.

1812.

August.

Joseph Bonaparte could muster, for the defence of the capital, about twenty thousand men,—a force altogether inadequate to offer any serious impediment to the march of the allies. In Madrid all was confusion. So decisive a movement on the part of Lord Wellington had been altogether unforeseen, and no arrangements had been made for the defence of the capital. Joseph had left Madrid on the twenty-first of July, and marched by the Escorial to join Marmont. In the neighbourhood of Arevalo he received intelligence of Marmont's defeat. He then marched by his right to Segovia, with the intention of drawing Lord Wellington's attention from the army of Clausel. No sooner, however, did he learn that Lord Wellington was advancing against him, than he fell back rapidly on Madrid.

In the meantime the allied army continued its progress. No attempt was made to defend the passage of the Guadarama mountains; but, on the tenth, an engagement took place with a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had been sent for-

CHAP. IX. ward to watch the motions of the allies. This
1812. force was driven in in the morning by General
August. D'Urban, who moved on to Majalahonda, where
he took post with his brigade of Portuguese cavalry, Captain Macdonald's troop of horse artillery, and the cavalry and light infantry of the German legion.

The enemy's cavalry having again approached, General D'Urban ordered the Portuguese brigade to charge the leading squadrons of the enemy, which appeared too far in advance to be supported by the main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but before they reached the enemy, turned about and fled. By this disgraceful conduct three guns were lost, which owing to the difficulties of the ground could not be removed. The Germans then charged, and succeeded in checking the progress of the enemy; and Colonel Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of the seventh division coming up shortly after, the French burned the carriages of the captured guns and retired.

Aug. 12. On the twelfth the allies entered Madrid; Joseph having abandoned it on the preceding night, and retired to the left of the Tagus, where he took post with his right at Aranjuez, and his

left in the direction of Toledo. A garrison of seventeen hundred men were left in the Retiro, in order to check the enthusiasm of the people, and preserve the convoys from plunder.

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1812.

August.

The appearance of the allied army was hailed with joy and triumph by all ranks in the capital. All business was suspended ; and thousands of the inhabitants bearing branches of laurel, came forth to welcome their victorious liberators. On the day following the Retiro surrendered. Don Carlos d'España was appointed governor, and the Constitution was proclaimed amid the enthusiastic *vivas* of the populace.

While these brilliant operations were in progress, Marshal Soult had advanced against Sir Rowland Hill ; but that officer retreating on his approach to the position of Albuera, which had been strengthened by entrenchments and redoubts, Soult did not venture to attack him. At Ulna, on the eleventh of June, an unfortunate affair took place between the heavy brigade of cavalry, under General Slade, and a party of the enemy, commanded by General Lallemande. General Slade charged with great spirit, and in a few minutes put the French to flight ; but the pursuit being continued

Jun. 11.

CHAP. IX. too far, the enemy were reinforced, and be-
1812. came the assailants in turn. After a sanguin-
August. ary conflict, General Slade's brigade were driven
back in great confusion, with the loss of nearly
two hundred of their number in killed, wounded,
and prisoners. Many other cavalry affairs took
place, in, one of which Lieutenant Streuwitz
succeeded in surprising a party of the enemy,
which he attacked and defeated, with the loss of
twenty men and horses, besides a great number
killed.

But the aspect of affairs in the whole Penin-
sula was at once changed by the victory of Sa-
lamanca. Soult relaxed his grasp of Andalusia,
and determined to concentrate his army in Gra-
Aug. 25. nada. On the twenty-fifth of August the siege of
Cadiz was raised, and the Spaniards took imme-
diate possession of Puerto Real and Chiclana.
The enemy's rear-guard was attacked by a de-
tachment sent from Cadiz, under Colonel Sker-
ret and General Cruz Morgeon, which drove it
Aug. 27. from St. Lucar; and on the twenty-seventh Se-
ville was carried by assault. The French, on the
approach of the allied force, evacuated the sub-
urb Triana, and retreated to the town. An at-
tempt was then made to defend the bridge; but

the grenadiers of the Guards attacked them with the bayonet, when all resistance ceased, and the enemy fled, leaving the streets strewed with their dead. In this affair they lost above two hundred prisoners, besides a considerable quantity of baggage, horses, and money.

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August.

The enemy having withdrawn from Estramadura, the presence of General Hill on the Guadiana was no longer required, and that leader was directed to move to the Tagus, and connect his operations with the main body of the army. On the approach of General Hill's corps, Joseph abandoned Toledo, and fell back to Almanza, on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia, from which point he could communicate both with Soult and Suchet.

With the exception of one battalion, the whole British troops were withdrawn from Cadiz; and every effort was made by Lord Wellington to excite the Spaniards to new and increased efforts at a crisis so important.

CHAPTER X.

SIEGE OF BURGOS—RETREAT OF THE ALLIED
ARMY.

CHAP. X. THE situation of Lord Wellington at Madrid, though brilliant, was full of peril. The defeated army of Marmont was still numerous. and had been largely reinforced ; and a corps of observation, of ten thousand men, had been sent into Alava. The armies of the south and centre, by forming a junction with that of Suchet, might speedily advance against the capital, with a force at least treble in amount to that of the allies.

1812.

August.

Little benefit had resulted from the tardy arrival of the Sicilian force under General Maitland. A few days before its appearance on the coast, General O'Donnell had been defeated at Castalla, and driven into Murcia, with the loss of three thousand of his army. The only Spanish army with which he could co-operate having

thus been beaten from the field, General Mait-
land remained cooped up in Alicante, and none
of those benefits which had been anticipated
from the arrival of this force were realized.

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1812.

August.

In the north, indeed, Santocildes, with the Gallician army, besides other minor advantages gained over the enemy, succeeded in reducing Astorga; and the garrison, amounting to twelve hundred men, surrendered prisoners of war. A detachment of seven hundred men was captured by the Empecinado in Guadalaxara; and the Guerillas were every where active in their vocation. But in the neighbourhood of Madrid, no active exertions were made against the common enemy. There was no attempt to organize any military system, and it soon became evident to Lord Wellington that he could only calculate with security on his own army, to defeat the projects of the enemy.

To remain in Madrid, therefore, was impossible, and only three other courses presented themselves.

He might advance into the south against Soult; but, in that case, the other armies would immediately combine and act in his rear, and no advantage of any kind could be secured.

CHAP. X. He might unite his whole force, enter Valencia, march directly on Alicante, establish his communications with General Maitland, threaten the armies of Arragon and the centre, and prevent their junction with Soult, leaving a corps of sufficient magnitude to guard the passage of the Douro.

1812.

August.

He might, in the third place, advance against the army of the north, which had again assumed a hostile attitude, and compelled General Paget to cross the Douro. This scheme was attended with the evident disadvantage, that it was in the power of Soult, Suchet, and Joseph, to combine their forces, and thus compel him to retreat.

Under more favourable circumstances, the second of these projects, was probably that which Lord Wellington would have followed. Had Ballasteros done his duty in the south, and thrown himself between Soult and the army of the centre—had O'Donnell's army been in condition to join him—and had the force of General Maitland, been of the magnitude which Lord Wellington had been taught to expect, the allied army, by entering the eastern provinces, might probably have secured a more brilliant termination to the campaign. But in all these

things Lord Wellington had been deceived. Bal-
lasteros refused to combine his movements with
those of the allies. General Maitland's corps
barely amounted to six thousand men. The army
of O'Donnel had been beaten from the field; and
in the whole south and east of Spain there exist-
ed not a single force on the assistance of which
he could rely.

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1812.

August.

There were also other reasons to induce Lord Wellington to transfer his operations to the north. The resources of Galicia had never been called forth since the French were driven out, about three years before, and Lord Wellington was assured, that a force of twenty-five thousand men were ready to act with him from thence, and able to oppose Clausel, if put in possession of Burgos. Considerable reinforcements were expected from England, and in the north only could these effect their junction, in time to influence the success of the campaign. By advancing against the army of Portugal, he would at all events create a strong diversion in favour of the southern provinces, the most wealthy, the most populous, and the most patriotic in the kingdom. He would secure the liberation of Andalusia, which Soult had unwill-

CHAP. X. lingly been driven to abandon, and was again
1812. prepared to occupy on the first return of success.

September.

Thus forced on a choice of difficulties, Lord Wellington, considering it possible to strike a blow against Clausel before the other armies could advance to his support, determined to march in person to the north, with four divisions of his army. Two divisions were left in garrison at Madrid. General Hill moved to Aranjuez, to observe the motions of the army of the south; and Ballasteros was requested to unite his force with the corps of that leader, in case Soult should direct his march on Madrid. In the event of Soult moving into Valencia, he was to take post at Alcazar, and defend the approach to the capital on that side.

On the first of September, Lord Wellington quitted Madrid, and on the morning of the
Sep. 7. seventh, the army passed the Douro, and took possession of Valladolid. Clausel fell back on the approach of the allies, destroying the bridges on the Pisuerga. At Palencia, the Gallician army effected its junction, but, instead of an efficient force of twenty-five thousand men, it scarcely mustered above ten thousand undisciplined soldiers, utterly deficient in every thing of equip-

ment and organization, and officered by men CHAP. X.
ignorant of the first rudiments of their profes-
sion.

1812.

September.

Sep. 19.

On the nineteenth, the allied army entered Burgos; and the French, under General Souham, who, with a reinforcement of nine thousand men, had arrived on the day previous, to assume the command, fell back to Briviesca, leaving in the castle a garrison of two thousand men, under General Dubreton.

The castle of Burgos is situated on an eminence, and strongly defended by its outworks. The enemy had encircled the acclivity, by two lines of formidable field-works, armed at all points with cannon, and the base of the hill was surrounded by an uncovered scarpwall of very difficult access. Lord Wellington considered the reduction of this fortress to be essential to the success of his operations, for the French had collected in it large stores of ammunition and provisions, and the allied army required it as a point of support, in the insecure position which it was boldly intended to assume.

Lord Wellington, therefore, immediately directed the investment of the place, though the whole of his artillery consisted of three eighteen

CHAP. X. pounders, and five twenty-four pounder iron
1812. howitzers, and the supply of ammunition was
September. very deficient. The siege was allotted to the
first and sixth divisions, under Generals Campbell and Clinton, while the main body of the army advanced to the neighbourhood of Quintanapala, to hold Souham in check.

Sep. 19. On the evening of the nineteenth, a formidable horn-work on the hill of St. Michael, which commanded several of the works of the castle, was carried by assault. The troops employed on this service, under command of General Pack, suffered very severely. The assault lasted above an hour; but a detachment, led by the Honourable Major Cocks, having at length effected an entrance by the gorge, the work was carried. The loss of the assailants, owing to the gallant resistance of the garrison, and the warm fire to which they were subjected from the place, was very great. It amounted to about four hundred in killed and wounded. In the work were found three guns. One captain and sixty-two men, the sole survivors of a strong battalion, were made prisoners.

On the day following, the guns were drawn up and planted in battery on the hill of St.

Michael; but the enemy kept up so strong a fire from the castle, that two of the guns were, after a few days, dismounted. On the night of the twenty-second, an attempt on the exterior line of works unfortunately failed. The storming party succeeded in escalading the outer wall; but after many gallant efforts to maintain their ground, were driven back with great loss. Two of his guns being disabled, Lord Wellington abandoned the ordinary method of attack, and had recourse to the slower and more uncertain process of sapping.

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On the twenty-ninth, a breach having been effected in the outer wall by the explosion of a mine, a party of the first division attempted to storm it. The enemy, however, had placed such obstacles at the mouth of the breach as it was found impossible to surmount, and the attack failed, with considerable loss on the part of the assailants.

Sep. 29.

Another mine exploded on the evening of the fourth October, and made a second breach. The exterior line of the enemy's works was at length carried, and the twenty-fourth regiment effected a lodgment on the space between the outer wall and the first line of field-works. The

Oct. 4.

CHAP. X. garrison, however, on the day following, made
1812. a spirited sortie, and driving back the British
October. troops at the point of the bayonet, gained possession of the lodgment, which was immediately destroyed. Fresh troops were then sent on to retrieve this disaster; and under a desperate and most destructive fire from the place, the works were again carried, and the enemy driven behind their interior defences.

Oct. 8. The progress of the besiegers was slow, for at every step they were encountered by obstacles, which the deficiency of means at their disposal rendered almost insuperable. Before day-break on the eighth, the enemy made another sortie, and overpowering the guard in the trenches, succeeded in destroying all the work of the besiegers within the outer wall. In this affair, the Honourable Major Cocks, commanding the seventy-ninth regiment, was killed. The zeal and gallantry of this officer, had on all occasions been conspicuous.

Oct. 11. The perseverance of the besiegers, however, was not to be overcome. They continued their labours, and established themselves within one hundred yards of the enemy's second line. On the eleventh, a mine was successfully sprung,

and another breach being formed, the assault was given on the same evening, and the second line carried after a severe struggle. On the eighteenth, preparations for the assault of the castle being completed, the Guards and German Legion in the first division attempted to carry it by escalade, and succeeded in effecting an entrance; but the fire from the garrison was so heavy, that the assailants found it impossible to maintain their ground.

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This was the last effort to gain possession of the fortress, the advance of the enemy rendering it necessary to desist from further operations. The failure is attributable to the deficiency of means, not to any deficiency of ardour or devotion in the troops. Never were the boldness and intrepidity of British soldiers more admirably displayed than in those unfortunate attacks, the unsuccessful termination of which was attributable to causes beyond their control. The loss of the allied army during the siege was very severe. It exceeded two thousand men, a number nearly equal to that of the brave garrison, whose efforts were at length crowned by merited success.

In the meantime, the army under Souham,

CHAP. X. having been joined by the whole disposable
 1812. force in the north, advanced through Monas-
 October. terio, with the apparent intention of fight-
 ing a general action for the relief of Burgos.

Oct. 20. On the evening of the twentieth, the enemy
 came on in force, and drove in the outposts
 of the allied army; but Sir Edward Paget, who
 was directed to move the first and fifth divisions
 upon their right flank, promptly executed this
 manœuvre, and the French immediately fell
 back.

While these events were passing in the north
 Sep. 15. of Spain, Marshal Soult, on the fifteenth of Sep-
 tember, had commenced his march from Granada,
 and having effected a junction with the army of
 the centre, advanced along the line of the Xucar
 towards Madrid. Ballasteros, influenced by petty
 jealousy of Lord Wellington, on whom the Cortes
 had wisely conferred the chief command of
 the Spanish armies, offered no annoyance to the
 enemy during this movement. He was in con-
 sequence removed from all military command,
 and imprisoned in the fortress of Ceuta on the
 coast of Barbary. The small force of General
 Maitland, cooped up in Alicante, without support
 of any kind from the native armies, could effect

nothing ; and a trifling detachment of about six hundred men, with some artillery, which, under General Donkin, had landed near Denia, were defeated in their object of carrying that post, and forced to re-embark.

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The armies of Soult and Jourdan then approached Madrid, and arrived at Aranjuez on the twenty-third of October. Sir Rowland Hill immediately placed his forces in position, covering the capital, and preparations were made for a general engagement. On the night of the twenty-seventh, however, an express from Lord Wellington arrived, directing Sir Rowland to fall back on the Adejo, unless an opportunity should occur of bringing the enemy to battle under circumstances of great advantage.

Oct. 23.

Oct. 27.

The position chosen by General Hill was highly favourable ; but Soult, whose movements were combined with those of Souham, avoided a general engagement ; and marching to Toledo, crossed the Tagus, and thus threatened the rear of the allies. Under these circumstances, independently of the orders of Lord Wellington, immediate retreat became necessary. Madrid was in consequence evacuated,—the magazines in the Retiro were blown up, the guns spiked, and,

CHAP. X. agreeably to his instructions, Sir Rowland Hill

1812. put his corps in motion, and slowly retired to-
October. wards Salamanca.

Nothing can be more admirable than the whole arrangements of Lord Wellington at this period of difficulty, nor more nicely balanced than his manœuvres.

- Oct. 21. On the twenty-first of October, the siege of Burgos was raised. During the night, Lord Wellington filed his whole army under the walls of the castle, and across the bridge of the Arlanzon, closely enfiladed by the guns of the place. This bold measure was productive of little loss ; and Lord Wellington thus succeeded in gaining a march on his opponent, who did not overtake him till the
- Oct. 23. twenty-third. On that day, the enemy's cavalry made a sharp attack on the rear-guard, which was gallantly repulsed by a light infantry battalion of the German legion.

On the twenty-fourth, the army was joined by a reinforcement from England, under Lord Dalhousie, consisting chiefly of the Guards, which had disembarked at Corunna, and Lord Wellington took up a position behind the Carrion, the left at Villa Muriel, the right at Duenas.

The retreat had been so sudden and rapid, CHAP. X.
that the greatest difficulty was experienced in
the conveyance of the sick and wounded, a great
portion of whom had not yet crossed the Douro.
Lord Wellington, therefore, found it necessary
to halt during the whole of the twenty-fifth ; and
in order to check the pursuit of the enemy, di-
rected the bridges over the Carrion and Pisuer-
ga to be destroyed on their approach.

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In consequence the bridges at Villa Muriel and Duenas were blown up. At Palencia the enemy attacked the party posted to cover the operation, and gained possession of the bridges in a perfect state. At Tariejo, owing to the failure of a mine, the bridge was little injured ; and the enemy, having pushed on a considerable body of cavalry, the covering party, under Captain Ferguson of the fifty-eighth, were made prisoners. The enemy then pushed a corps across the Pisuerga, in contact with the posts of the allied army. Lord Wellington determined to force them back ; and on the approach of the columns, they hastily recrossed the river. On the left, a strong body was thrown across the river by a ford near Villa Muriel, and took possession of a village at some distance

CHAP. X. from the bank. The Spaniards were ordered to dislodge them, but failed in the attempt; and the French, pursuing their success, came in contact with the fifth division, and the engagement was for some time very serious. The Spanish General, Don Miguel Alava, observing the discomfiture of his troops, immediately galloped into the plain, and rallying them by dint of great exertion, led them back to the charge. The enemy being also repulsed by the fifth division, were then beaten back across the river with considerable loss.

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October.
- Oct. 26. On the twenty-sixth, the army continued its retreat along miserable roads, and exposed to an incessant deluge of rain. The troops, dispirited, began to manifest symptoms of disorder. During the night, the soldiers quitted their bivouacs in search of wine, and were guilty of numerous excesses. A large proportion being intoxicated, were regardless of command; and the utmost exertions of the officers to restore discipline and regularity, were unavailing. General Souham made some attempts to gain possession of the bridge at Cabeçon, which were repulsed. He then marched down the Pisuerga towards the
- Oct. 28. Douro, and endeavoured to pass the river at Siman-

cas, which was found impracticable from the complete destruction of the bridge. A battery was established on some heights near Valladolid, which commanded a part of the road on the left of the river, along which the allied army was retreating; and the hospital waggons and commissariat became occasionally exposed to its fire.

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On the twenty-ninth, the army continued its retreat along the left of the Pisuerga, having destroyed the bridges at Cabeçon and Valladolid. The Douro being too high to be fordable at any point, the whole of the divisions crossed at Tudela and the Puente del Douro. The bridges at these places were likewise blown up. In the night, the enemy crossed a party by swimming, who dislodged a German regiment, posted to guard the ruins of the bridge of Tordesillas, and immediately proceeded to re-establish the communication. Lord Wellington in consequence took up a position in which he might give battle, and stationed his army along the banks of the Douro, on nearly the same ground which it occupied in July, before the battle of Salamanca.

Oct. 29.

On the sixth of November, the enemy having repaired the bridges at Toro and Tordesillas,

Nov. 6.

CHAP. X. Lord Wellington recommenced his retreat, and
fell back to Torrecilla del Orden, the corps of
1812. Sir Rowland Hill having effected a junction on
November. the third. On the eighth the divisions from Burgos occupied the heights of St. Christoval, in front of Salamanca ; and General Hamilton's Portuguese division held the town of Alba de Tormes.

On reaching the Douro, General Souham desisted from the pursuit, till being joined by the armies of the south and centre, under Soult, their whole united force, amounting to seventy-five thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, concentrated in position on the Tormes, on the
Nov. 10. tenth of November. The army of Lord Wellington did not exceed forty-eight thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry ; and with the disadvantage of so great a disparity of numbers, he felt it necessary to continue his retreat, unless a favourable opportunity should occur of bringing the enemy to action.

On the ninth, the French drove in the cavalry piquets in front of Alba ; and in the course of the day approached the positions on the Tormes, and attempted to force the passage of the river. They attacked General Hamilton's division in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon ; but finding

they made no impression, the greater part of the troops were withdrawn during the night.

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On the fourteenth the French crossed the river in force, at three fords near Lucinas, and took post in a formidable position at Mozarbes. Lord Wellington then moved his army to the Arapiles, the scene of his former victory ; but finding the enemy too strongly posted to render it prudent to assume the offensive, and perceiving that detachments of their cavalry were already in motion to intercept his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, he withdrew the troops from Alba, and put his army in retreat towards the Agueda.

On the sixteenth the allied army encamped on the Valmusa. Nov. 16. Soult followed their steps with a strong advanced-guard, but made no attempt to achieve any great and signal success. On the seventeenth the enemy cannonaded the rear-guard on its passage of the Huerba, near Munoz ; and, on the same day, Sir Edward Paget was unfortunately made prisoner, almost in the centre of the allied army. A detachment of French light troops were concealed in a wood on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Sir Edward observing an interval between the fifth and seventh divisions of infantry, rode alone to the

CHAP. X. rear to inquire into the cause by which the progress of the latter had been delayed. On his return he missed his way, and fell into the hands of the enemy. By this unlucky accident, his country, at a moment of peculiar need, was deprived of the services of one of the bravest and most distinguished of her leaders.

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November.

During the whole of this retreat, though little annoyance was experienced from the enemy, the sufferings of the troops were very great. The weather was cold and inclement; the troops at night were without shelter of any sort, and the rain descended in torrents, which precluded the possibility of lighting fires. The wretched condition of the roads, in many places nearly impassable, occasioned great irregularities in the supply of provisions; and under the pressure of such sufferings, it was found impossible to maintain discipline.

Nov. 18. On the eighteenth the head-quarters of Lord Wellington were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the two following days the army crossed the Agueda. Shortly afterwards, on learning that the enemy had withdrawn from the Tormes, the divisions were distributed in extensive cantonments, the right being thrown forward to Banos

and Bejar to hold the passes, and the left re- CHAP. X.
tired on Lamego. The season of the year no
longer admitted of military movements, and the 1812.
troops were suffered to enjoy the repose neces- November.
sary to prepare them for the toils of the succeed-
ing campaign.*

* On the arrival of the army in quarters, Lord Wellington addressed a letter to the commanding officers of battalions, censuring, in the severest manner, the misconduct of the troops during the retreat from Burgos.—“It must be obvious,” he said, “to every officer, that, from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.

“Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches,—none in which they made such long and repeated halts,—and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. These evils,” continues Lord Wellington, “I have no hesitation in attributing to the habitual inattention of officers of regiments to their duty as prescribed by the regulations of the service, and the orders of this army.

“Unfortunately, the inexperience of officers of the army, has induced many to conceive, that the period during which an army is on active service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier; for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field-equipments, and his horse and horse-appointments; for the receipt, and issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his

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The intelligence of the retreat from Burgos was received in England with clamours of discontent and disappointment. The hopes which the early successes of the campaign had overweeningly excited, were unreasonably depressed by its termination. Within and without the walls of Parliament loud accusations were heard against the Ministry. Even Lord Wellington, who, by a course of splendid achievement, had won his way to a high place in the hearts and hopes of all Englishmen, now ceased to be "gracious in the people's eye." He was accused of compromising the safety of his army by a series of rash miscalculations. The Government were charged, by one class of politicians, with wasting the resources of the country in a hope-

food, and the forage for his horse, should be most strictly attended to by the officer of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army—a British army in particular—shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial."

Lord Wellington then proceeds to point out the most effectual means of remedying these evils, by means of greater vigilance and attention on the part of officers commanding regiments and brigades, and notices the superior regularity, in some particulars, of the French army. The letter, altogether, is of the most severe and unsparing character, and produced a powerful effect.

•

less struggle,—with lavishing the best blood of England in defence of a people whose zeal and patriotism, if such ever existed, were long proved to have subsided into sluggish and imperturbable inertia. The events of the campaign were declared to have spread dejection throughout Spain, and renewed the confidence of her invaders. All hopes had been disappointed,—the allied army had been forced again to abandon the Spanish territory,—and the very name of Englishmen had become hateful to the people. The clever sophistry, it was said, by which the nation had been so long deluded into the belief that we were contending for the independence of Britain and Spain, amid the mountains of the Peninsula, was at length powerless. Thenceforth it must be manifest to all, that the war was solely continued because a powerful faction were benefited by the expenditure it occasioned.

By such base and contemptible clamour it was little probable that Lord Wellington would be moved. No man ever sacrificed less to the acquisition of mere temporary and vulgar popularity; none has ever done more to secure the lasting gratitude of his country. He knew that the campaign, which had thus exposed him to

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CHAP. X. contumely and abuse, had shed fresh and unfading
1812. lustre on the British arms. It had been marked by three signal triumphs; the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, of Badajos, and by the victory of Salamanca. These had been achieved at a time when the military power of the Spanish was at the lowest ebb. With an army whose effective force did not certainly exceed sixty thousand men, he had traversed the interior of Spain—defeated a powerful army—occupied the capital—liberated the southern provinces,—and, by a series of nicely calculated manœuvres, baffled the pursuit of an enemy overpoweringly superior. At the very period when all this had been effected, the enemy had a force of two hundred thousand men in the Peninsula, commanded by leaders of high name and pretension, and whose fame had become familiar to all Europe.

That the consequences of the victory of Salamanca were less brilliant than might have been anticipated from its decisive character, is attributable to causes over which Lord Wellington could exercise no control. He was entitled, nay instructed, to calculate on the co-operation of a strong force in the eastern provinces. He was entitled to calculate on good service from

the armies of O'Donnel and Ballasteros. He was entitled likewise to expect, that the patriotism of the Spaniards would have taken advantage of the liberation of the capital to burst the carments of its sepulchre, and come forth in renovated strength.

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In all these—not vain but reasonable calculations, he was deceived. By the bungling of the Ministry, the force from Sicily was delayed till too late, and was most beggarly in amount. The army of O'Donnel was defeated a few days before its arrival. Ballasteros refused to co-operate with the allied army, and did nothing. In spite of the victory of Salamanca, and the expulsion of the intrusive monarch from the capital, the tree of Spanish patriotism put forth no blossom. What, then, was to be done? The course pursued by Lord Wellington, in the circumstances of difficulty by which he was surrounded, has been vehemently censured; yet there existed no other to which objections of equal magnitude did not apply. One great object—the liberation of the southern provinces—was at least secured by it. The failure before Burgos was unfortunate; but nothing could exceed the skill of the manœuvres by which it was followed, and never was a re-

CHAP. X. treat more imposing than that of Lord Wellington in face of the combined French armies. It may be fearlessly asserted, that no man of competent judgment can read the details of this most splendid campaign, without perceiving, that in tactic and combination Lord Wellington proved himself throughout superior to his opponents. While he repeatedly belied their calculations, in no one instance was he taken at a disadvantage, or involved in difficulties, which he was unprepared to encounter and surmount.

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A general of less nerve would probably have fought a battle to escape the clamour by which he must have known he would be assailed in consequence of the reverse at Burgos. But Lord Wellington was not thus to be moved. He knew that the cause of his country and her allies would more effectually be promoted by a different policy ; and in spite of every personal motive, he avoided battle, and continued his retreat to the frontier of Portugal. In truth, if there is any one quality in Lord Wellington which demands our paramount admiration, it is the self-command with which, under every temptation, he kept the natural boldness of his character in strict subordination to the dictates of the coolest prudence.

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE OF LORD WELLINGTON—BATTLE
OF VITTORIA.

JUDGING from the past events of the war, it CHAP. XI.
 has been maintained by many, that had Napo-
 leon remained at peace with the other nations of 1813.
 Europe, the complete subjugation of the Penin-
 sula must at length have been effected. Such
 an inference we hold to be unfounded. The
 whole Peninsula had long been unable to
 support either the armies of its invaders or
 its defenders. Agriculture had almost wholly
 ceased, in provinces subjected to perpetual in-
 roads, in which marauders continually destroyed
 the labours of the peasant. The cattle were
 driven into defiles amid the mountains, and a
 great portion of the population was converted
 into bodies of armed herdsmen, the more active
 and enterprising of which kept up a war of ex-

CHAP. XI. termination on the enemy. They harassed his
1813. march, intercepted his foragers, and plundered his convoys. It was necessary, therefore, from the first, for the French to employ numerous armies in Spain ; to maintain a strong yet extended line through the whole country ; and, above all, to preserve unbroken the communication with Bayonne. While they were able to do so, the victories achieved by Lord Wellington appeared, from their want of subsequent advantages, as so much waste of blood. The warmest partisans of the cause became, in some degree, disheartened, by that continued alternation of victory and retreat which had marked the arms of the allies ; and, to a superficial observer, it might have seemed that little progress had been made by the lavish expenditure of British blood and treasure, towards the attainment of the first great object of the war—the liberation of the Peninsula.

But the extreme diffusion of force thus necessary to the invaders, was pregnant with all the elements of defeat. Every additional province overrun by their arms, was in itself a cause of weakness. While they occupied the south, the north was still in arms : while pursuing their victories in the east, they were defeated in the west.

Present everywhere, they were nowhere strong enough to put down resistance, and the greatest achievements of their arms were in general only followed by the farther extension of a vulnerable front.

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But, independently of other causes, nothing could be more certain, than that the increasing deficiency of the means of sustenance, would ultimately of itself have compelled the French to diminish their forces, and narrow their schemes of conquest. The British army, secure of its supplies, though at an enormous expense, by the ports of Lisbon and Oporto, were better able than their opponents to support a war of deprivation. Lord Wellington, therefore, had only to maintain his footing in the Peninsula, to feel secure that the hour would at length come when the contest would be maintained on equal terms, and he might enter on a wider and more brilliant course of achievement.

The period thus warmly anticipated at length came. It was accelerated not created by the events in the north of Europe. These are well known. By the destruction of his army in the Russian campaign, the throne of Napoleon had been shaken to its base, and it became at length

CHAP. XI. **apparent that the hour of deliverance for the**
1813. nations of the Peninsula was at hand. At all
events an important change had been wrought in
the relative position of the belligerents. Hither-
to the losses of the French armies had been re-
placed by a large and almost constant influx of
reinforcements. In this mighty power of re-
storation consisted the great and prominent ad-
vantage which the enemy till now had possessed
over Lord Wellington. While the whole means
of England were unequal to repair the loss which
might have flowed from one disastrous battle,
the French leaders acted throughout with the
conviction that no misfortune was irreparable.
In opposing the British, therefore, it was their
policy to dare every thing, conscious that in
every struggle where the loss of combatants was
equal, the game was in their favour. But times
were now changed. The necessities of Napo-
leon had compelled him to withdraw nearly
twenty thousand men from the force in the Pen-
insula; and the movements of the enemy gave
indication of an intention to abandon the whole
south and centre of the kingdom.

During the long interval in which the allied army remained in Cantonments, no hostile

movement of importance took place. In November, Longa, the celebrated partisan, succeeded in surprising a body of the enemy under General Fremant, who were posted in the town and valley of Sedano, near Burgos. He defeated them with the loss of seven hundred killed and wounded, five hundred prisoners, two guns, and the whole of their baggage, plunder, and provisions.

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In the month of February, General Foy advanced from Salamanca, with a considerable force, in hope of surprising the town of Bejar. The garrison, however, were prepared; and when General Foy attempted to effect an entrance by the gates of the town, his troops encountered a spirited repulse.

In the meanwhile every effort was made to repair the losses which the army had suffered during the late active campaign, and to restore the troops to that vigour and discipline which the sufferings of the retreat from Burgos had materially impaired. During the winter, large reinforcements and supplies of every kind were received from England. Several regiments of cavalry arrived; others were remounted; and every corps and department in the army was

CHAP. XI. brought into a state of complete efficiency for
active service.

1813.

In the late campaigns the health of the troops had been found to suffer so severely from want of cover, that it was deemed advisable to remedy this evil by providing tents for the soldiers. A pontoon train was likewise fitted out, an adjunct of the highest utility and importance in a country so intersected by rivers as that which was about to become the theatre of operations.

While the army remained in cantonments, Lord Wellington, who had at length been appointed to the chief command of the Spanish forces, repaired to Cadiz and Lisbon, to concert measures with the authorities. In a conference with the Spanish Regency, it was arranged that a force of fifty thousand native troops should be placed at his disposal, and an order was issued, for a portion of the general staff to remain at head-quarters, to serve as a channel of communication with the Spanish leaders. Having completed these preliminaries on the eleventh of May, Lord Wellington returned to Frenada, and preparations were immediately made for the advance of the army.

It has been already stated, that the allied forces were distributed in a very extensive line. Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, and a body of Spaniards under General Morillo, was in Estramadura, and the remainder of the British and Portuguese occupied cantonments, extending along the northern frontier of Portugal to Lamego. The Duke del Parque, commanded an army in La Mancha, and the force of General Elio, was stationed on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia. The recent levies in Andalusia were intended to act as an army of reserve, and placed under the command of O'Donnel. The army of Galicia, was commanded by Castanos, and occupied the frontier of that province.

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The Spanish armies were generally in a state of the most miserable equipment and discipline ; but the chief obstacle to their efficiency, lay in the petty jealousies of the secondary leaders, who, considering the assumption of the chief command by a foreigner, as involving a national degradation, did much to paralyse the zeal and valour of their soldiers, and frustrate the skilful combinations of the campaign. Something, however, had been achieved. The government had at length adopted a wiser and more reasonable

CHAP. XI. policy, and Lord Wellington received assurances

1813. that a great and determined effort would be made throughout the whole Peninsula, in the approaching campaign.

Notwithstanding, Soult, with a considerable body of troops, had been called to Germany, there were still about one hundred and sixty thousand French in Spain ; but of these, a large proportion was dispersed in garrisons ; and the force under Suchet in the eastern provinces, may be calculated at thirty-five thousand. The armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south, under command of Joseph, amounting collectively to about seventy thousand men, were spread through Castile and Leon, with the general head-quarters at Madrid. The army of Portugal, under the immediate command of General Reille, had its head-quarters at Valladolid. That of the centre, under Dróuet, was distributed around the capital ; and the head-quarters of the southern army were in Toledo. Arragon and Biscay were also occupied by independent divisions, under command of Generals Clausel and Foy.

The position of the allies thus formed an extensive semicircle round that occupied by the enemy, and the latter perhaps conceived that by

the rapid movement of their concentrated forces, CHAP. XI.
they would be enabled for a time, at least, to

1813.
baffle the manœuvres of an enemy acting on a
line so extended. It was evident, however,
from the preparatory arrangements of the ene-
my during the past winter, that his views were
chiefly directed to the defence of the Douro.
The ground on the northern bank of that river,
naturally strong, had been fortified at every as-
sailable point by works and retrenchments; and
with such advantages of position, with a deep
and rapid river covering its front, little doubt
was entertained that an insuperable barrier
would be opposed to the progress of the allied
army.

Preparations being at length completed for May.
the commencement of operations, the army was
put in motion on the sixteenth of May, in three
bodies. Five divisions, with a large force of ca-
valry, under Sir Thomas Graham, who had re-
sumed his station as second in command, crossed
the Douro, by means of boats provided for that
purpose at Lamego, at Torremoncorvo, and St.
Joao de Pesqueira, with orders to move through
the province of Tras Os Montes, on Braganza,

CHAP. XI. and Zamora, and effect a junction with the remainder of the army near Valladolid.

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May.

Lord Wellington in person, with the light division, a brigade of cavalry, and a corps of Spaniards, moved forward on Salamanca by the direct route; and Sir Rowland Hill, on the right, with the troops from Estramadura, was directed to advance on the same point by Alba de Tormes. By this grand and comprehensive movement, the enemy's position on the Douro was turned, as well as that of their whole forces on the south of the river.

The movements of the right and centre were executed with such rapidity, that the officer commanding at Salamanca had barely time to abandon the town when it was entered by the British cavalry under General Fane, who pursued his rear-guard with great effect, and captured about two hundred prisoners, and some guns. Lord Wellington then placed the divisions of the right and centre in cantonments between the Tormes and the Douro, and, passing the river on the thirty-first, he joined the corps of General Graham.

May 31.

This portion of the army had encountered se-

rious difficulties from the impracticable character of the country through which its march lay. The roads were miserable, intersected at numerous points by rivers and ravines, and leading over steep mountains, up which the horses were unable to drag the artillery. By great exertion, however, these obstacles were overcome; the corps reached its point of destination on the appointed day, and took up a position, with the left resting on Tabara, in communication with the Gallician army.

CHAP. XI.

1813.

May.

The enemy were utterly unprepared for this movement of Lord Wellington. Their attention had hitherto been directed to the front of the position, and the possibility of the allied army effecting the passage of the Douro within the Portuguese frontier had never been contemplated. The corps of General Graham reached the Esla, therefore, without encountering an enemy, and a party posted to guard the fords of that river near Losilla, hastily retired on their approach.

On the thirtieth the fords were reconnoitred, but being found too deep, a bridge of pontoons was laid down for the passage of the troops; and, on the first of June, General Graham encamped in the neighbourhood of

May 30.

Jun. 1.

CHAP. XI. Zamora, the French falling back on his approach.

1813.

June.

On the day following, the enemy continued their retreat, having previously destroyed the bridges at Toro and Zamora. A brilliant affair took place with the cavalry. The hussar brigade coming up with the enemy's rear-guard near Morales, gallantly charged and overthrew it; and, continuing the pursuit for several miles, made two hundred prisoners. On the same

Jun. 2.

evening, Don Julian Sanchez, with his Guerillas, surprised and captured a French cavalry piquet at Castronuno. On the third, the corps of General Hill having crossed at Toro, the whole army directed its march on Valladolid.

In the meanwhile, the rapid advance of the allies had placed the army at Madrid in a situation of immediate peril. By remaining there, it must have been cut off from the army in the north, and from its line of communication with France. Joseph, therefore, immediately abandoned the capital, and crossing at Puente de Douro, succeeded in effecting a junction with the army of Portugal. The French armies, thus united,

Jun. 7.

continued their retreat. On the seventh, the allies crossed the Carrion at Palencia, and on

the following days occupied both banks of the CHAP. XI.
 Pisuerga, the French retiring on Burgos, with- 1813.
 out any effort to defend the passage of the June.
 river.

The whole forces of the enemy were now concentrated at Burgos; and as this fortress formed the key of the north of Spain, and the last before reaching the Ebro, it was anticipated that here the decisive stand would have been made. Lord Wellington, therefore, to give time for the coming up of his rear, and to recruit the troops exhausted by the rapidity of the marches, made short movements during the eleventh, and on Jnn. 11.
 the twelfth remained stationary with his left. In order to ascertain the enemy's intentions, however, and force him to some decisive measure, he made a strong reconnoissance with the right, under Sir Rowland Hill, and, by a flank movement, dislodged a considerable force, under General Reille, from an advantageous position above the village of Hormaza. Though vigorously pressed by the cavalry, the enemy retired in the finest order, and succeeded in crossing the Urbal and Arlanzon with little loss. During the night, the whole French army abandoned Burgos, having destroyed, as far as pos-

CHAP. XI. sible, the defences of the castle, and retreated
1813. towards the Ebro by Briviesca.

June.

Thus far the campaign had been one of signal, though bloodless triumph. The next great object of Lord Wellington was to effect the passage of the Ebro, which the enemy had made every preparation to defend. They had garrisoned the strong fortress of Pancorvo; and the attempt to cross a river so considerable, in face of the combined forces of the enemy, must have led to an engagement under circumstances of the greatest disadvantage. Instead of continuing the pursuit, therefore, along the main road, Lord Wellington had again recourse to the manœuvre which had been so successful on the Douro. He moved the army to its left by the road to St. Andero, and then traversing a country of such difficulty as to have been hitherto deemed impracticable for carriages, crossed the Ebro, near its source, at San Martino and Puente de Arenas.

For such a measure the enemy was utterly unprepared, and no precaution had been taken to occupy the strong natural defences which that portion of the Ebro afforded. From Puente de Arenas, the road, for nearly three

miles, runs along the left bank of the river, and is flanked by a ridge of rugged and precipitous mountains, in many places inaccessible. In some parts the road has been hewn through the solid rock; and at one point in particular, the rock not only projects over the road, but juts out upon the Ebro. The whole country, on either bank of the Ebro, above Miranda is eminently defensible. Having passed the river, the march of the army often lay through passes and defiles, which a thousand men might have successfully maintained against twenty times their number.

Through such a country did the allied army pursue its march on Vittoria, without obstruction from the enemy. On the eighteenth the light division came in contact with two brigades of French infantry, on the march from Frias to Vittoria, which they attacked and defeated with the loss of three hundred men. At Osma a strong corps of the enemy, which had been assembled in great haste at Espejo, made a spirited attack on the first and fifth divisions under Sir Thomas Graham. Though superior in numbers the French were repulsed and pursued to Espejo. From thence they continued their retreat unmolested to Subijana on the Bayas.

CHAP. XI.

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June.

Jun. 18.

CHAP. XI. On the nineteenth the enemy's rear-guard
1813. were found strongly posted on the left of the
June. Bayas, their right covered by Subijana, their left
by the heights in front of Pobes. Lord Wellington
directed the light division to turn the left of
the position, while Sir Lowry Cole attacked it
in front ; and the rear-guard was thus driven
back on the main body of the army, then in
full march on Vittoria.

The moment had at length come when the
enemy, whose whole movements since the com-
mencement of the campaign had been those of
retreat, was compelled to make a final and deci-
sive stand on the Spanish territory, or suffer
himself ingloriously to be driven headlong on
the Pyrenees. Joseph decided on the former ;
Jun. 19. and on the night of the nineteenth concentrated
his forces in position in front of Vittoria, which
the French had made their central depot in the
frontier provinces. During the twentieth Lord
Jun. 20. Wellington collected his divisions, on the Bayas,
which had been scattered in the hasty march a-
cross a rugged and difficult country ; and hav-
ing made a close reconnoissance of the position
of the French army, determined on the follow-
ing morning to attack it.

Vittoria, the chief town of Alava, one of the Biscayan provinces, stands behind the little river Zadorra, in a plain about two leagues in extent, bounded on one side by a part of the Pyrenean chain, and on the other by a range of bold heights of smaller altitude. The ground around Vittoria is marked by considerable inequalities of surface, of which the enemy did not fail to take advantage. At the period in question it was for the most part covered with ripening corn, which gave concealment to the light troops, and sometimes even to the movements of whole battalions during the engagement.

CHAP. XI.

1813.


June.

The French army was posted as follows. The right extended northward from Vittoria across the Zadorra, and rested on some heights above the villages of Abechuco and Gamarra Major, covered by formidable field-works. Between the centre and right was a thick wood, into which were thrown several battalions of infantry. The right of the centre occupied a strong height commanding the valley of the Zadorra. It was covered with infantry, flanked and otherwise defended by one hundred pieces of cannon. The advanced posts of the centre lined the banks of the Zadorra, the bridges over

CHAP. XI. which were fortified. The left and left centre
1813. crowned the high ridge above the village of
June. Subijana de Alava, with a reserve posted at the
village of Gomecha, and a corps thrown out to
occupy the bold mountains above Puebla, to
protect the centre, which might otherwise have
been turned by the main road where it crosses
the Zadorra.

Thus posted, the French army covered each of the three great roads which concentrate at Vittoria, in the great road to Bayonne. That of Logrono by its left, that of Madrid by its centre, and that of Bilboa by its right. It was commanded by Joseph in person, having Marshal Jourdan as Major-General. In point of numbers there existed little disparity on either side ; it having been found necessary, before passing the Ebro, to detach General Foy with twelve thousand men towards Bilboa, to procure subsistence for the army, and keep in check the powerful Guerilla bands which haunted the neighbourhood , and General Clausel, with a corps of fifteen thousand, was at Logrono. Lord Wellington likewise had found it necessary to employ the sixth division, under General Pakenham, in guarding the line of supply. The

**Battle of
VITTORIA
2^d June 1813.**



amount of combatants on either side, therefore, CHAP. XI.
 may be fairly calculated at from seventy to 1813.
 seventy-five thousand men. June.

At daylight on the morning of the twenty-first June, Lord Wellington put his army in motion, in three great divisions. That on the right under Sir Rowland Hill, consisting of the second British division, the Portuguese division of the Conde de Amarante, and Morillo's corps of Spaniards, was destined to commence the action, by attacking the enemy's left on the mountains behind Subijana. Jun. 21.

The left column, commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, composed of the first and fifth divisions, two brigades of cavalry, and the Spanish division of Longa, was directed by a wide movement to turn the enemy's right, and crossing the Zadorra, to cut off his retreat by the road to Bayonne.

The centre corps, consisting of the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions, in two columns, was ordered to wait till both or one of the flank columns should have crossed the Zadorra, and then to make a powerful attack on the French centre.

The Spanish troops under General Morillo commenced the action by an attack on the enemy's corps, posted above Puebla, supported by

CHAP. XI. the light companies of the second division and
1813. the seventy-first regiment, under the Honourable
June. Colonel Cadogan. After a severe struggle, in
which that most promising and gallant officer
was mortally wounded, the enemy were driven
from the heights at the point of the bayonet.
Strong reinforcements were then brought up by
the enemy, and the contest was renewed, and
continued for some time with great obstinacy on
both sides. Sir Rowland Hill, however, having
detached an additional force to support the troops
already engaged, the French at length gave
way, and yielded undisputed possession of the
heights.

Thus far successful, Sir Rowland Hill crossed the Zadorra, and directed two brigades of the second division to attack the heights of Subijana de Alava. Here the contest was severe. The troops advanced under a heavy fire of artillery, and succeeded in dislodging the enemy, and driving them back on their reserve. The heights thus gallantly carried, however, were too important to be resigned, while a chance of regaining them remained. Fresh columns of attack were formed, and repeated efforts were made by the enemy to recover their

ground, but without success. At length Joseph, CHAP. XI.
alarmed at these repeated failures, and the threat-
ening attitude assumed by Sir Rowland Hill, 1813.
withdrew his advanced posts from the Zadorra, June.
and directed the left to fall back for the defence
of Vittoria.

In the meantime, General Cole, with the fourth and light divisions, had passed the Zadorra at the bridges of Nanclares and Tres Puentes: and the third and seventh divisions, crossing by the bridge on the Mendonza road, both columns advanced against the heights in the centre. At the same time, Sir Rowland Hill moved forward from Subijana de Alava, and vigorously followed up the left wing in its retreating movement.

Though the enemy had been forced to withdraw his left, the centre still stood firm, and received the columns, advancing from the Zadorra, with a fire so destructive, as for a time to check their progress. Two brigades of horse-artillery were then moved forward to the front; and, thus supported, the centre columns continued their advance in fine order. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, the division of Sir Thomas-Picton first came in contact with a

CHAP. XI. strong body of the enemy, whom, by a spirited attack, he drove into immediate retreat, with the loss of twenty-eight pieces of artillery. On the approach of the fourth and light divisions, the whole heights were abandoned, and the French retired in admirable order on Vittoria, taking advantage of every favourable position to turn on their pursuers.

1813.

June.

In the meanwhile, Sir Thomas Graham, with the left column, which on the evening before had been moved to Margina, was advancing by the high road from Bilboa to Vittoria. About ten o'clock, he approached the enemy's right, posted on the heights commanding the village of Abechuco. From these he immediately dislodged them, by attacks both in front and flank.

Having gained possession of the heights, Sir Thomas Graham directed General Oswald's division to advance against the village of Gamarra Major, which the enemy occupied in great force, while, with the first division, he attacked the village of Abechuco. Gamarra Major was carried in the most gallant style by the brigade of General Robinson, which advanced in columns of battalion, under a heavy fire of artillery and musquetry, without firing a shot, and drove out

the enemy at the point of the bayonet, with great slaughter, and the loss of three guns. CHAP. XI.

The attack on Abechuco was no less successful. Under cover of the fire of two brigades of horse-artillery, Colonel Halket's brigade of the German legion advanced to the attack, and drove the enemy from the village, with the loss of three guns and a howitzer, captured by the light battalion in a very gallant charge. The village of Gamarra Menor was likewise carried by the Spaniards under Longa, after a trifling resistance.

During the operations at Abechuco, the enemy made the greatest efforts to re-establish themselves in Gamarra Major. A strong body advanced to regain the village, but were driven back in confusion by General Hay's brigade. In spite of this failure, another attempt was subsequently made ; but Sir Thomas Graham having caused the houses in front of the bridge to be loopholed, and placed his artillery in position to flank the approach, the enemy were again repulsed, and did not afterwards venture to renew the attack. •

Notwithstanding these successes, it was found impossible to cross the bridges, the heights on the left of the Zadorra being occupied by a

1813.

June.

CHAP. XI. strong reserve; and General Graham awaited the moment when the attacks on the enemy's left and centre should occasion the withdrawal of the corps in his front. This at length came. Towards evening, when the centre of the allies had penetrated beyond Vittoria, the right wing of the enemy, fearing to be cut off, retired hastily from its position. Sir Thomas Graham immediately pushed forward across the Zadorra, and took possession of the road to Bayonne, which, for some distance, runs along the margin of the river. Great confusion ensued. The baggage, heavy artillery, military chest, and court equipages of Joseph, had already been put in motion by that road, and were now intercepted. The enemy's columns, which were also retreating on Bayonne, were forced back into the Pampluna road; and in a moment the French army became a vast mob, without organization of any sort, and divested of every attribute of a military body. Never had any victory achieved by the enemy over the rude and undisciplined Spanish levies been more complete; never was any army reduced to a more absolute and total wreck than that which now fled from the field of Vittoria.

1813.

June.

The allies pressed forward, allowing not a moment of respite in which order might be restored, and adding to the amount of their captures at almost every step. Unfortunately the country was too much intersected by ditches to admit of the action of cavalry; and it was impossible for infantry advancing in military order to come up with an enemy who trusted solely for safety to rapidity of flight. The amount of prisoners, therefore, was comparatively small, though the pursuit was kept up with unremitting activity, till the approach of night, when the extraordinary fatigue of the troops occasioned it to be discontinued.

Joseph—whom from this period it would be a mere mockery to designate as King—fled towards Pampluna, and owed his safety to the swiftness of his horse. The tenth hussars entered Vittoria at full gallop the moment after his carriage had left it. Captain Wyndham, with one squadron, pursued, and fired into the carriage; and Joseph had barely time to throw himself on his horse, and escape under the protection of an escort of dragoons.

The immediate results of the battle were the capture of one hundred and fifty-one guns, and

CHAP. XI.

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June.

CHAP. XI. four hundred and fifteen caissons, with upwards of

1813.

June.

fourteen thousand rounds of ammunition, nearly two millions of musquet cartridges, forty thousand pounds of gunpowder, the military chest, and the whole baggage of the army, including the baton of Marshal Jourdan. Several carriages with ladies, among whom was the Countess de Gazan, likewise remained as trophies in the power of the victors. Many other females of rank, whose husbands were attached to the Court at Madrid, sought safety by mingling in the confused *melée* of fugitives. Being utterly unprepared for such a disaster, their sufferings were extreme during the retreat to the Pyrenees ; and many are stated to have crossed the frontier barefooted, and in a state of the most pitiable privation.

Though the defeat of the enemy was thus accompanied by every conceivable concomitant of disgrace, the loss of combatants on both sides was unusually small. The amount of killed and wounded, on the part of the allies, was under five thousand. That of the enemy is rated, by their own writers, so low as six thousand, but was unquestionably greater. The number of prisoners made by the allies, from the

causes already mentioned, did not exceed one thousand. Of the two guns which the enemy succeeded in carrying off, only one reached Pampluna, the other being taken on the following day.*

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* It is a coincidence worthy of remark, that the battle of Vittoria was fought nearly on the same spot with another, in which a victory obtained by the English restored a legitimate Sovereign to the throne of Spain. Within sight of the enemy's positions on the twenty-first of June, and only a few miles higher up the same stream, the Zadorra, stands the village of Navarrette, where, on the third of April, 1367, Edward the Black Prince, totally defeated Henry the Bastard, and, in consequence, seated Don Pedro on the Throne of Castile.

Froissart, who gives a lively description of this engagement, observes of Sir John Chandos, the most eminent among the English knights, that "he never thought during the day of making any prisoners; but was solely occupied in fighting and pushing forward." The most striking passage, however, in his account, is that in which he describes the approach of the two armies towards each other, when, a little before they met, the Prince of Wales, with eyes and hands uplifted towards Heaven, exclaimed—"God of Truth, the Father of Jesus Christ, who has made and fashioned me, grant through thy benign grace, that the success of this battle may be for me and my army; for thou knowest, that in truth I have been solely emboldened to undertake it, in the support of justice and reason, to reinstate this King upon his throne, who has been disinherited and driven from it, as well as from his country." This zealous prayer was immediately followed by the onset, the Prince crying aloud, "Advance, banners, in the name of God, and St. George." "At the commencement," says the old historian, "the French and Arragonese made a desperate resistance, and gave the good knights of England much trouble;" but at last, "when all the divisions of the Prince were formed into one large body," the enemy "could no longer

CHAP. XI. The whole of Lord Wellington's manœuvres
1813. from the commencement of this memorable campaign are entitled to the highest admiration. The annals of modern war contain record of nothing more brilliant and decisive. Every calculation of the French Generals had been set at nought. Disregarding all occasion of petty or ephemeral success, he had threatened their whole flank from St. Andero to Valencia; and every movement of the allied army may be regarded as an important, though bloodless triumph. In the short space of one month, the enemy had been driven from Madrid to Vittoria, and forced to abandon the strong lines of the Douro and the Ebro. It was impossible, however, that Joseph should tamely suffer himself to be expelled from the Spanish territory without a struggle. It was necessary, by a strong effort, to turn the tide

keep the ground, but began to fly in great disorder ;" and Henry (the Usurper) "perceiving his army defeated without hope of recovery, called for his horse, mounted it, and galloped off among the crowd of runaways." The English pursued them through the town of Najura, where they gained considerable plunder. "For King Henry and his army had come thither with much splendour ; and, after the defeat, they had not leisure to return to place in security what they had left behind them in the morning."

of war, which seemed about to burst the barrier of the Pyrenees and flow onward into France. In the plain of Vittoria, therefore, it was determined to give battle. The position chosen was a bad one ; and it was badly occupied. Covering a space of two leagues, it was too extensive ; and the only roads by which the army could retreat, lay at the extremity of the line. The wings were strongly posted ; but the only strength of the centre lay in the river, and in a height within half gun-shot, which commanded the valley for a considerable distance. It was in the centre that Marshal Jourdan anticipated attack, and concentrated his chief strength to repel it. Under this impression, instead of posting a strong division on the heights of Puebla, he occupied them only with a few light troops ; and every subsequent effort to repair this error proved abortive.

The loss of the battle flowed almost as a necessary sequence. Sir Rowland Hill having gained the heights of Subijana, continued to advance ; and the centre, weakened for the support of the left, was penetrated with facility by the centre columns of the allies. The left and centre were thus thrown back on Vittoria ;

CHAP. XI.

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CHAP. XI. and the right, being unsupported, retreated,
1813. leaving the road to Bayonne in possession of
Sir Thomas Graham. No victory was ever
more complete and decisive. The whole plunder
of Spain was disgorged in a moment; and
he who had passed the Pyrenees as a monarch,
recrossed them as a fugitive.

On examining the position two modes of attack naturally presented themselves to Lord Wellington. One of these was to content himself with merely threatening the wings, and to direct his principal attack against the enemy's centre, by penetrating which, and moving rapidly on Vittoria, in all probability the left wing would have been cut off. The other was that actually adopted, viz. to turn the position on both flanks, and subsequently to direct a powerful attack against the centre, when, by the necessities of the contest on the right and left, it should have been considerably weakened.

Against the first of these projects there were many objections. The Zadorra in front of Vittoria is not fordable; and to have forced the bridges, in face of a powerful army advantageously posted for their defence, was an operation of the greatest hazard and difficulty, which

could not have been effected without incurring CHAP. XI.
a much heavier loss than that which actually re-
sulted from the whole battle. 1813.

The French writers, by whom in the mortification of wounded vanity the charge has been made, neither will, nor can understand the situation of Lord Wellington. They cannot understand that with a high career before him, in which a single failure must have placed an insuperable barrier to his progress, he could not afford to sacrifice even a life beyond what was necessary for the attainment of the great and paramount end of his operations. The loss of ten thousand British soldiers at Vittoria, would have been poorly compensated by the capture of an equal number of the enemy. The previous fame of Lord Wellington had left him no petty vanity to gratify. It was his object not to gain victory merely, but *cheap* victory, for such alone could be attended with those great and important results, which in his eyes gave victory its value. By his manœuvres at Vittoria, he deceived the calculations of the French generals; and, having forced them by his flank attacks to weaken their centre, his columns passed the Zadorra with trifling opposition. Under these circumstances

CHAP. XI. it may fairly be doubted, whether, by any other

1813. scheme of attack, a victory of equal magnitude
could have been attained, without incurring a
loss infinitely greater.

We do not assert, and it is not necessary for the triumphant vindication of Lord Wellington that we should assert, that even greater results might not have been attained by a different system of tactic at Vittoria. That Napoleon, with the population of a vast empire at his command, and without responsibility of any kind, would have fought the battle differently we have no doubt. But the circumstances of Lord Wellington were utterly dissimilar. He was intrusted with the destinies of three nations ; and to have rashly hazarded so mighty a stake, would, even if successful, have deprived him of half his fame.

In truth, as the character of Lord Wellington is viewed by his countrymen, it exhibits no quality more worthy of admiration, than that unswerving energy with which, in spite of all temptations, he persevered in the pursuit of great objects ; daring much where daring was required, yet pausing even in the moment of victory, whenever these objects had been attained. It is this nice proportioning of the hazards to the

ends,—this unvarying refusal to sacrifice the lives of his troops, for the sake of converting certain into more brilliant results, which constitutes the brightest and most enduring claim of Lord Wellington to the gratitude of his country. To the soldiers trained in the school of Napoleon, who, as has been truly said, would have sacrificed a million of lives for a million of pounds of coffee, this may seem inexplicable. Yet so it is. The very points which they select for censure, are those which will be handed down to posterity, as having attracted, in a supreme degree, the gratitude of England, and the applause of those nations whom he rescued from the yoke.

After the battle of Vittoria, Sir Thomas Graham, with the left wing, was directed to advance on Bilboa, to intercept the retreat of General Foy, who then occupied that town. On receiving intelligence of the battle, however, General Foy, having collected all the detachments from the different military stations in Biscay, except Santona and St. Sebastian, immediately fell back on Bayonne, and endeavoured to impede pursuit by barricading the gates of Tolosa, and occupying the convents and large buildings in the vicinity.

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{ June.

CHAP. XI. Towards evening Sir Thomas Graham directed a
1813. general attack. The French were rapidly driven
June. from all their positions without the town, and a
nine-pounder was brought up to burst open one
of the gates. The allied troops then entered ; but
it was already dark, and in the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing the troops of the different nations en-
gaged, the enemy effected their escape with small-
er loss than they must otherwise have suffered.

Sir Thomas Graham continued to push the
enemy along the road to Bayonne, dislodging
them from every position in which they attempt-
ed to make a stand. They were driven across
the Bidassoa, which forms the boundary in this
direction between Spain and France, by a bri-
gade of the Gallician army under Castanos. On
Jun. 30. the thirtieth, the garrison of Passages, a harbour
of considerable importance, surrendered to the
troops of Longa, and St. Sebastian was block-
aded by a detachment of Spanish troops.

The enemy, in retiring from the Ebro, having
left a garrison in the castle of Pancorvo, Lord
Wellington directed the Conde de Bisbal, with
the Spanish reserve, to reduce it. On the twen-
ty-eighth, the town and lower fort were carried
by assault ; and, on the first of July, the castle

surrendered by capitulation. The garrison, consisting of six hundred and fifty men, were made prisoners.

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1813.

July.

Whilst these operations proceeded on the left, the remainder of the army was no less actively employed: On reaching Pampluna, Joseph withdrew his wings from the Spanish territory, leaving three divisions of the centre, under Gazan, in the valley of El Bustan. Lord Wellington, entertaining some suspicion that they intended to fortify a position in that fertile and defensible country, directed Sir Rowland Hill, with three brigades of the second division, and one brigade of Portuguese, to approach the enemy by the pass of Lanz; and Lord Dalhousie, with the seventh division, to menace their right by a movement on San Estevan. These manœuvres were completely successful. By a series of brilliant attacks, the enemy were successively driven from every post, and forced to seek safety in a rapid retreat across the Pyrenees.

Jul. 7.

In the meanwhile, the third, fourth, and light divisions, with two brigades of cavalry, marched in pursuit of General Clausel, who, ignorant of the battle, advanced to Vittoria on the day following. Finding it occupied by General Paken-

CHAP. XI. ham's division, he instantly retreated on Logrono, where he remained several days, and Lord Wellington conceiving it possible to intercept his retreat, moved a large force towards Tudela, while another advanced on Logrono. Clausel, however, receiving intelligence of the approach of the allies, and discovering that the direct road to France was barred against him, fell back on Zaragoza by forced marches, pursued and harassed by a strong Guerilla body under Mina. Having reached that city, he continued his retreat on the pass of Jaca, where he entered France, with the loss of his artillery, and about three hundred prisoners, captured by the indefatigable Mina.

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July.

Jul. 1.

With the exception of the garrisons of Pampluna and St. Sebastian, the whole army of Joseph had now retreated into France; and preparations were immediately made for the reduction of these last strongholds of the enemy. As Pampluna was generally believed to be ill provided with provisions, it was placed under blockade by a corps of Spaniards, and encircled by a strong line of entrenchments to prevent the escape of the garrison. St. Sebastian was immediately invested; and Sir Thomas Graham, with

the first and fifth divisions, directed to prosecute the siege. CHAP.

1813.

Intelligence of these events was received in England with unequalled joy and exultation. The Marquis Wellington was raised from the rank of Lieutenant-General to that of Field Marshal, and received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament. Illuminations and rejoicings took place in all the principal cities, and the measure of the national gratitude was filled to the brim.

Nor were the Government of Spain backward in testifying their deep sense of the eminent services of Lord Wellington. By a decree of the Cortes, he was created Duke of Vittoria; and a grant, in perpetuity, of the Lordship of Soto de Romano, in the kingdom of Granada, was annexed to the title.

CHAPTER XII.

OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

CHAP. XII. WHILE in the north-west of Spain the cause
1813. of liberty and justice had gone forward, prospering and to prosper, the eastern provinces had become the scene of events of a very different character. During the preceding winter, a considerable reinforcement, under Major-General Campbell, arrived at Alicante from Sicily, and a body of native troops had been organized in the Balearic islands, under British officers. No movement, however, took place till the beginning of April, when Sir John Murray having assumed the command, the Anglo-Sicilian army, amounting to about sixteen thousand men, advanced to Biar and Castalla. General Elio, who, with a corps of twelve thousand men, oc-

cupied the frontiers of Murcia, also advanced to Yecla and Villena. CHAP. XVI.

On learning this combined movement, Suchet collected his whole disposable force; and on the morning of the eleventh, General Harispe succeeded in surprising the Spanish division in Yecla, about fifteen hundred of which were killed or made prisoners. On the day following he again attacked the Spaniards at Villena, from which the cavalry immediately retired, leaving in the castle a battalion, which, wanting means of subsistence and defence, capitulated next day.

1813.

April.

Apr. 11.

Apr. 12.

Suchet then advanced by the road to Castalla, leading through the pass of Biar, which was occupied by the advance of Sir John Murray's army, under Colonel Adam. The orders of that officer were to fall back on Castalla, but to dispute the passage with the enemy. After a contest of several hours, Colonel Adam accordingly retired on the main body, with the loss of two mountain guns, which had been disabled in the action.

On the following day, Suchet found the allied army strongly posted, with its left on a range of heights in front of Castalla, and the right and

Apr. 12.

MAP. XII. centre covered by a ravine. He immediately directed a strong column to attack the left of the position, at the same time threatening the right with his cavalry. The enemy's column, covered by their light infantry, ascended the heights with great gallantry, opposed only by the Spanish brigade of General Whittingham, which, for nearly an hour, kept up a continued skirmish with the light troops. At length, when they had nearly reached the summit, the British troops opened fire with tremendous effect; and charging with the bayonet, drove back the assailants with great precipitation on their main body in the plain.

After this repulse, Suchet, unwilling to commit his army by a general engagement with the defile of Biar in rear, retreated on Fuente la Higuera; and Sir John Murray, on the day following, moved by the direct route on San Felipe, in hope of reaching that point before the defeated force. In this he was disappointed; and retracing his steps, again established himself in the position at Castalla. The loss of the allies in these engagements, amounted to one hundred and forty-five killed, and somewhat more than five hundred in wounded and missing.

That of the enemy is acknowledged by Marshal Suchet to have been very great.

1813.

May.

No consequences, however, flowed from the advantage gained at Castalla. The position of the enemy on the Xucar was too strong to admit of a direct attack on its front; and the armies remained inactive till the end of May. Sir John Murray then received instructions from Lord Wellington to embark his army for Catalonia, and, securing an establishment on the coast, to combine his operations with the Catalan leaders, and thus effect a diversion in favour of Valencia. Should Suchet, however, succeed in bringing up his troops in time to prevent the capture of a maritime fortress, his orders were instantly to re-embark and return to Valencia, to assist the Duke del Parque in driving the enemy from his line on the Xucar.

On the thirty-first of May, therefore, the army was embarked at Alicante on board of the English fleet on that station, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell. Early on the third of June, the troops were landed near the point of Salon; and in the course of the day Tarragona was reconnoitred and invested.

May 31.

Jun. 3.

A brigade under Colonel Prevost had pre-

CHAP. XII. viously been despatched to attack the Fort
1813. on the Col de Balaguer, which commands the
June. only road practicable for artillery between Tortosa and Tarragona. This force was joined on the fifth by two Spanish battalions; and on the seventh the Fort capitulated. The garrison, consisting of eighty men, were made prisoners of war.

The strength of Tarragona had been materially diminished since the former siege. The French could not afford a garrison sufficient for the defence of works so extensive, and the outer line had been dismantled. In order to delay the progress of the besiegers, however, General Bertolletti, the governor, occupied the Fort Royal and the ruins of the Bastion San Carlos, which had been hastily repaired on the approach of the allied army.

Though General Murray was yet in no state to enter seriously on the siege, two batteries were opened on the morning of the sixth against the Fort Royal, and another on the seventh. On the morning of the eighth, it was reported by Major Thackray, the commanding engineer, to be practicably breached. It was the request, however, of that officer that the

Jun. 8.

fort should not be assaulted, as the immediate possession of it could be rendered available for no object, and to maintain it would necessarily be accompanied by considerable loss. General Murray, therefore, determined to delay the attack, and gave orders that the fire on the fort should continue only to prevent the restoration of its defences.

CHAP. XII.
1813.

June.

The stores, and the artillery, and engineer horses, were at length landed; and on the morning of the eleventh, fire was opened on the body of the place from two heavy batteries, at a distance of four hundred and fifty yards. But time had been already given for the approach of Marshal Suchet, who, leaving the command of the troops, on the Xucar, to General Harispe, moved rapidly with the remainder of his army on Tortosa, where, learning the fall of the Col de Balaguer, he left his artillery, and continued his march, with a single division, by paths through the mountains on his left towards Tarragona. In the meanwhile, orders had been sent to General Maufice Mathieu, to advance rapidly with his whole disposable force from Barcelona, to the relief of the place.

Jun. 11.

CHAP. XII. On learning these movements, General Murray decided on raising the siege; and in the course of the twelfth of June, embarked his infantry, leaving nineteen pieces of artillery in the trenches, and a considerable quantity of stores. Against this sacrifice Admiral Hallowell vainly remonstrated, and urged his opinion that by delaying the embarkation till night the guns might be brought off. But Sir John Murray, strongly impressed with the conviction that the force under his command, even when joined with the Spanish army of Copons, in the immediate neighbourhood, was unequal to contend with the enemy, adhered to his resolution. The cavalry and field artillery were sent to the Coll de Balaguer, as affording a more favourable place for their embarkation.

During the night of the twelfth, General Murray received an express from the Col de Balaguer, informing him that a large body of the enemy had passed towards Tarragona, and he proceeded to that fort on the following day. On his arrival, he found that a skirmish had taken place between the out-piquets and the French cavalry, and that it was necessary to land infantry to protect the embarkation of the cavalry

and artillery. During the following day, his whole force was disembarked, in the hope of being able to cut off a body of the enemy at Bandillos. This hope, however, proved vain; and on the seventeenth, Lord William Bentinck arrived to assume the command of the army, which he immediately re-embarked, and having destroyed the defences of the fort, returned to Alicante.

CHAP. XII.

1813.

June.

Jun. 17.

Such was the miserable conclusion of these operations. In the course of the following year, the conduct of Sir John Murray became the subject of investigation before a military tribunal. By the decision of the court, he was acquitted of all intentional disobedience to his instructions; but convicted of having "unnecessarily abandoned a considerable quantity of artillery and stores, which he might have embarked in safety, such conduct being detrimental to the service." As no evidence of unworthy motive was adduced, the court attributed his conduct to an "error in judgment;" and nothing followed upon the decision, as the case did not appear to the Prince Regent to call for the admonition pointed out by the court.

But the verdict of no tribunal could remove

CHAP. XII. from Sir John Murray the imputation of gross
1813. incapacity. Entertaining the deliberate conviction that the force he commanded was utterly unequal to contend with that of Suchet, it might naturally be supposed that on learning the approach of that leader he would take instant measures for the security of his army. But Sir John Murray, influenced by some unknown and unintelligible motive, continued his operations against the town, at a time when he must have known that its reduction was impracticable. Instead of re-embarking the guns and stores already landed, we find him, during the whole of the tenth and eleventh, employed in landing more, and moving them to situations of greater danger and exposure.

On the twelfth, however, a change came over the spirit of his dream. He then determined instantly to re-embark his troops ; the guns were left in the trenches without an effort to remove them, in spite of the arguments and entreaties of Admiral Hallowell, who stated his conviction, that, by the delay of a few hours, they might be brought off.

All this is very miserable ; yet we do not blame Sir John Murray. That he acted to the

best of his judgment, we are bound to believe: CHAP. XII.

But what shall be said of those who, amid the multitude of accomplished officers presented to their choice, selected such a man for the command of an army?

 1813.

July.

On reaching Alicante, Lord William Bentinck advanced to form a junction with the Duke del Parque; with the view of attacking the different French posts in Valencia. But intelligence of the battle of Vittoria no sooner reached Suchet than he determined on abandoning the province. On the fifth of July, he retired into Catalonia, leaving twelve thousand of his army to garrison the chief fortresses in his rear.

Jul. 5.

Lord William Bentinck, leaving the blockade of the other strongholds to the Spaniards, entered Catalonia, and crossing the Ebro below that city, immediately invested Tarragona by sea and land. On the third of August, the army was joined by the Duke del Parque; and on the eleventh, by the Catalan force, under General Sarsfield. It was then determined to land the ordnance and ammunition, and commence the works of the siege.

Jul. 30.

Aug. 11.

Suchet, however, who had retired on Barcelona, aware that Tarragona, if left to itself, must

CHAP. XII. soon ~~fall~~, determined to make a strong effort for its relief. Having formed a junction with De-
1813. caen, and collected all the troops which could
August. be spared from Barcelona and the neighbouring garrisons, he advanced with a force of twenty-five thousand men. A strong column attempted to proceed by the road along the coast, but driven from this route by the fire of the British squadron, it struck into that leading by Brafín and the Col de St. Christina, while De-caen, crossing the Francolí, advanced from Valls. On the approach of Suchet, Lord William Bentinck took up a position in front of Tarragona, with the intention of giving battle; but subsequently judging from an affair of outposts, that the enemy were too strong, fell back during the night to Cambrils, and gave up Tarragona.

In the circumstances of the French army, however, Suchet did not think it prudent to retain possession of Tarragona, but destroying the works he withdrew the garrison, and fell back behind the Llobregat. In this position he maintained his communication with Lerida, and covered Barcelona and the road to France.

In the beginning of September, Lord William

Bentinck being informed that a considerable por- CHAP. XII.
tion of the French forces in Catalonia had been
withdrawn, moved forward to Villa Franca. An
advanced corps, under Colonel Adam, consisting
of a British, a Calabrian, and three Spanish bat-
talions, with four mountain guns, was posted con-
siderably in advance at Ordal, a position of great
strength, which commanded the high road from
Barcelona. Though Lord William Bentinck
was aware that Suchet had already assembled a
large force at Molino del Rey, he considered
the advance at Ordal to be secure, and antici-
pated that the enemy would attempt to dislodge
him from his position by a movement in flank.
In this calculation he was deceived. At mid-
night of the twelfth, the piquets of the advanced
corps were suddenly driven in, and the French
came on in great force. The allies, though taken
by surprise, and attacked by overwhelming num-
bers, made vigorous resistance, and twice re-
pulsed their assailants. At length, however, the
position was carried; and the French cavalry
executing a charge on the retreating column, it
was thrown into confusion, and forced to seek
safety by dispersing amid the mountains. The
guns, and a considerable number of prisoners,

1813.

September.

Sep. 12.

CHAP. XII. were taken by the enemy; and the total loss of the allies amounted to nearly one thousand men.

1813.

September.

On the following day Lord William Bentinck retreated from Villa Franca on the approach of Suchet and Decaen, the latter of whom was advancing on his left flank from Martorell. During the march an affair of cavalry took place, in which the Brunswick hussars behaved with great gallantry. Suchet then recrossed the Llobregat; and the allies, unmolested, continued their retreat on Tarragona by Altafulla. Shortly afterwards, Lord William Bentinck returned to Sicily, and was succeeded in command by Lieutenant-General Clinton.

CHAPTER XIII.

BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.

NAPOLEON, while occupied with the great con- CHAP.XIII
 test, which he was about to wage on the banks
 of the Elbe, had, in some degree, withdrawn his
 attention from the operations in the Peninsula.
 He had trusted that the army, in the strong line
 of the Douro or the Ebro, would be enabled to
 give a decisive check to the progress of the al-
 lies; and the more immediate pressure of the war
 in Germany had induced him to recall many of
 his ablest generals, and among others Soult, who
 had long held the chief command. But in one
 short month his hopes had been overthrown. By
 a series of splendid manœuvres, terminating in
 a victory no less splendid, his grand army had
 been swept out of Spain, and the tide of war had
 already rolled onward to the Pyrenees, where a

 1813.

CHAP. XIII mighty effort was demanded to arrest its progress.

1813.

Under these circumstances, Napoleon at once perceived that the contest on the southern frontier was one which could no longer be disregarded. He felt the urgency of the crisis; he saw that the most immediate and energetic measures could alone rescue France from invasion; and a portion of the vast levies then raising was directed to recruit the exhausted ranks of the army in the Pyrenees. Soult, whose talents alone seemed equal to so great an emergency, hastened from Germany to assume the command, with the rank of Lieutenant of the Emperor.

If any measure could have restored the confidence of the disheartened and fugitive legions of Joseph's army, this appointment would unquestionably have done so. The reputation of Soult stood almost pre-eminently high, and no other leader, during the whole war in the Peninsula, had enjoyed the confidence of the troops in an equal degree.

Soult having proclaimed his determination of repairing the errors of his predecessors, and of driving the allies across the Ebro, took instant measures for the re-organization of the

army. Supplies of all sorts were sent ~~to~~ replace CHAP. XIII
the losses sustained in the campaign, and rein-
forcements of cavalry and artillery gave consid-
erable augmentation to his strength in these
arms. His infantry, which by recent losses and
desertions, had been reduced to eighty thousand,
he divided into three corps, under command of
Generals Reille, Drouet, and Clausel, with a
body of reserve under Villatte. These arrange-
ments being completed, he established a large
dépôt at St. Jean Pied de Port; and prepared,
by a strong effort, to relieve the fortresses, and
roll back the tide of war from the frontier.

1813.

The situation of Lord Wellington, to whom the progress of the campaign had hitherto been little else than one continued march of triumph, was become one of considerable hazard. Having to cover the siege of two fortresses, with a wide interval between, he was under the necessity of extending his line in a dangerous degree. The positions occupied by his divisions were indeed strong; yet, by the impassable nature of the country, they were cut off from all direct communication with each other, and the enemy enjoyed the advantage of being able to direct the whole volume of his force

CHAP. XIII against a single corps, while the other divisions, separated by almost impenetrable barriers, could lend no assistance. A defensive army, therefore, was weak in the precise proportion of the number of the passes it was necessary to maintain; and by the success of the enemy at any one point, the safety of the whole was liable to be compromised.

1813.

This circumstance gave Marshal Soult a great and prominent advantage over his opponent. By a strong and sudden attack, he might reasonably calculate on overpowering one of the corps covering the passes; and then, by pushing forward on the flank and rear of the remainder, he might force the whole army to a hasty retreat, and thus effect the relief of the blockaded fortresses.

A change, therefore, was about to take place in the character of the contest. The allied army was to defend a series of mountain defiles, in a country where cavalry could not act, and in positions to which artillery could not be conveyed. They were about to enter on a struggle for which they were unprepared by any former experience; while the system of mountain warfare was one for which the lightness and

activity of the French troops peculiarly fitted them, and in which they had hitherto been considered unrivalled. The high fame of the hostile commanders contributed also to invest this period of the war with an extrinsic interest. Unless at Oporto, Soult had never been brought into close and direct contact with Lord Wellington. The celebrated leaders by whom the latter had been successively opposed, when weighed in the balance had been found wanting; and Soult had been selected by the Emperor, as the man on whose skill and energy he relied, to repair the disasters of the campaign, and free the soil of France from the reproach of invasion.

CHAP. XIII

1813.

July.

The principal passes of the Pyrenees were occupied by the allied army, which was distributed in the following manner:—

The right wing covered the direct approaches to Pampluna from St. Jean Pied de Port. The brigade of Major-General Byng, and the Spanish corps of General Morillo, occupying the advanced passes of Roncesvalles and Arbaicete, formed the extreme right, supported by the fourth division at Biscaret, and the third division in reserve at Olacque.

The right of the centre, under Sir Rowland

CHAP. XIII Hill, consisting of the second division, and the Portuguese division of the Conde de Amarante, guarded the passes near Maya, in the valley of Bustan, distant about twenty miles from the pass of Roncesvalles. On his left were the seventh and light divisions, the former posted in the pass of Echelar, the latter on the mountain Sta. Barbara, and in the town of Pera. The sixth division was placed in reserve at St. Estevan, to support the troops at Maya or Echelar, as occasion might require.

1813.

July.

The left wing, commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, consisting of the first and fifth divisions, was engaged in the siege of St. Sebastian, protected in its operations by a force on the Bidassoa, composed of Lord Aylmer's brigade and the Spanish corps of General Freyre.

The army of the Conde de Bisbal, about ten thousand strong, was employed in the blockade of Pampluna; and the corps of Longa extended the line of communication from the Urumea to the Bidassoa, forming a chain between the left, and left of the centre.

Soult's first object was to relieve Pampluna. With this view, he collected the main body of his army in the neighbourhood of St. Jean Pied

de Port. Posting the reserve at Urogne to guard the line of the Bidassoa on his right, he formed his army into two powerful columns, with which he prepared to make a simultaneous attack on the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. By the one he hoped to secure his immediate object, while the other was chiefly intended to deceive his opponent; and, by diverting his attention to a different point, to delay the transmission of reinforcements to the real scene of danger.

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1813.

July.

The column destined for the attack on the position of Maya, was about thirteen thousand strong, and commanded by Drouet. At ten o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth, this corps was perceived to be approaching the right of the position, by a mountain path, leading from Espallete, across the ridge to the village of Maya. At the same time demonstrations were made against the different passes, and under cover of these manœuvres having concentrated a strong force in front of Aretesque, about half-past eleven they filed in column from behind the mountain, and attacked the piquets of the second division on the heights of Maya.

Jul. 25.

The piquets, with the support of the light in-

CHAP. XIII **fantry companies of the second brigade, for a**
1813. **time sustained the onset of the enemy, with the**
July. **greatest steadiness, but were at length over-**
powered. The thirty-fourth and fiftieth regi-
ments then came up, and charging with the bay-
onet, succeeded in driving back the assailants.
The latter, however, again advanced in great
force, and the two gallant battalions were on the
point of being surrounded, when the right wing
of the ninety-second came up to their support.
The contest was then continued on both sides
with the greatest obstinacy. While the thirty-
fourth and fiftieth were re-forming, the wing of
the ninety-second was opposed to a force of the
enemy more than two thousand strong, and al-
most annihilated in the contest.

The troops which had hitherto waged so unequal a contest were at length ordered to withdraw ; and fresh regiments were moved forward in their place. But the enemy, in spite of all opposition, continued to gain ground, and was already in possession of the pass. The second division, overmatched in numbers, retired slowly, defending every favourable point, till joined by a brigade of the seventh division, under General Barnes, when the lost ground was regained, and

the enemy driven back beyond the pass of Maya. CHAP. XIII
 About nine at night, the contest ceased ; and
 the troops, having formed line, were allowed an
 interval of repose.

 1813.

July.

Throughout this severe engagement the British laboured under a decided disadvantage. Though the attack was made only at one point, it was impossible for General Stewart to denude the other passes of defence ; and while the enemy acted in one compact and powerful body, they were opposed only by successive battalions, brought up as the pressure of circumstances demanded. It was owing to this, that the utmost gallantry of the troops was unequal to arrest the progress of the assailants ; but in no instance were the qualities of British soldiers more finely displayed. The loss of the allies was very severe ; it exceeded sixteen hundred men, and four guns were taken by the enemy.

During the night, Sir Rowland Hill retired from the heights which had been so gallantly defended, and took post on some very strong ground in rear of Elizonda. The enemy remained inactive in his position in front of Maya, during the whole of the twenty-sixth.

Jul. 26.

In the meanwhile, Soult, with a column of

CHAP. XIII thirty-five thousand men, had directed a more
1813. powerful attack on Roncesvalles. Making a de-
July. monstration on the front of General Byng's posi-
tion, in advance of the Pass, he pushed the main
body of his army along the ridge of Arola, on its
left, occupied by General Cole's division. Though
the enemy were greatly superior in numbers,
General Cole defended his ground with great
obstinacy, but was at length forced to retire with
considerable loss. He then took up a strong
position in rear, which the enemy did not ven-
ture to attack.

Soult then directed his efforts against the
front of General Byng's brigade, and forcing it
back gained possession of the road to Arbaicete,
which enabled him to attack the Spanish corps
of Morillo, on the right. The Spaniards, after
some resistance, were forced to retire for sup-
port on the fourth division; and the position
being thus turned, General Cole, as soon as it
was dark, fell back to a strong ridge in front of
Zubiri, where he halted for the night.

Jul. 26. On the day following, General Picton moved
up with the third division, and assumed the
command; but the enemy coming on in great
force, both divisions retired to some strong

ground in the rear, where they remained in order of battle till night. On the twenty-seventh, the retreat was continued to a position in front of the villages Huarte and Villalba, which covered the blockade of Pampluna.

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1813.

July.

At the commencement of these operations, Lord Wellington was with the left of the army, probably anticipating that Soult's first effort would be directed towards the relief of St. Sebastian, as the fortress more immediately in danger. On the night of the twenty-fifth, he received intelligence that the enemy were in motion, and hastened to the scene of action, where he arrived at the moment when the divisions under Sir Thomas Picton were taking up their ground.

Lord Wellington determined to concentrate the main body of his army for the defence of Pampluna, and the sixth, seventh, and light divisions, were directed to pass the mountains of Lanz, and form on the left of the fourth division. Sir Rowland Hill was directed to retire behind the Lizasso, and keep in check the corps of Drouet, which might otherwise have advanced on Pampluna, by the lateral road from Irantsum and Berisplano; a body of the blockading force,

CHAP. XIII under the Conde de Bisbal, was ordered to move

1813. up and form a *corps de reserve*. At the same
July. time, Sir Stapleton Cotton was ordered to bring
up the cavalry, and take post on the right of the
third division, the only ground which permitted
the action of that arm.

General Picton's division formed the right, and was posted on a ridge, in front of the village Huarte, with its right extending to the hills beyond Olaz. The left, consisting of General Cole's division, General Byng's brigade, and General Campbell's brigade of Portuguese, occupied the heights in front of Villalba, between the rivers Arga and Lanz, with the left at a chapel behind Sauroren, on the high road from Maya.

The divisions had scarcely taken up their ground, when the enemy directed an attack on a hill, projecting from the line on the right of the fourth division, occupied by a Portuguese and a Spanish battalion. These troops maintained their ground, and drove back the enemy with the bayonet; but the possession of this post being considered of importance to the position. Lord Wellington directed the fortieth regiment to advance to their assistance. Thus reinforced

the enemy were defeated in every effort to gain possession of the hill. CHAP. XIII

 1813.

July.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth, the French army were formed on a mountain ridge, fronting the position of the allies. Their left rested on some bold heights beyond the road of Roncesvalles, and their right extended to the village of Sauoren, which they occupied in force. Before any hostile movement had taken place, the sixth division, under Major-General Pack, came up, and were immediately formed, unobserved by the enemy, across the valley, in rear of the left of the fourth division, making face against the village of Sauoren.

The troops were scarcely posted, when the enemy pushed forward a very large force from Sauoren, in order to penetrate by the valley, and turn the left of the position. But this body being unexpectedly met by a strong fire, both in front and flank, was speedily forced to retire with great loss.

The next effort of Soult was directed against the centre. About one o'clock, a strong column advanced against the left of the fourth division, posted at a chapel on the road to Ortiz, and speedily dislodged a Portuguese battalion, by

CHAP. XIII which it was defended. The brigade of General
1813. Ross, however, coming up, the Portuguese were
July. enabled to rally, and the enemy in their turn
were forced to give way.

A powerful attempt was made to gain possession of the hill on the right, defended by the fortieth regiment, and two Spanish battalions. The French succeeded in gaining the summit of the height; but the fortieth, charging with the bayonet, drove them back with distinguished gallantry, and every effort of the enemy at this point proved abortive.

Soult then directed a general attack on the whole front of the heights occupied by the fourth division, and a contest of the most desperate character ensued. The French advanced, with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" to penetrate the position with the bayonet. The fourth division waited their approach, reserving their fire till the enemy had approached within a few paces, then pouring in a volley, and charging almost at the same instant, drove them down the heights in the greatest confusion, and with prodigious loss.

In one instance alone was the attack successful. A Portuguese battalion, on the right of

General Ross's brigade, having given way, the
assailants gained possession of the chapel near
Sauoren ; and General Ross being thus obliged
to retire, the enemy succeeded for a moment in
establishing his columns on the line of the allies.

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July.

On perceiving this circumstance, Lord Wellington directed the twenty-seventh and forty-eighth regiments to charge ; and nothing could exceed the gallantry or the success with which these orders were obeyed. The two regiments, and General Ross's brigade, made several most brilliant charges, and at the bayonet's point dislodged the enemy from the chapel. At the same time, General Pack's division having moved up the valley to support the left of General Cole, the attack on this part of the position ceased entirely ; and Soult, at length convinced of the hopelessness of the contest, drew off his troops.

The brunt of this severe struggle was borne almost exclusively by the fourth division, which, though repeatedly attacked by the enemy in great superiority of numbers, maintained its ground throughout the day. " In the course of this contest," says Lord Wellington, " the gallant fourth division, which has been so frequently distinguished in this army, surpassed their

CHAP. XIII former good conduct. Every regiment charged
 1813. with the bayonet, and the fortieth, the seventh,
 July. twentieth, and twenty-third, four different times.
 Their officers set them the example; and Major-General Ross had two horses shot under him. The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the Spanish regiments del Principe and Pravia."

Jul. 29. During the whole of the twenty-ninth, both armies remained inactive. But the situation of the allies was materially improved by the arrival of the seventh division at Marcalain, between Sir Rowland Hill's position and the right, which secured the communication between the corps, and gave unity of action to the whole force. Soult then gave up all idea of penetrating the line of the allies, at the points towards which his efforts had hitherto been directed, and determined, by a lateral march, to effect a junction with the corps of Drouet. This would open to him the road from Pampluna to Tolosa, by which he might advance against the left of the allied army, and taking it in rear, effect the liberation of St. Sebastian.

In order to masque his intention, he still oc-

cupied, in considerable force, the strong position on the heights of Sauroren, which then became the *point d'appui* of the extreme left, and put the remainder of his force in motion by its right. At the same time, the wounded, the artillery, and a great part of the baggage, were sent off to the rear, in order that the army might, as much as possible, be untrammelled in its movements.

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On the morning of the thirtieth, the enemy's troops were observed to be in motion towards the mountains on the south of Lanz ; and Lord Wellington, instantly divining the object of the manœuvre, determined on dislodging the corps in his front from its position. Sir Thomas Picton, therefore, with his division, was directed to move by the valley of Arga, against the French left, while the seventh division, under Lord Dalhousie, should turn their right in the valley of Lanz. These manœuvres were completely successful. The brigade of General Inglis, with great gallantry, carried a height which supported their right ; and General Pakenham, who, after General Pack was wounded, had assumed command of the sixth division, drove the enemy from the villages of Sauroren and Ortiz.

Jul. 30.

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July.

General Cole, with the fourth division, then moved on to attack the front of the position, and the enemy, after trifling resistance, gave way on his approach. By these operations, the French were compelled to abandon a position which Lord Wellington declared to have been "one of the strongest and most difficult of access he had ever seen occupied by troops."

In the meanwhile, Sir Rowland Hill having occupied the post of La Zarza, which exceedingly cramped and impeded their movements, the right wing, under Drouet, was strongly reinforced, in order to dislodge him. About ten o'clock, the enemy filed about twenty thousand men to their right, to turn the left flank of the position. In consequence, Sir Rowland Hill moved General Pringle's brigade to the summit of the hill on the left of the road leading to La Zarza, which, as the enemy extended his right, was directed to make a corresponding movement on the ridge. General Walker's brigade was likewise moved to the left; and the heights on the right^e of the road were occupied by Portuguese.

While the left of the position was thus threatened, powerful and repeated attacks were made

on its front, which uniformly encountered re-
pulse. The ninety-second and thirty-fourth re-
giments, in particular, charged with the bayonet,
and drove back the enemy with great slaughter.
At length, Sir Rowland Hill observing that the
enemy had already encircled his left, withdrew
his troops to a strong and rugged ridge, about a
mile in rear, where he maintained his ground
in spite of every effort to dislodge him.

CHAP. XIII

1813.

July.

On the morning of the thirty-first, the French
were discovered to be in full retreat ; the column
of Reille by the road to St. Jean Pied de Port,
and that of Clausel by Echalar and Sarre, and
that of Drouet by Maya. The allied army in-
stantly moved forward in pursuit. About eleven
o'clock, a strong rear corps was found posted in
the pass of Douña Maria, from which Lord Wel-
lington dislodged them, by moving the second
and seventh divisions on their flanks. A smart
engagement, however, took place, in which the
brigade of General Barnes, of the seventh divi-
sion, particularly distinguished itself. The pur-
suit was vigorously continued, many prisoners
were made, and a large convoy with baggage
was taken in the town of Elizonda.

Jul. 31.

Thus terminated these great conflicts. By a

CHAP. XIII skilful concentration of his strength, Soult had
1813. actually succeeded in penetrating to within a league of Pampluna ; yet, after one of the most desperate struggles in which troops ever were engaged, he had been compelled to return, leaving this important fortress to its fate. On the twenty-eighth, the garrison made a spirited sortie, and succeeded in gaining several batteries ; but they were at length driven back by the Spanish division of Don Carlos d'Espana. The loss of the French army in these operations exceeded eight thousand men. That of the allies amounted to about six thousand.

By the retreat of the enemy, the allied army again became masters of the passes through the mountains. On the first of August, the different divisions were established nearly in the same positions which they had occupied previous to the attack of the twenty-fifth ; and, in order to provide against future attack, these were strengthened by the construction of redoubts and entrenchments.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAPTURE OF ST. SEBASTIAN—SOULT DEFEATED
AT ST. MARCIAI..

THE town of St. Sebastian stands on a pen-
insula, formed by an inlet of the sea on its
southern, and by the river Urumea on its
northern side. The only approach is by a low,
sandy, isthmus, which is crossed by a regular
line of works, having a large hornwork in front.
The water faces consist of a single high wall,
with no flank defences but a few small towers.
About six or seven hundred yards distant is a
range of sand-hills, on the left of the Urumea,
which flank the land defences of the town;
and in front of these the Urumea is fordable on
the efflux of the tide. Near the neck of the isthmus
is a range of heights, on which stands the
Convent of St. Bartholemeo, about eight or nine

CHAP. XIV.

1813.

CHAP. XIV. hundred yards distant from the body of the

1813. place, which the enemy had put into a state of
July. defence.

Behind the town, at the extremity of the peninsula, is the castle. It stands on the summit of a high oval shaped hill, the sides of which are scarp'd and precipitous, and by a projection to the south, forming, by the aid of moles, a harbour for small craft.

The side selected for attack was that towards the Urumea; and as a preliminary operation, it was judged necessary to gain possession of the Convent St. Bartholemeo, against which two small batteries were constructed on the night of the thirteenth of July. At the sametime, working parties were employed on the sand-hills on the north of the river, in erecting batteries to open on the body of the place, as soon as the Convent should have fallen.

Jul. 14. The batteries having opened fire on the fourteenth, a false attack was directed on the day following, in order to ascertain whether the enemy's intention was to defend the place to extremity. This attack, however, by the ardour of the troops, was converted into a real one, and encountered a severe repulse.

On the seventeenth, one end of the Convent CHAP. XIV.
 being in ruins, the assault was again given, and
 it was carried without difficulty, by the ninth 1813.
 regiment, and a brigade of Portuguese. July.

The way being thus cleared, operations were
 pushed forward against the town. Batteries
 were erected on the sand-hills, both for breaching
 the river face, and for enfilading the front de-
 fences. On the nineteenth, approaches were Jul. 19.
 commenced on the isthmus, both on the right
 and left of the village of St. Martin, which the
 enemy had burned. On the twentieth, all the
 batteries on both sides of the river opened fire
 on the town.

On the twenty-first, Sir Thomas Graham sent Jul. 21.
 a summons to the governor, who refused to ad-
 mit the bearer into the town. In cutting the
 parallel across the isthmus, a sort of tunnel or
 sewer was discovered about four feet in height,
 which on examination proved to lead into the
 ditch opposite to the face of the right demi-bas-
 tion of the hornwork, where it was closed by a
 door. In this drain it was thought advisable to
 plant a mine, and a quantity of earth was depo-
 sited at its further extremity, in the hope that

CHAP. XIV. the explosion might fill up the ditch, and form a
bridge for the assailants.

1813.

July.

On the twenty-third, the breach being reported practicable, the fire of the batteries was directed to form a second breach on the left. Towards evening, a second smaller breach was considered practicable, and preparations were made for storming them on the following morning, when the tide should prove favourable. At daybreak the troops were under arms, but owing to a furious conflagration among the houses behind the breach, which bore the appearance of design, it was judged advisable to countermand the order for assault.

Jul. 25.

At daybreak on the morning of the twenty-fifth, the troops being in readiness, the explosion of the mine gave the signal of advance. The storming party, consisting of about two thousand men, with the advance, led by Lieutenant Campbell of the ninth, then pushed forward towards the larger breach; and the confusion caused in the town by the unexpected explosion, enabled them to reach it with little loss. The garrison, however, soon recovered from their alarm, and the assailants, in ascending the breach, were re-

ceived with a fire so destructive, both in front CHAP. XIV. and flank, that after a gallant effort, they were driven back in confusion, with tremendous slaughter.

1813.
July.

A few hours after the repulse of this attack, the garrison, animated by their success, made a sortie, and entering the parallel by the left, succeeded in making prisoners of all the troops in the trenches, who sought refuge in some ruined houses in rear of the right of the parallel. These were exclusively Portuguese. The enemy then retired, carrying with him about two hundred prisoners into the town.

It was at this period that Soult advanced with the intention of driving back the allied army and relieving Pampluna. In consequence, Sir Thomas Graham embarked his guns at Passages, and till the issue of the operations in the Pyrenees became known, contented himself with keeping St. Sebastian in a state of rigorous blockade.

The retreat of Soult, however, was no sooner known than Sir Thomas Graham made preparations for the renewal of the siege. On the sixth of August the artillery was relanded, Aug. 6. and on the eighteenth a fresh battering train, and a plentiful supply of stores, arrived from

CHAP. XIV. England. It was determined to renew the former attacks, both from the north of the Urumea and from the isthmus, with increased power of artillery; and new batteries were accordingly erected.

1813.
August.

At midnight on the twenty-sixth, the garrison made a sortie on the advanced trenches, and succeeded in reaching the parallel. There, however, their progress was arrested by the guard in the trenches, and they were forced to retire into the town, carrying with them a few prisoners.

Aug. 28. The batteries opened fire on the morning of the twenty-eighth, against the towers which flanked the curtain on the eastern face, against the demi-bastion on the south eastern angle, and the termination of the curtain of the southern face. The fire continued throughout the whole day without intermission. During the night a party of two hundred men were landed from the fleet, under Sir George Collier, on the rocky island of Sta. Clara, and the small detachment posted for its defence were made prisoners. On the night following the garrison made another sortie, which, profiting by their former dear-bought ex-

Aug. 29.

perience, the besiegers succeeded in repulsing CHAP. XIV.
without loss.

During the following days the fire from the batteries was continued, and three mines were sprung on the morning of the thirty-first, which destroyed a large portion of the curtain. The column of attack was then formed. It consisted of Major-General Robinson's brigade, preceded by a storming party consisting of seven hundred and fifty volunteers from the different divisions of the army.*

As the column filed out of the trenches, it became exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape-shot; and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the hornwork in the front line of works, which blew down the counterscarp, under which the troops were advancing, but did not check their progress towards the breach. "Nothing," says Sir Thomas Graham, "could be more fallacious than the external appearance of the breach.

1813.

August.

Aug. 31.

* The storming party consisted of one hundred and fifty men of the light division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hunt of the fifty-second regiment; two hundred of the brigade of guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke; two hundred of the German legion, under Major Robertson, and two hundred of the fourth division, under Major Rose of the twentieth foot.

● CHAP. XIV. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but

1813.

August.

one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain formed a perpendicular scarp of at least twenty feet to the level of the streets, so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front, was the only accessible point. During the suspension of the operations of the siege, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by entrenchments and traverses in the hornwork, on the ramparts of the curtain and inside of the town opposite to the breach, ready to form a most destructive fire of musquetry on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain."

Every thing that the most determined courage could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, as they were brought forward in succession from the trenches. "No man," says Sir Thomas Graham, "outlived the attempt to gain the ridge," and it was found impossible, notwithstanding every exertion of the engineers and working parties, to effect a lodgment for

the troops, exposed to the shells and grape of the batteries of the castle. CHAP. XIV.

It was under such desperate circumstances that Sir Thomas Graham adopted the bold resolution of ordering the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire was then opened over the heads of the troops on the breach, which produced great effect ; and two hours were thus employed, during which the troops, though partially covered from the fire of the place, suffered very severely. In the interval a battalion of the thirteenth Portuguese regiment, led by Major Snodgrass, with great gallantry forded the Uru-mea near its mouth, and succeeded in carrying the small breach on the river face.

1813.
August.

It was then determined to renew the attack. The troops were ordered once more to ascend the breach, and to gain the high ridge at all hazards ; and an attack was also ordered on the hornwork. Fortunately an explosion of some combustibles took place on the rampart of the curtain, and created considerable confusion at the moment when the assault commenced. The narrow pass was gained ; and a detachment, which occupied the right of the breach, having succeeded

CHAP. XIV. in forcing the barricades on the top of the line-wall, effected an entrance into the houses which joined it. The assailants then formed a lodgment on the summit of the breach, and the troops impetuously pushing forward, the enemy were driven from all their defences into the castle, with the loss of nearly seven hundred prisoners.

1813.

August.

The loss of the army in this attack was very severe, upwards of two thousand men and officers being killed or disabled. Among the latter were Generals Leith, Oswald, and Robinson ; among the former Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher, commanding engineer, who on all occasions had given the highest proofs of gallantry and professional talent.

The capture of St. Sebastian was followed by scenes of atrocity and outrage painful to record. The inhabitants, who were prepared to welcome the British as liberators, were treated by the drunken and infuriated soldiers with the greatest barbarity. Every house was ransacked and plundered ; and notwithstanding the utmost exertion on the part of the officers, several days elapsed before it was found practicable to restore order. The lustre of the British arms was never

more deeply tarnished, nor the laws of honour and humanity more disgracefully outraged, than on this lamentable occasion.

CHAP. XIV.

1813.

Preparations were made for the reduction of the castle, and an occasional fire of shot and shells was kept up from the batteries on the right. During the assault on the thirty-first several houses had caught fire, and the flames not being extinguished spread through the whole town, and the operations of the besiegers were thus considerably retarded. On the ninth of September, however, the whole of the ordnance, amounting to fifty-nine pieces, opened fire on the castle, with such terrific effect, that in a few hours the white flag was hoisted on the Mirador battery; and the garrison, amounting to about eighteen hundred effective men, and five hundred sick and wounded, surrendered prisoners of war.

Sep. 9.

Thus terminated the siege of St. Sebastian, after a loss of nearly four thousand men, and an expenditure of upwards of seventy thousand shot and shells, and above five hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder. •

It has often been remarked that British soldiers, who have uniformly displayed in all their contests with the enemy in the field a de-

CHAP. XIV. cided superiority, have lost that superiority in
1813. every instance in which a fortified place was to
be attacked, and either failed in their object, or
purchased success at a great and disproportion-
ate price. This cannot be attributed to any
want of talent or zeal in the Engineer officers,
who were in general men accomplished in their
profession ; and the testimony borne by Lord
Wellington to their conduct on every occasion,
is more than sufficient to exonerate them from
censure. But the subordinate branch of the de-
partment was miserably defective. There was
no corps of sappers and miners, nor any body of
men peculiarly trained to carry on the intricate
and complicated operations of a siege. The corps
of Royal Artificers consisted of handicraftsmen
of different sorts, unprepared by previous edu-
cation for the novel duties they were called on
to discharge. But the number even of these
was small, and the chief labour of the trenches
fell to be performed by the soldiers of the line,
or in other words by a promiscuous mass of
men, bred many of them to sedentary occupa-
tions, most of whom were utterly unskilled
even in the use of the implements committed to
their hands. In conducting a siege with such

clumsy and unmanageable workmen it was of course found impossible to push the approaches to the body of the place, and rash and dangerous expedients were in consequence resorted to. It was attempted, often vainly, to purchase with life, that which in other circumstances might have been gained by labour ; and the reliance of the besiegers was placed not on the resources of art, but on the courage of the troops.

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1813.

To assault a breach in the body of a place before a lodgment has been formed on the counterscarp, is evidently one of the most dangerous enterprises in which it is possible to embark. All authority is against such a mode of proceeding ; it is a great and confessed violation of the just rules of attack, and has long been abandoned by the continental armies. Yet such was the system adopted by the British army in all its sieges in Spain. Both at Badajos and St. Sebastian it signally failed ; and the journals of these sieges afford—if such were wanted—satisfactory evidence that accident alone can give to an assault, under such circumstances, a reasonable chance of success. There is no fire from the trenches to keep down that from the

CHAP.XIV. place. The assailants advance to the breach
1813. without cover of any sort, and are therefore exposed, during their whole progress, to a most destructive fire from the garrison. Order is necessarily broken in descending the counter-scarp, and cannot be restored in the ditch, under the shower of missiles poured down from the parapet. Thus the attack is made under every possible disadvantage, while the difficulty of surmounting the obstacles to the ascent of the breach contribute still further to augment the confusion. But if in addition the breach be well entrenched, and the governor has employed the precautions prescribed by every treatise on defence, by covering the approach to the breach, and preserving a powerful flank fire both direct and vertical, to play on the assailing columns, no conceivable superiority of courage over a skilful enemy can counterbalance such enormous advantages. The attack *must* fail, or at all events can only succeed by the occurrence of some of these fortuitous and unforeseen accidents, by which in war the issue of a contest must sometimes be decided.*

* Those who wish to see this subject elucidated with great clearness and sound judgment, we beg to refer to the "Journal

On the thirty-first of August, the very day CHAP. XIV.
 on which the town of St. Sebastian was carried 1813.
 by assault, Soult made another effort for its re- August.
 lief. Three divisions of Spaniards, under Gen-
 eral Freyre, occupied the left bank of the Bidas-
 soa, covering the high road from Bayonne.
 They were drawn up on the strong heights of
 St. Marcial, with their right extended in front
 of the Haya mountain, to observe the different
 fords by which the enemy might approach the
 position. On the left, they were supported by
 the first division and Lord Aylmer's brigade in
 rear of Irun, and General Longa's Spanish di-
 vision was posted in rear of their right.

On the thirtieth, it was ascertained that the Aug. 30.
 enemy were assembling a large force in the
 neighbourhood of Bera, and the brigade of Gen-

of the Sieges in Spain," by Colonel Jones. The work constitutes a record of great importance, and the author exposes the deficiencies of the particular branch of the service to which he belongs with an unsparing hand. The evils complained of, however, we are happy to state, are now in progress of amendment; and in any future siege in which a British force may be engaged, there is no reason to apprehend a repetition of such unfortunate results as those which it is our present duty to record. In the establishment under Colonel Paisley at Chatham, young officers of engineers, and the corps of sappers and miners, are not only instructed but practically exercised in all the duties of their profession.

CHAP. XIV. eral Inglis was in consequence ordered to the
 1813. bridge of Lezaca, and two brigades of the
 August. fourth division to take post on the left of the Haya
 mountain, to strengthen the right flank. A
 Portuguese brigade was likewise moved to the
 right of the mountain, to prevent the position
 being turned in that direction.

Aug. 31. On the morning of the thirty-first, the enemy
 crossed the Bidassoa in great force, by the fords
 in front of the position, and made a desperate
 attack on the Spanish left, on the heights of St.
 Marcial. The Spaniards, advantageously post-
 ed, received the attack with great firmness and
 gallantry. They charged the enemy with the
 bayonet, and drove them down the face of the
 heights, in the greatest confusion, to the river,
 in which many were drowned.

The course of the Bidassoa being immediately
 under the heights occupied by the enemy, on
 which he had thrown up several batteries, he
 was enabled to throw a bridge across the river.
 A general attack was then made on the heights
 of St. Marcial. While the French columns were
 ascending the heights, Lord Wellington appear-
 ed in front of the line. The Spanish troops ex-
 pressed their joy and confidence by loud and re-

peated acclamations; and again charging the enemy with the bayonet, put them to the route, and pursued them across the river. Nothing could be more triumphantly decisive than the success of the Spaniards, achieved without the smallest support from the British divisions posted in reserve. The French fled, panic-stricken and without order, and plunged headlong into the river at the different fords. The bridge gave way under the extraordinary pressure of the fugitives, and most of those passing at the moment were drowned. Soult, observing the extreme facility with which his most vehement attacks had been repulsed, then gave up all hope of success, and took advantage of the darkness of a violent storm to withdraw his troops.

 1813.

August.

“ The conduct of the Spanish troops,” says Lord Wellington, in his official account of the action, “ was equal to that of any troops I have ever seen engaged; and the attack having been frequently repeated, was, upon every occasion, defeated with the same gallantry and determination.”

During this ineffectual attempt to penetrate by the high road to St. Sebastian, strong columns

CHAP. XIV. of the enemy forded the Bidassoa in the neighbourhood of Bera and Salines, with the view of turning the right flank, and gaining possession of the road leading through Oyarzun. The Portuguese brigade, stationed on the right of the Haya mountains, was then attacked; and, though the brigade of General Inglis was immediately brought up to its support, it was found necessary to abandon the heights between Lezaca and the Bidassoa. General Inglis then withdrew to a strong ridge in front of the Convent of St. Antonio, where the remainder of the seventh division shortly after came up to his support.

1813.

August.

The aspect of this formidable position, and the entire failure of the attacks on the heights of St. Marcial, at length induced the enemy to re-cross the Bidassoa. The river had become so swollen with the heavy rain which had fallen during the day, that the fords were found impassable before the rear of the column had been able to cross. In order, therefore, to gain the bridge of Bera, they attacked General Skerret's brigade of the light division, both from the pass of Bera and from the left of the river. By this measure, the remainder of their force succeeded

in effecting its passage by the bridge, though
exposed to a heavy fire from the light division.

CHAP. XIV.

1813.

August.

The loss of the enemy, during these engagements, was very great, and included two Generals of division; but the moral consequences of their defeat were far more important. In presence of both armies, the French columns had been repeatedly routed by the Spanish troops, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to regard with supreme contempt. The effect of this was twofold. It gave the Spaniards that collective confidence in themselves, which a long series of disasters had contributed to impair: it tended to depress the hopes and ardour of the French soldiers, in whose minds the results of the day must have been accompanied by a mortifying sentiment of inferiority.

CHAPTER XV.

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.
EVENTS IN SPAIN.

CHAP. XV. AFTER the fall of St. Sebastian, nearly a
1813. month elapsed unmarked by any hostile movement on the part of either army. During this interval, both were employed in strengthening their respective positions, by the construction of field-works, and in preparing for the further prosecution of the campaign. The weather was cold and inclement, and the sufferings of the part of the allied army employed in guarding the passes were very great. Compelled to pass a season of extreme rigour on the stormy summits of the Pyrenees, the troops gazed down with a feeling of envy and discontent on the fertile plains and rich valleys of France, outspread before them. Being liable at any moment to attack, it was necessary that the strictest vigi-

lance should be maintained, and the duties were in consequence severe. Under these circumstances, a spirit of gloomy discontent became diffused among the soldiers, and the prospect of future glory was outweighed by present suffering. Desertions, in consequence, became numerous; and it was found necessary to check the increasing prevalence of this disgraceful crime by severe examples.

CHAP. XV.
1813.
October.

Until the fall of Pampluna it was impossible to act on the offensive on a great scale; but, in the meantime, Lord Wellington determined to push his left across the Bidassoa, and dislodge the enemy from a range of heights on the right of that river, extending from the high and steep mountain, La Rhune, to the sea. On the sixth of October, preparations were made for the approaching encounter; and at three o'clock, on the morning of the seventh, the troops were under arms.

Oct. 6.

Oct. 7.

The dispositions for attack were as follows:—On the left, the first and fifth divisions, and General Wilson's brigade of Portuguese, were directed to ford the river in four columns, near its mouth, and attack the enemy's entrenchments in the neighbourhood of Andaye.

CHAP. XV. The Spanish corps of General Freyre, in three
1813. columns, was to cross at fords higher up the ri-
October. ver, in front of Boraton, and attack the works
on the Montagne Vert, and the height of Mandalle.

The light division, under General Alten, and the Spániards, under Longa, were to dislodge the enemy from the mountain of Commissari, and the pass of Bera.

The Andalusian troops, under General Giron, were to advance against the entrenched position on the mountain of La Rhune.

Every precaution was adopted to prevent discovery by the enemy. The troops moved on to the attack in deep silence. The night had been one of cloud and storm, and the approach of morning was accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, which occasionally shed a glare upon the columns, brighter by contrast with the deep darkness by which they were preceded and followed. The storm, however, had rolled on to the French side of the river, and thus favoured, notwithstanding the noise of the artillery and pontoon train, the troops succeeded in gaining the different fords of the Bidassoa undiscovered by the enemy.

The fifth division enjoyed the honour of first CHAP. XV.
planting their feet on the French soil. Under a
brisk fire from the enemy's piquets, they continued their advance against the French line, which was hurriedly forming on the nearest range of hills. The first division came up soon after, and the enemy were driven from their works in gallant style, with the loss of six pieces of artillery. The brigade of General Hay, in particular, distinguished itself. It attacked the enemy in three successive positions, with the most perfect success.

1813.
October.

The attack of the light division on the position of Bera was peculiarly brilliant. The approach was narrow, and completely commanded by several strong redoubts on the acclivities and summits of the steep mountains above the village of Bera. But these obstacles did not retard the advance of the division. General Skerret's brigade, led by Colonel Colburne, attacked the right of the position, and drove the enemy from his entrenchments by a most gallant charge. The brigade of General Kempt attacked the pass of Bera, and carried it with little difficulty. The result of these operations was the capture

CHAP. XV. of upwards of four hundred prisoners, and of
three pieces of cannon.

1813.

October.

General Giron likewise succeeded in carrying the lower slopes of La Rhune. But the summit was still maintained by the enemy, when the approach of darkness prevented the prosecution of further measures to dislodge them. In the morning, however, the post was surrendered after a feeble resistance; and General Giron pushing forward, the enemy were forced to abandon the whole of their intrenchments.

These important successes were achieved with a loss comparatively small on the part of the allies. It amounted, altogether, to little more than fifteen hundred men. The resistance of the enemy was certainly more trifling than was anticipated, owing partly, perhaps, to the secrecy and suddenness of the attack, and partly to the circumstance that the views of Soult were chiefly directed to the concentration of his army behind a strongly-fortified line on the Nivelle.

The allied army now occupied a range of commanding situations, from which it might at any moment continue its advance into the French

territory. The surrender of Pampluna at length removed the obstacle which had hitherto tram-
melled its operations, and forced it to linger
inactive on the frontier. On the thirty-first
of October, the garrison, four thousand in num-
ber, surrendered prisoners of war, and all the
artillery and stores were given up. The only
cause of delay being thus removed, Lord Wel-
lington immediately determined to assume the
offensive, and drive the French army from its
position.

CHAP. XV.
1813.
October.

Before transferring his operations to the French territory, Lord Wellington issued a proclamation to the army, prescribing the conduct to be observed on passing the frontier. Nothing can more honourably mark the wisdom and humanity of the British Commander, than the regulations which, at such a moment, were imperatively promulgated to the troops. As an example to future ages, and a contrast to the ferocious system of intimidation adopted by the enemy in Spain, the following clauses are worthy of historical commemoration :— •

“ Officers and Soldiers must recollect, that their nations are at war with France, solely because the ruler of the French nation will not al-

CHAP. XV. low them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget, that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy, in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal, have been occasioned by the irregularities of his soldiers, and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, toward the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country. To avenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France, would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to which the Commander of the Forces now addresses himself."

1813.

October.

To enforce this order, however, was no easy task. In the British army, indeed, the system of discipline was too rigid, and the conduct prescribed too much in unison with the individual feelings of the officers, for any glaring breach of it to remain undetected or unpunished; but the Spaniards and Portuguese were filled with too powerful a remembrance of the atrocities perpetrated in the Peninsula by the French armies, not to feel desirous of retaliating on the French people the evils under which their own countries had so severely suffered. Cases of outrage, therefore, did at first occur; but the firmness of

Lord Wellington in bringing the offenders to punishment, speedily put a stop to such vindictive demonstrations, which the peaceful character of the inhabitants did nothing to provoke. During all the operations in the south of France the strictest discipline was maintained; and the forage and provisions necessary for the supply of the troops were paid for at the highest price. Thus secure from spoliation, and certain of a favourable market for their produce, the inhabitants of the country in a short time returned to their dwellings, and established a peaceful and lucrative traffic with the invading army.

On the failure of his efforts in the Pyrenees, Soult had directed the formation of a strong line of defence, about twelve miles in extent, covering the town of St. Jean de Luz, and extending from the sea across the Nivelle to the heights behind Ainhoë. The whole front of this position was strongly fortified; and the right, in particular, was covered by several formidable redoubts, and by an interior line of very considerable strength. In the centre, the line extended along the left of the Nivelle, which, at that part, forms a considerable inflexion in rear of the mountain Petite La

CHAP. XV.

1813.
October.

CHAP. XV. Rhune, along a range of heights, covered on the
 1813. left by the Sarre. The line then crossed the
 November. Nivelles, and extended along a strong ridge in
 rear of Ainhoe, covered by a series of redoubts.

In addition to the reinforcements drawn from the general conscription throughout France, a decree had been issued, by which a force of thirty thousand conscripts was ordered to be levied in the provinces bordering on the Pyrenees; and the French army was thus daily receiving fresh accessions to its numbers. Unfortunately, the extreme inclemency of the weather, and the miserable condition of the roads, rendered nearly impassable by the heavy rains, contributed very considerably to retard the operations of Lord Wellington. This delay was most valuable to Marshal Soult, who thus gained time to discipline his new levies, and these military neophytes, being mingled in the ranks with the veterans of Spain, in a short time became instructed in their military duties.

Nov. 10. At length, on the tenth of November, the meditated attack took place. Soon after midnight, the troops having fallen under arms without the signal of trumpet or drum, began to descend the

Pyrenean mountains by moonlight, by the differ-
 ent passes, and advanced to the verge of the line
 of out-piquets, preparatory to the attack at day-
 dawn. This grand movement was made in the
 most profound silence. As the columns moved
 onward, the stillness was felt by all to be im-
 pressive. The village clocks striking the hours
 amid the darkness increased the general anxiety
 for break of day ; and the first streaks of light
 which dappled the east were watched by many
 thousand eyes with strong and almost feverish
 impatience. On reaching their stations the troops
 were ordered to lie extended on the ground, and
 the columns were so posted that the intervening
 ground concealed them from the enemy.

It was the object of Lord Wellington, in the
 approaching attack, to occupy the attention of
 the enemy by false attacks on his right wing,
 where the position was too strong to be serious-
 ly assailed, while his chief efforts should be di-
 rected to penetrating the centre, and thus to se-
 parate the wings of the French army. This
 object attained, it was even possible, that by
 establishing his troops in rear of the enemy's
 right wing, its retreat on Bayonne might be cut
 off.

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CHAP. XV. The left wing of the army was commanded
1813. by Sir John Hope, who, on crossing the Bidas-
November. soa, had succeeded Sir Thomas Graham as second in command.* It consisted of the first division, under Major-General Howard; the fifth division, under Major-General Hay; Lord Aylmer's independent brigade; and the Portuguese brigades of Generals Wilson and Bradford.

The centre was divided into two columns; the left of which consisted of the light division, under Charles Baron Alten, supported by Longa's corps of Spaniards. The right column of the centre was commanded by Marshal Beresford. It was composed of the third division, under the Honourable Sir Charles Colville, in the absence of General Picton; of the fourth division, under the Honourable Sir Lowry Cole; of the seventh division, under Mariscal del Campo de Cor, in the absence of Lord Dalhousie.

General Giron, with the Spanish army of reserve, was posted between the two columns of the centre, which were supported by a brigade of cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton.

* Sir Thomas Graham had been recalled, to assume the command of an expedition sent from England to assist in the liberation of Holland.

The right wing, under Sir Rowland Hill, consisted of the second division, under the Honourable Sir William Stewart; the sixth division, under Sir Henry Clinton; the Portuguese division of Sir John Hamilton; and the Spanish division of Morillo.

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The attack began at daylight by a brisk cannonade, and a skirmish of the piquets along the whole line. The fourth division then advanced to attack a strong redoubt of the enemy in front of the village of Sarre, and carried it with little opposition. Sarre was then abandoned by the enemy without any attempt at resistance. At the same time, the light division, advancing with the greatest impetuosity, forced the lines on Petite La Rhone, and, having driven the enemy from the different redoubts, formed on the summit of the hill.

These preliminary attacks having proved successful, the centre columns continued their advance against the heights, in rear of Sarre, under a heavy fire from the various lines of retrenchment by which this point of the position had been secured. On the approach of the columns, however, these were successively aban-

CHAP. XV. done, with scarcely an effort at defence, and
1813. the enemy fled in great disorder towards the
November. bridges on the Nivelle. The garrison of one redoubt alone attempted to repulse the assailants. While the light division were escalading the work, the column of Marshal Beresford succeeded in intercepting the retreat of the garrison, and an entire French battalion, nearly six hundred strong, was in consequence made prisoners.

In the meanwhile, Sir Rowland Hill made a powerful attack on the heights of Ainhoe. The troops moved on in echelons of divisions; and the sixth division, supported by that of Sir John Hamilton, having first crossed the Nivelle, came in contact with the enemy's right, posted behind the village, and at once carried the whole of his defences on that flank. The second division was equally successful in its attack on a redoubt on a parallel ridge in the rear; and both divisions then advanced to Espellate, when the enemy, afraid of being intercepted, abandoned their advanced line in front of Ainhoe, and retreated in some confusion towards Cambo.

During these operations, a detachment of fifteen hundred Spaniards of Mina's division moved along the heights of Maya, and attacked the ad-

vanced post of the enemy in that direction. CHAP. XV.

Their onset was vigorous, and the French were
 at first forced to retire ; but, being reinforced, 1813.
 they again returned to the assault, and beat the November.
 Spaniards back nearly to the village of Maya.

The heights on both sides of the Nivelle being thus carried, the third and seventh divisions were directed to move by the left, and the sixth division by the right of the river, against a ridge of fortified heights near St. Pe, where the enemy was observed to be collecting in considerable force. These divisions came up, and, after a smart engagement with the enemy, drove them in confusion from the position. By this success the troops of the centre were established in rear of the enemy's right, which still remained in their works. But the extreme extent of the line of movement, and the great difficulty of part of the ground to be crossed, joined to the approach of night, prevented Lord Wellington from pushing farther the advantages he had acquired. Marshal Soult took advantage of the darkness to retire the force from his right, and resigned his whole line to the victorious army.

The result of these splendid operations was

CHAP. XV. the capture of fifty guns, fifteen hundred prisoners, and a considerable quantity of stores and ammunition. The loss of the victors little exceeded five hundred killed and two thousand wounded,—an amount of casualties almost incredibly small, when the strength of the position occupied by the enemy, and the amount of the forces engaged, are taken into calculation. The truth is, that the enemy, in defending his works on the Nivelle, did not display that courage and resolution, by which, aided by the talent of their leaders, the French army had earned trophies in every quarter of Europe. They were dispirited and disheartened by a continued series of defeats, and no longer met their opponents in the field with that confident anticipation of victory, which, like other prophetic aspirations, frequently contribute to their own fulfilment. Had it been otherwise, the loss of the allied army must have been very severe.

Though the whole of the allied army conducted itself in a manner impossible to be surpassed, no small portion of the success must be attributed to the artillery under Colonel Dickson. By the indefatigable exertions of that officer, artillery was brought to bear on the enemy's

works from situations which appeared utterly inaccessible to that arm. Mountain guns, harnessed on mules trained for the service, ascended the most difficult ridges, and showered down destruction on the entrenchments below. Even in the situations where the enemy considered themselves most secure, they found they had miscalculated, and suffered very severely from the action of the British guns.

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The achievements of the tenth of November were followed by an interval of repose. The allied army went into cantonments between the Nivelle and the sea, while Marshal Soult withdrew his army within an entrenched camp in front of Bayonne. The shortness of the space which divided the armies, induced Lord Wellington to adopt the precautionary measure of establishing a defensive line of outposts, to protect the divisions from sudden attack. It extended from the sea along the front of the allied position to Cambo on the right.

During the whole of November the weather continued inclement; and the heavy and almost incessant rains, induced Lord Wellington to continue his troops in their cantonments. The

CHAP. XV. enemy, in the meanwhile, guarded the right
1813. bank of the Nive, and communicated, by strong
December. patrols of cavalry, with a division, under
General Paris, stationed at St. Jean Pied de
Port. Thus the allies occupied only the con-
fined space between the sea and the Nive, and
were cut off from the whole country beyond
that river, which afforded large supplies to the
enemy. Lord Wellington, therefore, determined
to cross the Nive, and drive back the advanced
posts of the enemy, from the strong ground they
occupied between the Nive and the Adour.

Dec. 9. The ninth of December was the day fixed
for the execution of these intentions. At ten
o'clock on the evening of the eighth, the
pontoon train passed through Arauntz as quiet-
ly as possible, and the troops were ordered
to be under arms three hours before daylight.
The left wing, under Sir John Hope, was di-
rected to advance by the great road leading
from St. Jean de Luz, and reconnoitre the ene-
my's entrenched camp near Bayonne. Sir Row-
land Hill was to cross the Nive at Cambo, and
the sixth division, under Sir Henry Clinton, at
Ustaritz.

Accordingly, at day-dawn, Sir John Hope commenced his advance, and the enemy on his approach retreated, covered by his light troops, which skirmished with the advance of the allies. By one o'clock, the left wing had gained the heights on the right of the Bayonne road, and the enemy were driven into their intrenched camp. .

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Sir Rowland Hill with his corps passed the river by a deep ford above Cambo, and flanking the enemy's left at Urcuray, without resistance gained possession of the great road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Bayonne. The sixth division having crossed at Ustaritz, attacked a position to which the enemy had retired at Ville Franque, and speedily dislodged them. Darkness then came on, of which the enemy took advantage to withdraw all his posts within the lines of Bayonne; and Sir John Hope, with the left wing, returned to his former cantonments. On the morning of the tenth, Sir Rowland Hill established his corps with its right resting on the Adour, its left on the heights above the village of Ville Franque, and the centre in front of Vieux Monguerre, covering

Dec. 10.

CHAP. XV. the road to St. Jean Pied de Port. The sixth

1813.

December.

division re-crossed to the left of the Nive.

Bayonne is situated at the point of confluence of the Nive and the Adour. The former which, during the greater part of its course, is a rapid mountain stream of little consequence, becomes unfordable for several miles above the city. The latter is a river of greater magnitude, and descending from the centre of the Pyrenees, in a course of fifty leagues, waters and enriches the plains of Gascony, and at Bayonne falls into the sea. The town is strongly fortified on three sides, and on the fourth is covered by the Adour, which divides it from the city or suburb of St. Esprit. The citadel or castle likewise stands on the right of the Adour, across which there is a bridge, and commands the whole city and the anchorage. It is the work of the celebrated Vauban, and of very considerable strength. In addition to the defences of the town, the enemy had formed an intrenched camp on the left of the Adour, covered in front by an impenetrable morass, and sufficiently spacious to contain an army.

There were only two roads practicable for artillery, by which Bayonne could be approach-

ed from the south—the one leading from St. Jean de Luz, the other from St. Jean Pied de Port. All the other approaches were of the most miserable description, and, in the depth of winter, wholly impassable for carriages of any sort.

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While the armies were thus posted, Soult could direct an attack at pleasure on any portion of his adversary's line, the communications along which were of the worst and most difficult description. He likewise enjoyed this advantage, that, even if defeated, he had a secure retreat opened to him within the lines of Bayonne. Accordingly, on the morning of the tenth, Soult assumed the offensive, and directed a powerful attack on the left of the allied army covering St. Jean de Luz, the great *entrepot* for the supply of the allied army.

At daybreak, he moved out of Bayonne with the main body of his army, and advanced by the wood of St. Jean de Luz, to attack the left wing, under Sir John Hope. The road was defended by the fifth division, under Major-General Hay, stationed on the strong plateau of Barouillet, having the Portuguese brigade of General Campbell in its front. The light division was posted at Ar-

Dec. 10.

CHAP. XV. canques, about two miles on the right, between

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December.

which and Barouillet there was a broad valley, which had not been occupied, in the belief that the enemy would not venture to advance in this direction, with posts of such strength on either flank.

A column of the enemy first came in contact with General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, which retired for support on the fifth division on the plateau of Barouillet. Another column attacked the light division, and drove their outposts within the village of Arcanques, which had been strongly intrenched. A strong body, however, pushed forward some distance beyond the left flank of the light division, and directed a powerful attack on the right of the fifth division, with the evident object of penetrating between the two allied corps, in the direction of Arbonne.

The fifth division, attacked in great force in front and flank, maintained its ground with the utmost gallantry, but its loss was very severe, and Major-General Robinson was wounded. In front of Barouillet, there is a thick coppice wood, and on the right there is a large field and an orchard. Through these the enemy

came on in great strength, and having driven in General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and the brigade of General Robinson, which had been sent forward to support it, at length succeeded in penetrating beyond the front of the position. At this moment, a Portuguese battalion, on the left flank, moved forward by the road, and wheeling into the rear of the wood, charged back on the French columns. The ninth regiment, on the right, made a similar movement; and the enemy, thus unexpectedly attacked in rear, was compelled to retreat, with a heavy loss in killed and prisoners.

The enemy, however, notwithstanding this check, renewed their attacks, and again attempted to dislodge the fifth division from their ground. But the brigade of Guards coming up to their support, the French columns were uniformly repulsed, till the approach of night put a close to the combat.

In the meantime, the attacks on the light division at Arcanques had been scarcely less animated and persevering than those on the left. Repeated efforts were made by the enemy to drive the light division from their defences, which were always repulsed with great loss :

CHAP. XV.
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CHAP. XV. but, at the close of the day, the French troops
 1813. retained possession of the plateau of Bassussary,
 December. in the immediate front of Arcanques.

During the night, Soult retired the bulk of his force from its position in front of Sir John Hope, with the intention of attacking the light division in overwhelming numbers. At day-
 Dec. 11. break on the following morning, the enemy's piquets were driven in by the fifth division, and the sentries were again pushed forward to their former stations. Sir John Hope, suspecting the enemy's intention, moved part of his corps to their right to support the light division. This occasioned a change in the plans of Marshal Soult, who, conceiving that the force at Barouillet had thus been materially weakened, again directed several columns against that point.

The morning had passed quietly, the troops on the left had received their rations, and parties had been sent out to cut wood, when the alarm was given that the enemy were approaching. The cry of "To arms!" was instantly echoed by a thousand voices, and the fatigue-parties ran hastily back to assume their stations in the ranks. On observing this, loud cheers were heard from the enemy, and with shouts of "*en*

avant ! en avant !" their columns advanced to the attack. CHAP XV.

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In a few moments, however, the left wing was under arms, and formed to receive them. The efforts of the enemy were less vigorous than on the preceding day; and they were again repulsed with considerable loss. At the close of the day, both armies remained in the same positions which they had occupied on the preceding night.

On the morning of the twelfth, the French was still observed to be in great force in front of the left wing, and his movements gave indication of an intention to renew the attack in that quarter. In the afternoon, the enemy pushed forward a body of tirailleurs, and some severe skirmishing took place with the piquets, but no attempt was made to advance in force, and night again closed without any change having taken place in the positions of the hostile armies.

Dec. 12.

Marshal Soult had now resigned all hope of penetrating the left of the allied army, but conceiving that the pertinacity of his attacks on that part of the line must have induced Lord Wellington to withdraw a considerable portion of his troops from the right, he determined on an entire change in his plan of attack. During the night

CHAP. XV. of the twelfth, therefore, availing himself of the
1813. facilities afforded by his position, he withdrew
December. his whole force through Bayonne, with the intention of attacking the right of the army under Sir Rowland Hill.

But Soult was again deceived in his calculations. The probability of such a manœuvre on the part of the enemy had occurred to Lord Wellington, and measures had been taken to prevent its success. Orders were given to the fourth and sixth divisions to move to the support of the right, and the third division was held in readiness to cross the Nive, and afford still further support if required.

The force, under the immediate command of Sir Rowland Hill, consisted of about thirteen thousand men. It was distributed as follows :— On the left of his position a range of heights extends from the village of Ville Franque along the Nive, towards Bayonne. It is bounded by the river on one side, and by a deep valley, in the bottom of which are several large mill-dams, on the other. On this ridge was stationed General Pringle's brigade of the second division.

On the right, in front of the village Vieux Monguerre, there is also a long ridge of high

ground, which is bounded on the right by the CHAP. XV.
 Adour, and on the left by several mill-dams. On 1813.
 this was stationed the brigade of General Byng. December.

The centre extended along a ridge of heights opposite to the village of St. Pierre D'Irube, and in front of the heights of Petit Monguerre. It consisted of General Barnes's brigade, and the Portuguese brigade of General Ashworth. Two Portuguese brigades were posted in rear of Ville Franque, and formed a reserve.

At daylight on the morning of the thirteenth, Dec. 13.
 Soult issued from his intrenched camp with a force of thirty thousand men, and directed the march of his columns against the centre of Sir Rowland Hill. This general was no sooner aware of the enemy's intention, than he moved the brigade of General Byng, with the exception of one battalion, to support the right of the centre; and a Portuguese brigade was brought up from Ville Franque to strengthen it on the left. As the enemy's columns advanced up the long acclivities in front of the centre, they were subjected to a most destructive fire of artillery, and the havoc in their ranks was very great. The French, however, continued their advance, driving in the

CHAP. XV. piquets and the light troops which had been sent
1813. forward to their support. The engagement then
December. became very warm. The enemy, in spite of the
most determined resistance, succeeded, by superiority of numbers, in gaining possession of a height close to the position, and was continuing to gain ground when the brigades ordered to the support of the centre came up. The battle was then waged on more equal terms, and after a long and strenuous contest, the enemy were driven back. The whole of the regiments in General Barnes's brigade distinguished themselves by repeated charges on the enemy, and the conduct of the Portuguese troops was also marked by the greatest gallantry and firmness.

The attack on General Pringle on the left was apparently intended to be merely auxiliary to the chief effort in the centre. During its continuance the enemy kept up a warm fire from his *tirailleurs*, but did not venture any earnest and decided attack on the position. The guns, however, being advantageously posted, did considerable execution.

In the meanwhile the enemy pushed forward a column on the right, in order to turn the flank of the position, to the village of Vieux

Monguerre. The Buffs, and some companies of light troops, which remained on that flank when the remainder of General Byng's brigade had been withdrawn, were at first forced to retire to some heights in rear of the village. Being ordered, however, by Sir Rowland Hill to recover the post, they attacked the enemy in the village, and drove him from it, with the loss of some prisoners.

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Thus had the utmost efforts of Marshal Soult been defeated by the corps of Sir Rowland Hill, without any assistance from the divisions which Lord Wellington had directed to move to his support. Nothing could exceed the skill and coolness which Sir Rowland Hill displayed in this unequal contest, or the precision with which every movement was executed by the troops. He was ably seconded by the Honourable Sir William Stewart, whose gallantry, promptitude, and judgment, were conspicuous throughout the day.

Soult drew off his troops and retired to some strong ground in front of the intrenched camp, where he remained in great force. In order to dislodge them, General Byng's brigade was directed to gain possession of a height on their

CHAP. XV. left. This was done. General Byng led on the
1813. troops to the attack, and ascending the hill un-
December. der a heavy fire of musquetry and artillery, the
enemy were driven down in some confusion,
with the loss of two guns. An effort made to
regain this post encountered a severe repulse,
and the Portuguese brigade of General Buchan
coming up, the enemy did not venture to renew
the attack.

The result of the operations from the ninth to the thirteenth of December, during which the troops were exposed to the weather, at the most inclement season of the year, was honourable, in the highest degree, to the allied army. Though Soult, from his situation, possessed the advantage of being able to bear with his whole force on any point of an extended and vulnerable line, in none of his attacks, made in vast superiority of numbers, did he succeed in gaining any advantage. He could not, by all his efforts, recover a single yard of ground, from that adversary whom he had declared himself prepared to drive triumphantly beyond the Ebro. He had repeatedly attacked with an army, and been repulsed by a division.

The loss of the allied army, during these con-

tests, was very severe. It amounted altogether CHAP. XV.
to nearly five thousand men. That of the enemy, 1813.
as given by the returns of the different corps, December.
was about six thousand. On the eleventh, two
battalions of Nassau troops, having received in-
telligence of the liberation of their country, de-
serted from the enemy, in hope of being thus
enabled to join their restored sovereign.

The fierce and stormy contest which for five
days had raged between the armies, was follow-
ed by a calm of some duration. The extreme
rigour of the season induced Lord Wellington
to keep his troops in cantonments, and in this
quarter no military events of any consequence
took place before the close of the year.

The truth is, the proud and palmy days of the
French army were gone. They were now be-
come as familiar with defeat as they had formerly
been with victory. The confidence of the troops
had been broken by a continued series of disas-
ters. Many of the veterans of Spain had been
withdrawn, and the ranks were filled up with
raw conscripts, forced into the service at a mo-
ment when the French standard was sullied by
defeat in every quarter of Europe. The ap-
prentice was taken from his master, the student

CHAP. XV. from his college ; and they came, not voluntarily
 1813. and animated by the high aspirings of youthful
 December. ardour, but chained together like felons, the enforced defenders of their invaded country, and the supporters of that tyranny under which they suffered.

It was with such unhopeful materials that Soult had to oppose the march of a victorious army, superior in numbers, in discipline, in confidence, and in powers of physical endurance. The difficulties of his situation were great and manifold, and the bold and skilful manner in which he struggled with these, neglecting no effort, and allowing no advantage to escape, retarding the progress of his enemy where he could not prevent it, and yielding no tenable position without a struggle, unquestionably mark him as a general of the highest order.

We must now turn for a moment to Catalonia. The necessities of the Emperor occasioned large drafts to be made from the French army in the east of Spain. All thought of conquest in that quarter had been resigned ; and Napoleon, in the hope of being able to render the army of Suchet available for his necessities,
 Dec. 11. and to excite division among the allies, con-

cluded a secret treaty with Ferdinand, at Valen-
 çay, the object of which was to detach Spain
 from the coalition. By this treaty it was stipu-
 lated that the Spanish territory should be evacu-
 ated by the troops both of England and France,
 and that all who had taken office under Joseph,
 should be secured in all their titles, offices, and
 estates. The Duke de San Carlos was imme-
 diately despatched to Madrid with a copy of
 this document, bearing a letter from the King,
 in which the members of the existing govern-
 ment were directed instantly to ratify it in the
 customary forms.

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Dec. 18.

But the concessions of Napoleon were too
 evidently wrung from him by the pressure of
 circumstances, to have any influence on the go-
 vernment of Madrid. They were unwilling to
 desist from hostilities, on the mere faith of a
 treaty without guarantee of any kind; and the
 situation of Ferdinand, as a prisoner, was such
 as to deprive his assent of all valid power in
 binding the nation. The reply of the Regency,
 therefore, conveyed expressions of joy at the
 approaching liberation of the country, and the
 restoration of its royal line; but was accom-
 panied by a copy of the decree of the Cortes,

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 Jan. 6.

CHAP. XV. passed some years before, declaring that no public act of the King, while in a state of durance, could be recognised by the existing government of Spain.

1813.

December.

The arrival of the Duke of San Carlos at Madrid was followed by that of the celebrated Palafox, bearing another letter from Ferdinand, urging, in stronger terms, the immediate ratification of the treaty. But the Regency were immovable, and the Cardinal de Bourbon, in reply, informed his Majesty that an ambassador had been sent, in his name, to a congress of the belligerent powers, to treat for peace on an enlarged and secure basis.

In the meanwhile, Suchet was chiefly occupied in escorting convoys of provisions to Barcelona. And satisfied with retaining possession of the fortified places, he remained, prepared to shape his course as the current of events might direct.

With such events in the south of France and in Spain did the year close. It had witnessed the total and final discomfiture of one of the most profligate invasions in which cold and profligate ambition ever ventured to embark, and presented an example of vicissitude in human affairs, more extraordinary in its circumstances,

and memorable in its results, than any of which CHAP. XV.
the pages of history bear record. Napoleon, for 1813.
the first time, had been made to feel the full effects of his ambition, and of conquests extended too far to be either successfully maintained or honourably resigned. On every side his armies, hitherto so formidable, had encountered defeat. The monarchs whom he had humbled in the zenith of his prosperity, now declared against him; and after experiencing a succession of reverses, scarcely less decisive than those of the preceding campaign, he was driven across the Rhine, with the scanty and miserable relics of a vast army.

Under these circumstances it was that Napoleon returned to Paris; and, announcing to his Nov. 9.
Council of State the desperate situation of the country, demanded new sacrifices. He addressed them in a strain of turbid and disconnected eloquence, which spoke the distraction of his own feelings, and could not be heard unmoved by men elevated by the remembrance of past grandeur, and influenced by the immediate terrors of hostile invasion.

“Wellington,” he said, “is in the south; the Russians threaten the northern frontier; Aus-

CHAP. XV. tria, the south-eastern; yet, shame to speak it!

1813.

the nation has not risen in mass to repel them.—
Every ally has abandoned me—the Bavarians have betrayed me!—Peace? No peace, till Munich is in flames!—I demand of you three hundred thousand men. I will form a camp at Bourdeaux of a hundred thousand—another at Lyons—a third at Metz. With the remnants of my former levies, I shall have a million of men under arms. But it is *men* whom I demand of you—full-grown men, in the prime of life; not these miserable conscript striplings, who choke my hospitals with sick, and my highways with their carcasses.—Give up Holland? rather resign it to the sea!—The word *peace* is ever in my ear, when all around should re-echo with the cry of *war*!”

It was in such language that Napoleon gave expression to the wild tumult by which his spirit was convulsed. Reckless alike of human blood or human misery in following the frantic schemes of his ambition, he demanded fresh victims; and his cry, like that of the sisters of the Horseleech, was “Give, give!” The Senate, awed and intimidated, acceded to his demands. They at once passed decrees, ordaining a levy of

three hundred thousand men, and doubling the public contributions. But the execution of such edicts was becoming daily more difficult, in a country already drained of its male population, and of its wealth ; and they were probably passed, rather with the view of supporting Napoleon in the negotiations then pending with the Allied Powers, than with any expectation that so vast an augmentation of men and revenue could be furnished by the nation.

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In the meanwhile, though little obstacle intervened to the immediate invasion of France, the allies paused for a time in their career of success, and issued a public declaration, that their views were limited to the establishment of peace on equal and honourable terms, to which the ambition of Napoleon opposed the only obstacle. By this measure the hold which he possessed on public opinion was weakened ; and the French nation, exhausted by the exertions of the baneful struggle, relinquishing all hope of conquest, thought only on peace.

Hitherto, however, Wellington alone had invaded the French territory, and he it was who first broke the charm of imaginary sanctity with which the long absence of foreign aggression had invested it in the minds of the people.

CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLES OF ORTHEZ AND TOULOUSE.
CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

CHAP. XVI. AT the commencement of 1814, the allied

1814.
January. army occupied a line extending from Bidart on the left to Arcanques and Ville Franque, with the right thrown back *en potence* to Urcuray, on the road to St. Jean Pied de Port. The head-quarters of Lord Wellington were at St. Jean de Luz. In order to guard against surprise, telegraphic signal stations were established in the cantonments of the different divisions, to give notice of any movement of the enemy.

The French army occupied a defensive position, with its right, under Reille, in the intrenched camp; its centre, under Drouet, extending along the right of the Adour to Port de Lanne, guarding the islands De Broc and De Berens; and its left, under Clausel, along the

right of the Bidouse, from its confluence with the Adour to St. Palais; the flank being covered by the cavalry. General Harispe, a Basque by birth, who had been recalled from Catalonia in order to organize a system of Guerilla warfare among the mountaineers, was at St. Jean Pied de Port, with a corps of irregulars, and a weak division of troops of the line.*

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January.

For the support of this line on the right of the Pau, Hastings had been strongly retrenched, and the bridges on the Bidouse at Guiche, Bidache, and Come, were protected by *tetes-de-pont*. A bridge, covered by strong works, had been thrown across the Adour at Port de Lanne, and a series of redoubts had been erected along the line of the river. The works of St. Jean Pied de Port were strengthened and

* The efforts of General Harispe failed of success. By dint of great exertion, he succeeded in assembling a few bands of his countrymen, for the purpose of desultory war on the flank and rear of the allied army; but these were easily kept in check by the Spanish Guerillas, under Mina. The inhabitants, in general, were peaceable spectators of the contest waging in their country, and few instances occurred of their attempting acts of hostility. No motives of patriotism prevented their supplying the allied army with provisions of all sorts, which were paid for regularly; while Soult, who had neither the means nor the inclination to follow such a course, could only obtain by enforced requisitions the means of subsisting his army.

CHAP. XVI. repaired ; and the town of Dax was retrenched,
1814. to serve as an *entrepot* for supplies and reinforce-
January. ments drawn from the interior.

The impossibility of advancing through a country full of strong posts, and intersected by rapid streams, at a season when, by the heavy rains, the rivers had overflowed their banks, and the cross roads were impassable, prevented the movement of the allied army for a considerable period. Early in January, the Duc d'Angouleme arrived at St. Jean de Luz from England, accompanied by a small suite. Lord Wellington, while he received the Prince with all the respect due to his birth and his misfortunes, was unwilling to commit his country by a rash and premature adoption of the Bourbon cause ; and requested him to appear only in the character of a simple volunteer, since, by the instructions of his government, he was not authorized to receive him in any higher character. Nevertheless, an address to the French nation, calling on them to renounce their allegiance to the existing dynasty, and restore their ancient line of Princes, was circulated, by many private channels, through the country, and produced in several of the provinces a powerful effect.

Till the middle of February no collision CHAP. XVI.
 took place between the armies, except a few ca-
 valry skirmishes on the Joyeuse, and an affair 1814.
 between Mina and General Harispe, in which February.
 the former was compelled to retreat into the
 valley of Bustan. The weather having then
 become more favourable, Lord Wellington pre-
 pared to take the field. His first object was to
 drive the enemy from his line on the Bidouse,
 and force him to abandon the whole country on
 the left of the Adour. With this view, the corps
 of Sir Rowland Hill broke up from its canton-
 ments on the fourteenth, and moved on Hellete Feb. 14.
 to turn the enemy's left, and cut off his commu-
 nication with St. Jean Pied de Port. By this
 movement General Harispe was forced to retire
 on St. Palais, leaving a garrison of fifteen hun-
 dred men in St. Jean Pied de Port; and, on the
 day following, he continued his retreat to Gar-
 ris. Feb. 15
 The Spanish corps of Mina then returned,
 and blockaded St. Jean Pied de Port.

General Harispe, being joined by another body
 of troops near Garris, took post on the heights
 of La Montagne. The position was strong;
 but Lord Wellington conceiving it possible to
 cut him off from the bridge of St. Palais, deter-

CHAP. XVI. mined instantly to attack him, though the only
1814. troops at his immediate disposal were the second
February. division, under Sir William Stewart, and the
Spanish corps of Morillo. The Spaniards, therefore, were directed to march on St. Palais as rapidly as possible, while the British advanced to attack the position in front.

The second division, with great gallantry, ascended the heights, and drove down the enemy with the bayonet. The French made repeated efforts to recover their ground, but without success; and the march of Morillo on his rear, at length compelled General Harispe to put his force in retreat, after suffering considerable loss. The Spaniards having been unable to reach St. Palais in time to intercept his retreat, General Harispe was enabled to cross the Bidouse without molestation. This contest was not more remarkable for the gallantry displayed by the troops on both sides, than for the circumstance of its being chiefly waged in the dark, night having come on during the struggle.

On the day following, Sir Rowland Hill crossed the Bidouse, and continued the pursuit. On
Feb. 17. the seventeenth, the enemy were found posted behind the Gave de Mauleon, having destroyed

the bridge at Arivarette. Under protection
of the artillery, however, the ninety-second re-
giment crossed the stream by a ford, and attack-
ed the French troops in Arivarette. The ene-
my retired; and in the night passed the Gave*
d'Oleron, and took up a position at Sauveterre.

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By these successes, the enemy had been driven from a country of peculiar difficulty, which, from its frequent intersection by rivers, afforded great advantages for defence. The position occupied by the enemy at Sauveterre was very strong, and covered in front by a broad and rapid river. The greater part of Soult's force being concentrated in that neighbourhood, Lord Wellington determined to distract the enemy's attention by a general movement of the whole army to its front, thus simultaneously threatening him at different points, while Sir Rowland Hill should turn his left by crossing the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave. This manœuvre was attended by the most complete success. Marshal

* The torrents or rapids of the different rivers are known by the vernacular name of *gaves*, by the inhabitants of the country. These *gaves* are distinguished among each other by the addition of the name of the principal town near which they flow; for example, the Gave de Mauleon, the Gave d'Oleron, &c.

CHAP. XVI. Beresford drove the French posts within the
 1814. *tete-de-pont* of Peyrehorade. Sir Rowland Hill
 February. effected the passage of the Gave on the twenty-fourth; and Soult hastened to concentrate his forces behind the Pau, leaving in Bayonne a garrison barely sufficient for the defence of the works.

We must now turn to the operations of the left wing in the immediate front of Bayonne.

Lord Wellington determined to pass the left wing across the Adour below the city, by a bridge of boats. Preparations had been in progress for this purpose for some time, but, from the breadth of the river, and the strength of the tides, it was necessary to employ vessels of from twenty to thirty tons burthen. These, however,
 Feb. 22. had been provided, and, on the twenty-second, waited only for a fair wind to sail from St. Jean de Luz to the mouth of the Adour.

Feb. 23. On the morning of the twenty-third, Sir John Hope moved forward with the left wing; and driving in the enemy's outposts, formed a cordon round the town, terminating both above and below on the Adour. The heavy guns were with great labour and difficulty conveyed across the soft sandy ground to the banks of the Adour,

immediately below the intrenched camp where they were placed in battery. At the same time the fifth division obliged the French piquets, between the Nive and the Adour, to retire within the intrenched camp on that side.

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The squadron, with the bridge-vessels, under Rear Admiral Penrose, having been detained by contrary winds, Sir John Hope determined to make an immediate effort to cross the river by means of pontoon rafts, guided by ropes ; and having succeeded in stretching a hawser across the river, the project was put in immediate execution.

The enemy, trusting to the width and depth of the river, and the rapidity of the current, offered no opposition, their attention being apparently engrossed by the warm fire kept up by the British artillery on an armed corvette at anchor near the town. Owing to the strength of the tides, the rafts worked slowly, and in the evening only about six hundred of the Guards, and two companies of the sixtieth rifle corps, had been conveyed to the right bank. •

The French at length discovered their error in neglecting to defend the passage of the river below the city, and a little before dark two bat-

CHAP. XVI. talions were moved forward to attack the detachments which had already crossed. General
1814. Stopford made immediate preparations to receive
February. the enemy. He posted his troops behind some low sandy ridges, with their right resting on the Adour, and their left on a morass, the ground in their front being flanked by the artillery on the opposite bank. A few rocketmen were hastily sent across the river and advantageously posted on the sand-hills.

In this position did the Guards await the approach of the French columns, but the fire of the guns and rockets was alone sufficient to check their progress ; and, without venturing on closer encounter, the enemy retreated into the town.

During the night the allied troops continued to cross the river, and on the following evening the whole of the first division was established on the right bank.

Feb. 25 On the twenty-fifth, Admiral Penrose and the squadron appeared off the mouth of the river, and though the difficulties of effecting an entrance were very great from the swell on the bank, and the uncertainty of the channel, they were surmounted by the skill and energy of British seamen, who led the way in the ships'

launches, followed by the bridge-vessels. Of the latter several were wrecked, but the remainder, protected by gun-boats, passed up the river, and by dint of incessant labour, a bridge had been laid down in the course of the twenty-sixth.

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Feb. 26.

The bridge thus constructed was sufficiently strong for the passage of artillery ; and, till the conclusion of the war, served as the regular communication with the army from St. Jean de Luz and Spain, thus avoiding the inconveniences attending the route through the difficult country of the Gaves, in which all the bridges had been destroyed by the enemy.

The establishment of this communication across the Adour, opened to Lord Wellington the direct road to Bourdeaux, where he had long known that a strong party had been formed in favour of the Bourbons. But the district of country to be traversed by this route, besides being barren and uncultivated, was of a character unfavourable for military operations. Lord Wellington, therefore, when freed in his movements by the enemy's abandonment of the strong country in his front, directed his march on Orthez, where Soult had placed his army in a formidable position.

CHAP. XVI. Leaving the left wing under Sir John Hope to
1814. form the blockade of Bayonne, he moved the re-
February. mainder of the army in three columns. The left,
under Marshal Beresford, having driven the ene-
my from their intrenchments at Hastings and
Oyergave, passed the gaves of Oleron and Pau,
at their confluence above Peyrehorade, and ad-
vanced by the high road to Orthez. The cavalry
and third division crossed the Pau by fords
higher up the river near Berenx, and the corps
of Sir Rowland Hill advanced directly on the
bridge of Orthez, but finding it too strongly
fortified to be carried by a *coup de main*, and
being without artillery, no attempt was made to
force a passage at that point. On the twenty-
Feb. 27. seventh, the sixth and light divisions crossed the
river by a pontoon bridge; and Sir Rowland Hill,
with the second division, remained on the left
bank opposite to Orthez, on the road from Sau-
veterre.

Soult had placed his army in a strong position
in the neighbourhood of Orthez, where he ap-
peared determined to await the issue of a battle.
It consisted of a range of tabular heights about a
mile in length, stretching in the direction of Dax,
the right of which terminating in a hill of pecu-

liar boldness, was covered in front by the village of St. Boes. The left rested on the town of Orthez, and commanded the passage of the river at that point, while the centre, sweeping back in the form of an arc, was protected by the protrusion of the wings. The divisions of Villatte and Harispe, and the brigade of General Paris, were formed in reserve.

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Lord Wellington having reconnoitred the position, determined on immediate attack. He directed Marshal Beresford with the left wing, consisting of the fourth and seventh divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, to attack the enemy's right at St. Boes. The centre, consisting of the third and sixth divisions, and Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry, under Sir Thomas Picton, was directed to move by the road leading from Peyrehorade against the centre and left, while the light division moved up a ravine between the columns, ready to support either as occasion might require. Sir Rowland Hill was directed to cross the river at a ford about two miles above Orthez, in order to take the enemy in flank or rear, and cut off his retreat in the direction of Pau.

The action commenced about nine in the morn-

CHAP. XVI. ing, when Sir Lowry Cole, with the fourth di-
1814. vision, carried the village of St. Boes, after a
February. strenuous resistance. Marshal Beresford then
directed his efforts against two lines, posted on
the heights above, the only approach to which
lay along a narrow tongue of ground, flanked on
either side by a deep ravine, and completely com-
manded by the enemy's guns. In this confined
space it was impossible to deploy his masses; and
so destructive was the action of the French ar-
tillery, that notwithstanding the repeated efforts
of the fourth division, it was found impracticable
to reach the heights. A Portuguese brigade at
length fell into complete disorder, and its re-
treat was with difficulty covered by the remain-
der of the division and a brigade of the light
division which moved to their support.

Thus far the tide of success had flowed in fa-
vour of the enemy. The crisis was urgent, and
Lord Wellington with the greatest promptitude
at once decided on changing the plan of attack.
The column under Sir Thomas Picton received
instant orders to advance; and the seventh di-
vision, under General Walker, which had hith-
erto remained in reserve, and Colonel Barnard's
brigade of the light division, were ordered to

support it, and attack the height occupied by the right of the enemy, at its point of junction with the centre.

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This powerful and desperate attack was successful. The fifty-second regiment, under Colonel Colburne, led the way in the most gallant style, supported on either flank by the troops of the third, fourth, and seventh divisions; and the artillery, having gained a promontory jutting out from the position, swept the whole line of the enemy's centre. The third division earned particular distinction in the attack. The whole eleven regiments composing it were desperately engaged, and drove the enemy from every height on which they ventured to make a stand. The conduct of General Inglis's brigade was also admirable. It executed a brilliant charge on the enemy's left, which was completely successful, and, if possible, increased the very high character which this brigade had previously acquired, by its steadiness and gallant demeanour on all occasions.

At length, having gained the crest of the main position, a severe struggle ensued, but the French were at length forced to give way, and fled rapidly over the level ground in the rear, covered

CHAP. XVI. by their cavalry, which endeavoured to check
1814. the pursuit by a very gallant charge on the sixth
February. division. The infantry having reached some rising ground, rallied, and appeared determined to make a stand. They were charged, however, by Colonel Vivian, with the seventh hussars, who brought in some prisoners. The enemy then formed into squares, and continued their retreat in good order, though warmly pursued, and suffering heavily from the British guns.

The centre being thus forced, Soult was compelled to withdraw his wings, which had suffered comparatively little, and gave the order for a general retreat. The movement was at first conducted with regularity ; but the appearance of Sir Rowland Hill, who had passed the river above the town, and was observed to be marching on a line nearly parallel, to cut off the retreat on Sault de Navailles, occasioned great precipitation, and many quitting the road, fled over the fields towards the Adour. The allies pursued with all possible rapidity ; and could the cavalry have sooner acted off the great road, the French army must have been almost annihilated. Wherever any obstacle occurred to impede their flight for a moment, they sustained great loss. Up-

wards of two thousand fugitives, exclusive of the CHAP. XVI
wounded, were captured in the pursuit; and the
number was considerably increased by a charge
of Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry,
near Sault de Navailles. Six pieces of artillery
were likewise taken.

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Such was the victory of Orthez, in which the superiority of the allied army was maintained as conspicuously as in any former battle. It was marked by an incident, for the possible consequences of which, no success, however brilliant, could have made compensation. During the engagement, Lord Wellington was struck by a grape-shot, which drove the pommel of his sword against his side, with such violence as to occasion a severe contusion. He was in consequence unable to cross the intersected country in his front in time to direct the movements of the different divisions in pursuit. But for this misfortune, the results of Orthez would probably have been even more decisive. As it was, the loss of the enemy must have been very great; and such effect did its result produce on the minds of the French soldiers, that the desertion afterwards was immense. The loss of the allies amounted, altogether, to about two thousand three hundred men.

CHAP. XVI. Having crossed the Luy de Bearne, the
1814. French army continued its retreat during the
March. night to Hagetman, where it was joined by two
battalions of conscripts, and by the garrison of
Dax. On the day following, the main body re-
treated on St. Sever, while another column di-
rected its march on Aire, to protect a consider-
able magazine which had been formed there.

A sudden rise of the Adour and its tributa-
ries, occasioned by the heavy rains, delayed the
allied army in their pursuit, till the bridges, de-
stroyed by the enemy, should be re-established.
Sir Rowland Hill, however, was directed to
march on Aire, and dislodge the enemy from
Mar. 2. that post. He found them in occupation of a
strong ridge of heights, covering the road to the
town, with their right on the Adour. Notwith-
standing the strength of the position, Sir Row-
land made instant dispositions for attack. The
second division, under Sir William Stewart, ad-
vanced by the road, while the Portuguese bri-
gade of General Da Costa moved against the
centre of the heights. The latter succeeded in
gaining possession of the ridge, but were thrown
into such confusion by the resistance they en-
countered, as to be unable to re-form, while the
enemy were advancing to attack them in this

disordered state. Fortunately, Sir William Stewart, having previously dislodged the enemy in his front, detached the brigade of General Barnes to their assistance, which, by a gallant charge, drove back the approaching force in the greatest confusion.

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The enemy made reiterated efforts to recover their lost ground, in which, though unsuccessful, they persevered till the brigade of General Byng came up, when they were driven from the whole position and from the town, with great loss. The greater part of their force made a disorderly retreat on the right of the Adour; but a part being cut off from the rest by the rapidity of the pursuit, fled in the greatest confusion towards Pau, throwing away their arms.

In this affair, above one hundred of the enemy were made prisoners. The allies lost twenty killed and one hundred and thirty-five wounded. Among the former, was the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Hood, on the general staff of the army.

Marshal Soult, finding, neither at St. Severe nor Aire a tenable position, was compelled to continue his retreat. Three roads were open to him.

CHAP. XVI. The first leading through Mont de Marsan
to Bourdeaux.

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The second leading to Agen by Condom.

The third leading up the course of the Adour
to Tarbes.

By the first, it would be necessary to traverse the district of the Landes, a flat and barren country, without resources of any kind, and affording no military positions, while the rich departments of the Ger and the Garronne would be open to the allies.

By adopting the second, he would march indeed through a fruitful country, but Bourdeaux would be left open, and the war would be carried into the very heart of France.

By following the third, he was not without hopes of being able again to transfer the seat of war to the Pyrenees, where he might effect a junction with Suchet, and by withdrawing the allied army from the interior, neutralize the consequences of his defeat at Orthez. Bourdeaux indeed would, in this case also, be left exposed; but Soult imagined that Lord Wellington would not venture to advance on that city, leaving behind him the French army, and a place so formidable as Bayonne.

The last, therefore, was the route which Soult CHAP. XVI determined to adopt ; and there is no doubt that his decision was founded on true principles. 1814.
March. But Lord Wellington deceived his calculations. Aware that a powerful party in favour of the Bourbons existed in Bourdeaux, he took immediate advantage of Soult's movement to the north, to detach Marshal Beresford, with three divisions, to expel the military, and give the inhabitants an opportunity of declaring their sentiments. In order to supply the place of these divisions, the Spanish reserve, under General Freyre, which had hitherto remained in the neighbourhood of Irun, was ordered to join the army, as well as every other disposable body.

On the eighth, Marshal Beresford put his corps in motion ; and, accompanied by the Duke d'Angouleme, marched by Mont de Marsan on Bourdeaux. The Marquis de la Roche Jaquelin had previously been despatched to that city to make arrangements with the authorities for the reception of the Prince, and for making a public declaration in favour of the Bourbons. General L'Huillier, commandant of the garrison, satisfied that no support was to be expected from the people, quitted the city on the approach of the allied force. Mar. 8.

CHAP. XVI. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the
1814. Bordelais. The whole population of the city
March. came forth to welcome the descendant of their
ancient monarchs. The white flag was displayed from the summits of the spires, the Bourbon emblem was adopted by all, and the air was rent by the long-forgotten cry of *Vive le Roi !* The Duke d'Angouleme entered the city amid the acclamations of the people, who crowded round him, in tumultuous disorder, eager to gaze on him, to touch him, to kiss the hem of his garments, or even the horse on which he rode. Blessings on their prince were faltered from the lips of age, lisped by those of childhood, and uttered in the full volume of sonorous intonation by thousands, who declared themselves prepared to peril life and fortune in the cause of their unfortunate and exiled Monarch.

The scene was one impossible to be contemplated without emotion. It seemed as if feelings which had long slumbered in the hearts of the people, and hopes long subdued but never utterly eradicated, had, by one sudden and spontaneous impulse, been awakened into life and vigour. Like the stream of a river long pent up, they had gathered strength from the very obstacles which opposed their demonstration, and,

at length, bursting the restraints of prudence, CHAP. XVI.
flowed on with a force and an exuberance im-
possible to be controlled. The highly-wrought 1814.
sentiments of devotion with which the Bordelais welcomed their restored Prince, partook in nothing of the slavish and time-serving adulation of men veering cautiously with the current of events. The tribute of attachment which they offered was fraught with circumstances of the greatest danger. The treaty at Chatillon was yet in progress, and no important movement in favour of the Bourbons had been made in any of the provinces. The generous enthusiasm, indeed, which animated the Bordelais, placed them far above the dread of personal consequences. But deep apprehensions were entertained by the friends of freedom in other quarters, for those who, acting on the impulse of a precocious loyalty, had thus thrown off their allegiance to the existing government, which might yet be enabled to re-assert and establish its authority.

On the first of January the allied Sovereigns had crossed the Rhine, declaring their sole object to be the establishment of a general peace, which should leave France the whole territory she had possessed anterior to the Revolution, and

CHAP. XVI. disclaiming all intention of disintegrating any portion of her ancient possessions. This manifesto was attended by the most beneficial consequences. It proved that Napoleon, in continuing the war, was actuated only by projects of personal ambition, and contributed to generate an extensive alienation from his cause.

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In the meanwhile, the conduct of that great leader was regulated by no intelligible principle of prudence or expediency. He uniformly declined to make any appeal to the loyalty of the people. When solicited to declare publicly that the country was in danger, his reply was, “ *Non, jamais ; je ne ferai ma cour à la nation.*” Even the legislative assembly, having ventured to state the unpalatable truth, that the security of personal rights, and the establishment of a representative government, could alone secure the national support at a crisis so important, were dismissed with an indignant and insulting reprimand. This impolitic display of rooted despotism lost Napoleon the support of all those who might hitherto have indulged a hope of something like constitutional liberty under his sovereignty, while his harsh, overbearing, and insolent demeanour, was offen-

sive to those who had immediate access to his person and councils.

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From Paris, Napoleon returned to assume the personal command of the remnant of those mighty armies which his ambition had sacrificed; and, by a series of able manœuvres, succeeded, in the months of January and February, in gaining several advantages over his antagonists, who, by movements ill combined, were hastily endeavouring to reach Paris. Thus, by extraordinary skill and rapidity of movement, and continuing, with a mere handful of men, to shew formidable front to the enemy, he obtained from the confederated Sovereigns the continued option of peace on fair and honourable terms.

But the ambition of Napoleon was too innate and insatiable to be eradicated even by misfortune. It was the ruling impulse of his nature, and would not be controlled. Though, in obedience to the public sentiment of the French nation, he had sent an ambassador to Chatillon, he instructed him to insist on the retention of various fortresses beyond the ancient limits of the kingdom, which could only be useful as the means of facilitating future schemes of aggression. Every artifice of diplomatic chicanery was employed to de-

CHAP. XVI. lay and embarrass the proceedings of the Congress ; and so complicated, varying, and evasive were the proposals and pretensions of the French Ruler, that it was impossible to calculate, with any approach to probability, in what result the negotiations would at length terminate.

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Though the French people, exhausted by the conscriptions, the contributions, and the varied sufferings and privations to which they had been subjected, were little disposed to rally *en masse*, in support of Napoleon, or put forth the national energies in his behalf, it was still doubtful, however, how far they might be disposed to restore the Bourbon dynasty. The allies had hitherto taken no part in maintaining their pretensions ; and the appearance of the Duke d'Angouleme at Bourdeaux, accompanied by a British force, was to be considered rather as an experiment to ascertain the feelings of the nation, than as any indication of an intention in the British government to interfere in the internal policy of France. The great source of the remaining strength of Napoleon was the army. The veterans, whom in his happier days he had led to battle and to victory, still remained faithful to his cause, and maintained it, with obstinate and unshrinking bravery, till

the moment of its final and irresistible subver-
sion. The number of these, indeed, was com-
paratively small; but the people were passive,
while the opinions of men who reason, bayonet
in hand, are generally treated with respect.

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At this period a proclamation, couched in that peculiar style of vituperative bombast to which the French Marshals were somewhat overweeningly partial, was put forth by Soult. In this document he not only loaded the British nation with abuse, but descended to the adoption of the coarsest invectives against his great and successful competitor. This was unworthy of Marshal Soult; and in affording such evidence of a wounded spirit, he only gave additional splendour to that reputation, which he felt with bitterness to have overshadowed his own.

Soult was no sooner aware of the movement of Marshal Beresford on Bayonne, than he boldly determined to assume the offensive. With that view he put his army in motion on the thirteenth of March, and advanced by Lambege to Conchez and Viella, on the right flank of the allies, and driving in the piquets of Sir Rowland Hill, made demonstration of attack. Sir Rowland then took up a position behind the Gros Lees, extending

CHAP. XVI. from Aire to Garlin on the road to Pau. Lord

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Wellington, on learning this movement of the enemy, immediately moved two divisions to the support of the right wing thus threatened. These arrived before Soult had completed his offensive dispositions, when judging the allied force to be too strong in numbers and position to admit of attack, he retired on the night of the fourteenth to Lambege. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington considering that a single division was sufficient for the preservation of Bourdeaux, recalled Marshal Beresford with two divisions, leaving Lord Dalhousie with the seventh to guard the city.

Mar. 16, 17. During the sixteenth and seventeenth the allied army halted to give time for the junction of the Spanish reserve from Irun, and of the heavy cavalry.

Mar. 18. On the eighteenth they moved forward in two columns, one on each side of the Adour, the French retiring on their approach. On the nineteenth, the march of both columns was directed on Vic Bigorre, the one proceeding by Maubourget, the other by Lambege. At Vic, the French rear corps were found posted in the vineyards which encircled the town, and extended for a distance of several miles. It was impossible to

advance by the high road, until the vineyards, by which it was flanked on both sides, should be cleared. The third division, therefore, was ordered to dislodge them, which it effected with little difficulty, the chief loss being sustained by the light companies and the Portuguese brigade. The enemy then retreated on Tarbes, in the neighbourhood of which Soult had concentrated his whole army on the right of the Adour.

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On the twentieth they were found in position on the heights of Barbazon and d'Olent, their left resting on Tarbes, their right extending toward Rabastens. Sir Rowland Hill was in consequence directed to advance and drive the enemy from Tarbes, whilst Sir Henry Clinton, with the sixth division, supported by two brigades of cavalry, should cross the Adour between Vic Bigorre and Rabastens, in order to turn his position on the right. These movements were successful. The light troops of Sir Rowland Hill's corps entered Tarbes, and charging through the streets, drove the French from the town to the heights beyond it. The movements of Sir Henry Clinton, however, at once determined Soult to retreat, and he accordingly withdrew to a ridge of heights, nearly parallel, a

Mar. 20.

CHAP. XVI. short distance in rear, extending across the road
 of Tournay.

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Night closed before the arrangements had been completed for dislodging him, and in the morning, Marshal Soult was found to have retired by St. Gaudens on Toulouse, which he reached on the

Mar. 24. twenty-fourth, having destroyed all the bridges.

The allied army, owing to the state of the roads, and the encumbrance of a heavy pontoon train, moved more slowly, and did not reach the

Mar. 27. Garonne till the twenty-seventh, when they halted on the left of the river, in front of Toulouse.

The city of Toulouse stands on the right bank of the Garonne, above the point of junction with the canal of Languedoc, by which it is covered on the eastern and northern faces. The whole western side is protected by the river, and the city is thus only accessible on the south by the space extending between the canal and the Garonne. The Faubourg St. Cyprien stands on the left bank, which is surrounded by a good wall of brick, and communicates with the city by a stone bridge. To the south is the suburb St. Michael, through which runs the great road from Narbonne. The walls of Toulouse, though old, were of great thickness, and flanked

by towers, but these defences were inadequate to withstand the powerful resources of modern warfare. Marshal Soult, therefore, had assumed a formidable position on a range of heights extending along the space between the river Ers and the canal, on the eastern side of the town. The left and centre of the heights, which Soult considered the points chiefly assailable, were strongly fortified by intrenchments and redoubts; but towards the right where the line approached within half gunshot of the Ers, such precaution had not been deemed necessary, the river itself affording a sufficient defence. All the bridges crossing the canal were strongly guarded by *têtes de pont*, and those across the Ers, out of cannon range of the works, were destroyed. The Faubourg St. Cyprien, on the opposite side of the river, had likewise been covered by strong intrenchments, and the southern front was the only part of the *enceinte* to which no new defences had been added. For security in this quarter, Marshal Soult trusted to the width and rapidity of the Garonne, and the wretched condition of the cross roads, by which it was impossible to bring up artillery.

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
March.

On the twenty-eighth, Lord Wellington at- May. 23.

CHAP. XVI. tempted to throw a bridge across the Garonne at

1814. the village of Portet, a short distance above the
March. town ; but the current, owing to the recent rains,
was found to be too rapid, and the attempt given
up. A favourable spot was then selected, some-
what higher up, when Sir Rowland Hill's corps
succeeded in crossing ; but a difficulty of a differ-
ent nature occurred. The recent rains had ren-
dered the only roads, by which from this point
Toulouse could be approached, impassable.

Though the passage of the Garonne, above the
city, would have carried with it the advantage of
intercepting Soult's communication with Marshal
Suchet, after these failures the attempt was re-
Mar. 31. signed. On the thirty-first an endeavour was made
at a point considerably below the city, where the
river skirts the road from Grenade to Toulouse.
Flanking batteries being established, Marshal
Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions,
effected the passage ; but a sudden swell of the
river broke the bridge, and the corps on the
right bank was thus utterly left without sup-
port. Why Soult permitted so favourable an
opportunity of attacking this isolated portion of
the army to escape him, is not easily to be ex-
plained. But no attack was fortunately made,



and the river having subsided on the eighth, the pontoons were again launched, and the Spanish corps of General Freyre, passed to the support of Marshal Beresford. The situation of the bridge, however, being inconvenient, it was removed higher up the Garonne, on the night of the eighth, for the sake of approaching Sir Rowland Hill's corps, which remained in front of the Faubourg St. Cyprien. Delays, however, occurred in the arrangements, which were not completed till the morning of the tenth, when the third and light divisions having crossed, the whole army was in readiness to commence offensive operations against the enemy.

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Apr. 10.

Lord Wellington then made his dispositions for attack. Marshal Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions, was directed to cross the Ers at the bridge of Croix d'Orade, (which had been gallantly carried on the fifth by the eighteenth hussars,) and drive the enemy from the village of Montblanc. He was then to proceed along the left bank of the Ers, till he gained the enemy's right, when he was to form and move to the attack of that flank.

The Spaniards, under General Freyre, were to make a simultaneous attack on the left

CHAP. XVI. of the position, and then, by marching along the
1814. heights, to effect a junction with the left column
April. under Marshal Beresford.

The third and light divisions were to observe the enemy in the suburbs near the canal ; to threaten the canal bridge, and the town near the river.

The right, under Sir Rowland Hill, was to confine the enemy within his intrenchments on the left of the Garonne ; and the cavalry was stationed at different points along the line, to check any movement of the French cavalry.

The enemy were first engaged by the column under Marshal Beresford, who carried the village of Montblanc, and then proceeded along the Eers in three open columns, flanked by skirmishers, till having gained the point of attack, the columns wheeled up and advanced in line against the right of the enemy's position. At the same time the Spaniards, under General Freyre, moved forward against the left, with great spirit, driving before them a brigade of the enemy. On approaching the intrenchments, however, they were received with so heavy a fire of grape as to throw them into considerable confusion ; and the enemy taking advantage of this circumstance, made a general attack, and drove the

Spaniards down the hill with great slaughter. CHAP. XVI.
 One regiment, however,—*le Tirad de Cantabria*—maintained its ground with the greatest gallantry, till recalled by Lord Wellington. To cover the retreat of the Spaniards the light division was ordered to move to its left ; and thus protected, General Freyre succeeded in rallying his troops, and the enemy, who for a moment had gained a position on the right flank of the allies, were driven back.

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In the meanwhile, Marshal Beresford was more successful at the other extremity of the line. The fourth division advanced against the extreme right of the French line, while Sir Henry Clinton with the sixth moved up in front to attack the redoubts on Mount Calvinet. On the right of the centre, the face of the height was very steep and irregular, and General Clinton's division had to sustain, during every step of its progress, a severe fire from the enemy's artillery ; yet, in spite of these obstacles, it steadily continued its advance, and repulsing a charge of cavalry on their flank, carried the principal redoubt on the right with the bayonet, and established themselves on the crest of the position. Sir Lowry Cole, with the fourth division,

CHAP. XVI likewise overcame all resistance, and driving the
1814.
April. enemy from the heights on the extreme right of the line beyond the intrenchments, took up ground at some distance, on the left of General Clinton.

A pause in the operations then ensued. From the badness of the roads, Marshal Beresford had been obliged to leave his artillery in the village of Montblanc, and it was now judged necessary to wait till it should be brought up, and till the Spaniards should be in condition to support the attack by a renewed movement on the left of the position.

In other quarters the prospects of the allies had been overclouded. The light division had made a false attack on the *tête de pont* in their front, with a trifling loss. More to the right, Sir Thomas Picton, exceeding the limits of his instructions, had converted the false attack on the bridge nearest the Garonne into a real one ; and the troops having gained the counterscarp found it impossible to proceed further, owing to the formidable nature of the ditch. Under these circumstances, being without cover and exposed to a most destructive fire from the work, an immediate retreat became necessary, which was not effected

till a heavy loss had been sustained by the third division. Across the Garonne, Sir Rowland Hill drove the enemy within their works in front of St. Cyprien, and alarmed them by threatening a powerful attack in that quarter.

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Such were the circumstances of the contest, when Marshal Beresford, having been joined by the artillery, continued his movement along the ridge. Marshal Soult, observing that a considerable distance intervened between the sixth and fourth divisions, conceived it possible, by a powerful attack both in front and flank, to overpower the former, before the fourth division could come up to its assistance. With this view, he directed the division of General Taupin to move against the front of the sixth division, while the cavalry and the brigade of General Leseur was directed to charge it in flank. The situation being such that the assailants could receive no support from the fire of their redoubts, the contest on both sides was waged on equal terms. Instead of waiting to receive the meditated attack, General Clinton, moved on to meet it, and by a most brilliant charge of bayonets, in which General Taupin was killed, at once put them to the route. This success was vi-

CHAP. XVI. gorously followed up. The brigade of General

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Pack succeeded in carrying the two principal redoubts and the fortified houses in the centre. A powerful body of the enemy, however, pushed forward from the canal, and made a strong effort to regain the works thus carried, in which they were repulsed with great loss.

In this extremity, Soult changed his front, and rallying the routed divisions, took up a new line extending from the *Pont de Demoiselles* on the canal, to the heights of La Pujade. It was found impossible, however, to arrest the brave sixth division in its career of success. Supported by a corresponding movement of the Spanish troops, the enemy were driven successively from their redoubts, and forced to retire across the canal, under cover of their fortified bridges. Sir Rowland Hill had been equally successful on the left of the Garonne, and compelled the enemy to abandon the whole advanced line of retrenchments, and retire within the walls of the suburb.

The victory of Toulouse was not gained without heavy loss on the part of the allies. Above four thousand five hundred British and Portuguese were killed and wounded, and the loss of the Spanish army was also very great. The

French army, from their advantages of position, suffered less, but two Generals (Taupin and Lamorandiere) were killed; and three (Harispe, Baurot, and St. Hilaire) were made prisoners, with one thousand six hundred men. Only one gun was taken on the field of battle, the enemy having succeeded in removing the remainder into the town.

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In the meanwhile, Napoleon, in the ebb of his fortunes and of his power, had been unable to resist the progress of the vast armies by which he was opposed. Nevertheless, with a force scarcely exceeding seventy thousand men, he adopted the boldest manœuvres, and by a rapid march on Vitry and St. Dizier, he even threw himself into the rear of the confederated armies, trusting by this movement to force them to retreat, in order to preserve their communications with the Rhine. In this expectation he was deceived. The allies pushed forward on Paris, which capitulated on the thirtieth; and on the eleventh of April, Napoleon concluded a treaty with the Allied Sovereigns, by which he solemnly renounced all claim for himself and his descendants to the throne of France.

Mar. 30.

On the thirteenth, the Count D'Artois Apr. 13.

CHAP. XVI entered Paris, and was received by the Marshals,
1814. the civic authorities, and the great officers of
April. state, with all the honours due to his distinguished rank. On the twentieth, Napoleon left Fontainebleau for the Island of Elba, the sovereignty of which had been secured to him by the treaty.

After the battle before Toulouse, Soult withdrew his troops within the walls of the city, and made preparations for defence. The inhabitants were in despair at the impending prospect of their city being subjected to a siege, while the presence of a large military force, prevented any public demonstration of their aversion to that cause in behalf of which they were doomed apparently to suffer. On being summoned to surrender, Soult replied that he would rather bury himself in the ruins of the city. Lord Wellington, on his part, made strenuous preparations for the complete investment of Toulouse, all egress from which was already closed on three sides. But Soult was too deeply aware of the danger of his position, to await calmly the result of these operations. Conscious that the city was not tenable, and unwilling perhaps to encounter the odium, which the destruction of so wealthy and important a

city must have raised against him, he retreated with his whole force during the night of the twelfth to Ville Franque, and, on the following day, continued his march on Castilnaudry.

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The joy of the inhabitants of Toulouse at this event was excessive. They beheld themselves at once relieved from all the fearful apprehensions which had oppressed them, and welcomed the entrance of the victorious army with joyful acclamations. The white flag was hoisted ; cries of *Vive le Roi* rent the air ; and the public enthusiasm was still farther excited by the arrival of Colonel Cooke, and Colonel St. Simon, with intelligence of the abdication of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Bourbons.

At Bourdeaux, Lord Dalhousie crossed the Dordogne on the fourth of April, and attacked a body of the enemy, about fifteen hundred strong, under General L'Huillier, near Etauliers. It was posted in a large open common in front of the village, and the woods on either flank were occupied by light infantry. The French soon gave way, and retired through Etauliers, leaving their scattered parties without protection. In this affair, thirty officers and about three hundred men were made prisoners.

Apr. 4.

CHAP. XVI Toulouse unfortunately was not the only scene of unnecessary bloodshed. Early on the morning of the fourteenth, a sortie in force was made from the intrenched camp in front of the citadel of Bayonne, on the position of the allies at St. Etienne. Major-General Hay, the commanding officer of the outposts for the day, fell early in the engagement, and the assailants succeeded in dislodging the allies from the village. They also drove in the piquets of the centre, where Major-General Stafford was wounded. Reinforcements, however, were brought up, the whole of the lost ground was recovered, and the piquets were established in their former posts. The loss of the allies in this affair was very serious. It amounted to eight hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners. Among the last was Sir John Hope, who, in bringing up some troops from the right to support the piquets, came suddenly in the dark on a party of the enemy, when his horse was shot under him, and before he could be extricated he received two wounds and was made prisoner. The loss of the enemy in this affair exceeded nine hundred men.

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Apr. 14.

With this tragic episode, terminated the great drama of the war, and it only remains to advert

to the events more immediately connected with CHAP. XVI.
 the restoration of the Spanish monarch, before
 these Annals shall have reached their conclusion. 1814.

From the commencement of the present year, the military occurrences in Spain were of trifling importance. The enemy retained a force only in one corner of the kingdom, and were compelled to assume a part merely defensive, while the necessities of the war in other quarters occasioned a continual diminution of its numbers. In January the Regency and the Cortes removed to Madrid, where they were received with all the solemnity due to the national representation and government. The attempt to detach Spain from her alliance with England, by a treaty concluded with Ferdinand while a prisoner in France, having signally failed, Napoleon at length determined on the unconditional restoration of the Spanish monarch. On the thirteenth March. of March, Ferdinand set out from Valençay, and proceeding by way of Perpignan, on the twenty-fourth he reached Gerona, from whence Mar. 24. he addressed a letter to the Regency written with his own hand. It contained a general assurance of his wishes to conduce in every manner in his power to the welfare and prosperity

CHAP. XVI. of his subjects, and an expression of his happiness on finding himself again on Spanish ground, amid a people and an army which had given such generous and honourable testimony of fidelity to their sovereign.

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From Gerona, Ferdinand proceeded to Zaragoza, where he was received with the most enthusiastic demonstrations of devoted loyalty. At Valencia his reception was equally flattering and enthusiastic, and, emboldened by these testimonies of public attachment, he received the President of the Regency with coldness, and declined acknowledging the restrictions which the Cortes had placed on the despotic exercise of regal authority.

The enthusiasm of the nation, however, would not be restrained. The principal nobility and clergy, and many members of the Cortes, flocked round their restored sovereign, and were unwilling, in their generous loyalty, to shackle that authority which they trusted would be directed in its exercise to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Spanish nation. Their homage was too warm to be the offspring of calculation. The monarch for whom they had poured forth their blood as water, had at length been given

to their prayers ; and such was not the moment when it was probable that the cold dictates of prudence would be heard or obeyed. Ferdinand was received by his devoted subjects as a despotic monarch, and the advocates and supporters of the constitution became obnoxious to the great body of the people.

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Thus supported, Ferdinand issued a manifesto from Valencia, charging the Cortes with having violated the constitution of the kingdom, and introduced revolutionary innovations utterly subversive of the regal authority. Some abuses, it was confessed, might have crept into the Spanish government, but these were not to be corrected by the rash and unprincipled proceedings of an illegal body. In order to repair such evils, the king promised he would in due time convoke the Cortes in a legitimate form, and act in concert with them for this purpose. The proclamation concluded by declaring the Cortes to be dissolved, and ordaining that all opposing the execution of this decree should suffer death.

May 4.

Thus did this crowned slave display his gratitude to those noble-minded men, who, by their steadfast loyalty and persevering exertions, had

CHAP. XVI. contributed largely to his restoration to the

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Spanish throne. If the Cortes were irregularly convoked, and elected on principles unknown to the ancient constitution of the realm, it was owing to the circumstances of the times, and to the base and pitiful truckling of Ferdinand himself to the French ruler. That the Cortes were guilty of many errors is undoubted; that their views were generally narrow and injudicious, no one who has perused the record of their proceedings can venture to deny. But when we consider the bold and unwavering front which these men displayed in times of the greatest difficulty and danger, their generous ardour in the cause of liberty and loyalty, under the pressure of every danger and every temptation, their errors, when weighed against devotion so pure and so heroic, become but as dust in the balance.

May 13.

In a few days after the promulgation of this decree, Ferdinand removed to Madrid. His vengeance was first directed against the members of the Regency. The venerable Cardinal de Bourbon was banished to Rome, Agar to Carthagena, Cisgar to a fortress in Catalonia. The eloquent and noble-minded Arguelles was con-

demned to serve as a common soldier ; and all who had most distinguished themselves by enlightened and generous views in the proceedings of the Cortes, were proscribed and punished.

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The whole measures of the government were in barbarous consistency with those we have detailed. The liberty of the press was abolished ; the Inquisition, by royal statute, resumed its hateful dominion over the souls and bodies of the people ; and the functions of the monarchy were brought into full action, without a single correction of any of the enormous abuses which, in the lapse of centuries, had crept into every department of the government.

• In France, the restoration of the Bourbons, not only relieved the nation from the immediate evils of invasion, but brought with it the establishment of order, of civil rights, and perhaps of as much liberty as the people were at that period prepared to enjoy. Napoleon, dwindled from the Emperor of France into the prisoner of a petty island, exhibited a memorable instance of that retributive justice which Providence is occasionally pleased to display as a lesson to mankind. The mighty spirit which had shaken

CHAP. XVI. the world like a tempest, and exercised a larger
 1814. influence on the destinies of nations than any
 other individual of modern times, was made to
 pause a while in his career of ambition; and in
 his enforced retirement, he might have exclaimed
 in the words of Seneca, singularly applicable to
 his condition,

Quid me potens Fortuna fallaci mihi
 Blandita vultu sorte contentum mea,
 Alte extulisti, gravius ut ruerem, edita
 Receptus arce, totque prospicerem metus?
 Melius latebam, procul ab invidiæ malis,
 Remotus inter Corsici rupes maris.

FINIS.

